46: The Battle of Tereul

Description

The large Republican attacks on the city of Teruel would backfire, and result not in victory, but with the Nationalists reaching the coast, cutting Republican Spain in two.

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Sources

The Battle for Spain by Antony Beevor
Spain in Arms: A Military History of the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939 by E.R. Hooton
The Spanish Civil War A Modern Tragedy by George R. Esenwein
Spanish Civil War Tanks: The Proving Ground for Blitzkrieg by Steven J. Zaloga
The Anarchist Collectives: Workers’s Self-management in the Spanish Revolution 1936-1939 Edited By Sam Dolgoff
Patterns of Development and Nationalism: Basque and Catalan Nationalism before the Spanish Civil War by Juan Diez Medrano
Blackshirts, Blueshirts, and the Spanish Civil War by John Newsinger
Edge of Darkness: British ‘Front-Line’ Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1937 by Tom Buchanan
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Covert Aid to the Loyalists in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39 by Dominic Tierney
The Cult of the Spanish Civil War in East Germany by Arnold Krammer
Fascism, Fascitization, and Developmentalism in Franco’s Dictatorship by Ismael Saz Campos
Writing the Female Revolutionary Self: Deoloris Ibarruri and the Spanish Civil War by Kristine Byron
A Spanish Genocide? Reflections on the Francoist Repression after the Spanish Civil War by Julius Ruiz
The Spanish Civil War in the 21st Century: From Guernica to Human Rights by Peter N. Carroll
The Revolutionary Spirit: Hannah Arendt and the Anarchists of the Spanish Civil War by Joel Olson
Seventy Years On: Historians and Repression During and After the Spanish Civil War by Julius Ruiz
Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War by Brian R. Sullivan
The Spanish Civil War: Lessons Learned and Not Learned by the Great Powers by James S. Corum
Truth and Myth in History: An Example from the Spanish Civil War by John Corbin
‘Our Red Soldiers’: The Nationalist Army’s Management of its Left-Wing Conscripts in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39 by James Matthews
Multinational Naval Cooperation in the Spanish Civil War, 1936 by Willard C. Frank Jr.
‘Work and Don’t Lose Hope’: Republican Forced Labour Camps During the Spanish Civil War by Julius Ruiz
The Spanish Civil War, 1936-2003: The Return of Republican Memory by Helen Graham
Soviet Armor in Spain: Aid Mission to Republicans Tested Doctrine and Equipment by Colonel Antonia J. Candil, Spanish Army
The Soviet Cinematic Offensive in the Spanish Civil War by Daniel Kowalsky
Soviet Tank Operations in the Spanish Civil War by Steven J. Zaloga
The Spanish Military and the Tank, 1909-1939 by Jose Vicente Herrero Perez
The Theory and Practice of Armored Warfare in Spain October 1936-February 1937 by Dr. John L. S. Daley

Transcript

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 46 - The Spanish Civil War Part 11 - To the Sea. This week a big thank you goes out to Denis and Philip for their donations to the podcast and to Zach, Sunnysideup, Kelly, James, Chris, Philip, Liam, Mark, James, Travis, Rosanne, and Kevin for their support on Patreon, where they get access to ad free versions of all of the podcast’s episodes plus special Patreon only episodes released once a month. If that sounds interesting to you head on over to historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members to find out more information. The failure of the Brunete offensive in July 1937 would cause the Republican military to shift its focus away from central Spain and the areas around Madrid, and while the Brunete attack did achieve its goal of diverting Nationalist troops from the north, with the end of that attack those resources would once again be heading back north which necessitated renewed Republican offensives somewhere. The decision was made to move troops to the north and into Aragon to make this next offensive effort. The attacks in this area would be the last attempt to try and save the northern enclave, and once again it would not be successful. With the fall of the enclave another Republican attack would be launched, this time in late 1937 and into 1938. The target would be the city of Teruel, an area of Nationalist control that jutted far out into Republican held territory, supported by supplies passing along the Zaragosa road. In both cases the attacks would be launched in response to Nationalist plans, in the case of Teruel Franco was preparing to launch another assault on Madrid, but the hope was that the Republican attack would delay these efforts. Once the attack resulted in failure it would be answered by a counteroffensive which would be devastating, resulting in the Nationalist forces being able to advance all the way to the Mediterranean sea, cutting Republican territory in two. These two failures, while not the last Republican attempts at offensives, would end with the Republican attempts at offensives, would end with the Republican army in an incredibly poor state, and the overall course of the war strongly in favor of an eventual Nationalist victory.

While the decision had been made to move away from Madrid and central Spain for the next Republican attack, there was still the possibility of launching an attack in southwestern Spain, much like the earlier plans for the Estremadura attack. The decision was made to instead focus the efforts in the north, with political reasons driving that decision as much as any other reason. There were still concerns about the control that the central government had among the areas of Aragon and Catalonia, and so Negrin and the rest of the government hoped that by moving in military forces for an attack they would be able to further suppress any anti-government groups while also preparing for the attack. The planning for an offensive gave the government an excuse for moving in some of their best, and often highly Communist influenced, troops into Aragon. On August 11th the Council of Aragon, which had been set up early in the war by the various groups within Aragon, was dissolved by an order from the central government. This was done after it had lodged a complaint with the government about the actions of troops that had moved into the area. Some Anarchist troops had also led some protests around the occupation of various areas by Communist troops, but many of the anarchist heavy divisions were kept at the front and heavily occupied in preparations for the offensive to prevent them from fully understanding what was happening behind the front. What was happening, was that various Communist formations were used to break up the Anarchist collectives that had formed in rural areas of Aragon. Members of the Council were also arrested, CNT offices were seized and shut down, and there were other arrests and executions. There were some protests about what was happening, among from non-anarchist political leaders, but the justification used was that the people in the collectives were simply being liberated from the collectives that had been forced upon them. With the political objectives achieved, and more areas brought under more direct government control, focus could then shift to the planned attack.

By the time that the attack did begin, on August 24th, one of the reasons for the attack was already gone, because the attack into Santander had already started. This did not prevent the attack from happening, just really removed one of its primary goals. The plan for the attack, which is sometimes referred to as the Zaragosa offensive, was nothing if not ambitious. The goal was to break through the Nationalist front in several areas between Zuera and Belchite, which were to the north and south of Zaragosa respectively. This meant that they were attack on almost a 100 kilometer front. The Republicans were able to achieve a solid level of air superiority in these areas, they had more resources both on the ground and in the air as so much of the Nationalist strength was still focused in the north. However, how these Republican units were used was less than optimal. They were not well supplied and the summer time heat caused water shortages to be a serious problem. The attacks that would occur, and which would continue to occur for another two weeks, were a complete disaster. The opening attacks failed to achieve any of their goals, they advanced a few kilometers along most of the front, and captured a few villages, but nothing of any real value. This caused Generals Modesto and Lister, who were not on the best terms in terms of their working relationship, to downsize any further objectives and to change their efforts from a broad front to just focusing on the capture of Belchite. Here the dedicated attacks would begin on September 1st, and the results would be similarly disappointing. The small number of Nationalist defenders were able to hold out for several days while the Republican turned the entire town into a smoking pile of ruins. On September 6th Belchite was finally captured, but by that point all of the Republican strength had been spent and they were unable to continue the attack on an actually useful objective. The exact number of casualties sustained on both sides is not well documented, it is possible that somewhere around 15,000 were suffered by the Republicans, with the Nationalist number almost certainly below that. The most important outcome is that yet more Republican resources were wasted in a large offensive effort that achieved essentially nothing, it did not capture territory or objective of real value, it did not pause Nationalist efforts in the north.

The success of the attacks in the north allowed the Nationalists to have an incredible freedom to choose where they wanted to make their next effort. They were provided with this freedom because of two development, the first and most obvious was that they were able to move all of the troops and resources to any other area from the front, this included the aviation assets that had put so much focus on the efforts in the north. They were also able to capture all of the Republican weapons and equipment that had been in the northern enclave, and they also expanded their conscription efforts into the captured territory. The only downside of these efforts is that it would take some time for the troops to be properly organized, equipped, and moved into position which would delay the next Nationalist attack longer than Franco wanted if they were all to be on the front before the start. To try and shorten the time it would take to launch another attack the initial plan for an attack in Aragon was discarded, and instead the focus was shifted to Madrid. An action aimed at Madrid would require less resources and men than a larger attack into Aragon, which also had the possibility of encountering far more resistance. As with earlier attack the plan was to try and encircle Madrid to cut off the defenders in the city and to force them to surrender. The Army of Maneuver would be moved into Aragon, but would then attack towards the southwest along the Saragosa-Madrid road. This angle of attack had been prosed during earlier months, but the resources had never been available to actually make it happen, due to the priority of the northern operations. The Army of Maneuver was made up of all of the best forces available to the Nationalist army at this point in the war, which had all been put together for the purpose of launching attacks. After some further discussions and movements of troops the beginning of the attack was set for December 18th, however it would never happen because it would be disrupted by the Republican attack that would be launched 4 days earlier.

The Nationalist preparations for an attack in and around Aragon were well known to the Republicans. This was confirmed by both aerial reconnaissance and informants that were positioned behind the lines. There were also efforts by the troops of General Mera’s units, most of which were anarchists, to cross through the lines to try and gather more information. What they found made it almost certain that there would be a Nationalist attack in December, which would target Madrid, which was exactly the Nationalist plan. With this information, the question became what would be done to meet the attack. General Rojo, who had been promoted to Brigadier General, initially wanted to shift Republican focus south and to resurrect the idea of an attack in Estremadura, but with mounting evidence of the Nationalist plans the operations in the south was once again shelved. Instead the plan that would be implemented was that the Nationalist attack would be pre-empted with one of their own. The goal was to force the forces that had been gathered together for the attack on Madrid to be siphoned off to meet the Republican effort. Rojo would describe it as an ‘offensive-defensive’ operation which only aimed at limited destruction of enemy forces while distracting them from their own objectives. As for a target, they knew that it had to happen quickly, and it also had to be at an area that could not just be ignored by the Nationalists. For this purpose they chose the town of Teruel, which was at the end of the long Nationalist salient that jutted out into Aragon. It was a relatively important position to take as it controlled the as it controlled the highways in the area and river access on the Turia and Alfambra. If the operation was successful and the Nationalists did not respond, it would threaten the left flank of any advance that they wanted to do towards Madrid. There were some problems though, primarily around the weather, the area was known for some pretty savage winter weather, and December 1937 would be no exception. For the operation Rojo would be able to deploy 40,000 men along with over one hundred artillery guns, tanks, and aircraft. However, one set of units that would not be joining the attack were the International Brigades. The International Brigades had been a key feature of almost every major Republican attack up to this point in the civil war. By November 1937, they were beginning to be seen as a liability. There had been growing anger and frustration among the members of the Brigades, and this had only been growing as many found that they were not allowed to go home, even though they had believed that they were strictly volunteers that could go back home should they wish to. Many of the volunteers had surrendered their passports upon arrival in Spain and they were not returned, and the news of their treatment and the course of events in Spain had caused the various Comintern organizations around Europe to drastically cut down on the number of people they were encouraging to go to Spain. This had then forced the Republican leaders to start putting Spanish replacements within the units, which kept their numbers up, but resulted in them becoming simply normal Republican units with a contingent of individuals who were far from thrilled to still be involved. All of this resulted in the International Brigades simply being removed from any attacks. They would technically be in reserve, but this was mostly for propaganda reasons, with the Spanish Communist leaders were still hoping for a success that could be claimed to be partially caused by the International Brigades. Rojo’s original date for the offensive was mid-November, but there was heavy snowfall which delayed preparations and the attack. This delay would stretch into weeks and into December, until eventually it would land on December 14th. The Nationalist forces that were ready to meet them were less than well prepared. There were some troops of the 52nd division, and then some volunteers from the local area, but they were spread thin and were heavily outnumbered, with just 10,000 total defenders. They also did not truly understand the scale of the Republican attack before December 11th, when signs of the coming attack were fully detected and confirmed.

While the offensive would begin on December 14th, the snow would continue to fall, even as the Republican infantry began to move forward. During the night they would infiltrate forward, which was a smart move, and allowed for many Nationalist positions around Teruel to be compromised before they even knew what was happening. The one benefit of attacking in such weather was that the defenders were taken mostly by surprise. The advance would continue over the next several days, and it would result in Teruel being completely surrounded, although the Nationalists would maintain control of the city itself, when news arrived at Nationalist headquarters they were shocked. A decision was made to do what the Nationalists had already done so many times whenever the Republicans would attack, instead of continuing on with other plans, Franco would opt into the challenge and start committing huge numbers of Nationalist resources to meet the attack. At first just small numbers of troops and resources were moved, some heavy artillery batteries, and some Italian artillery, but the situation continued to deteriorate around Teruel, with Republican troops moving into the suburbs of Teruel itself on December 20th. Just two days later the attackers were at the literal walls of the city and were starting to make attacks against specific buildings to push forward. Republican artillery was also brought into close range to start to dismantle strong points that had been created and were manned by Nationalist defenders and civilian volunteers. Franco was determined not to lose the city and so the troops that had been concentrated for the Madrid operation began to be dismantled with troops sent to meet the attack. By December 22nd the Madrid attack was cancelled completely and all available resources were sent toward Teruel, where the constant bad weather also greatly reduced the advantage that the Nationalists often enjoyed in the air. It was the Nationalists turn to be slowed by weather, and the movement of troops into counterattack position was slowed, and this meant that it would not be until the 29th that the counterattack would begin. In the meantime it was critical that Teruel held out, with Franco sending the Nationalist commander the message: “Hold on and have confidence in Spain as Spain has confidence in you.“The artillery bombardment would once again be the largest of the war, and the weather even cleared a bit which allowed a much greater presence of Nationalist aircraft, but the results of this initial attack were quite disappointing, measured not in kilometers but in the hundreds of meters. The initial failures did not caused the counterattacks to be cancelled though, and instead more resources were committed. On December 30th 4 divisions of Nationalist troops, under the command of General Varela began their advance, and they would be far more successful. The success of this attack triggered some serious panic among the Republican troops within the city of Teruel, and they feared that they themselves would be surrounded. This would cause the commander of the Republican 40th division, whose troops were the ones actually making the urban assault, to abandon their positions. Fortunately for the Republicans this mistake was not immediately taken advantage of, and by the time they fully realized what was happening the Republican order had been rescinded and they were back in their positions. On December 31st the Nevarrese divisions, which had been so important to the northern operations, made some progress and were able to reach a point number 5 kilometers from the city. But the weather would rapidly deteriorate on the last day of the year, and a blizzard would move over the battlefield that would last for four days and drop over a meter of snow. Such a massive snowfall halted all operations on both sides for almost two weeks, and the conditions for the troops was a miserable mix of wet and cold, with thousands put on the hospital lists due to frostbite during this period. During the first day of the new year additional Republican forces arrived around the city, making any relief efforts even more unlikely to succeed. With the halt of the Nationalist attacks due to the weather, those that were still holding out in Teruel, having been under siege for over three weeks, surrendered on January 7th. After the surrender was completed and the Nationalist troops were on their way out of the city in Republican trucks, work immediately began on defenses to meet the expected Nationalist counter attack. This attack would be launched, but not immediately, and instead the Nationalists would target early February for their main effort.

Even though they had managed to capture Teruel, the Republican gains were in no way secure, this was made very clear when the Nationalist counter attack was launched on February 5th. The plan had been determined by General Varela for an attack on the large Republican salient that was present to the north of Teruel. This would be attacked from both the north in the south with the most optimistic hopes being for a double envelopment that would then push for the river Alfambra to the east. In contrast to earlier attacks the attack on February 5th would take place in very good weather conditions, allowing for the full advantage in the air that the Nationalists were able to utilize. They were also heavily supported by artillery. The resulting attack would be a complete disaster for the Republican army, they were caught off guard and the retreat had to begin immediately. The disorganization would cause a huge amount of equipment and supplies to be left behind, while between 15 and 20 thousand men would be casualties, about half of them being wounded and a 1/3 captured. With this success Davila wanted to keep the momentum going, and so on February 10th an operation was ordered to move across the Alfambra river closer to Teruel, with the goal of eventually surrounding the Republican forces that occupied the city. This attack would then be launched on February 13th, but then had to be postponed due to the weather until the 17th, the river was swollen by all the recent snow and rain, but that did not prevent the crossing from being successful, and after it was complete the forces began to push south. At the same time as Davila’s forces were pushing south and reaching the heights over Teruel, from the south Varela’s forces launch an attack pushing north and they would meet just outside Teruel, trapping all of the Republican forces inside. The commander, Campesino, would be able to personally escape, but he left all of his men behind, and they would surrender on February 22nd. In all the counterattack had been a costly affair for both sides, it had all taken place in the cold and often snowy weather of January and February, which had caused the casualties to balloon not just due to enemy action but also due to sickness and frostbite. The Nationalists would suffer over 40,000 casualties, perhaps as high as 60,000. The Republican casualties were even higher being somewhere between 54,000 and 60,000, with other estimates being above 80,000. What had begun as an attack on a mostly meaningless area of the front had developed into one of the bloodiest battles of the war. The attrition that had occurred was something that the Republicans, who were now outnumbered by the Nationalist army, could ill afford to bear. Unfortunately for the Republicans, their problems were not over, as Franco was not done with the Nationalist counter attack.

After the recapture of Teruel, the Nationalists were in a very good position, not only had they erased any gains made by the Republicans, they had also been able to do so without fully committing their best forces in the Army of Maneuver. They had only arrived later, after the bulk of the Republican offensive had been met by other Nationalist troops. The Nationalists were also generally better at rotating their units out of the fighting, which meant that they were fresher during the second half of February. This would allow them to be used for another attack, and on February 24th a meeting would be held among the Nationalist commanders in the area, during this meeting Colonel Vigon would outline the plan for a massive attack on the northern end of the Teruel area, towards Belchite. The primary objective would be to drive east and reach the Guadalupe river. This attack would be launched just two weeks in the future, with the start date of March 8th. In that time the forces that were needed were redeployed from their previous positions, giving Davila a total of 27 divisions and over 150,000 men, along with 700 artillery pieces and 600 aircraft. This would include the first combat operations of what would become one of the most famous aircraft of the Second World War, the Junker 87, better known as the Stuka. Redeploying all of these troops and their equipment was a logistical feat, and for the month following February 21st, as preparations and then the attack were launched over 1,800 trains would be used to transport men and then supplies for the attack. The Republican government, now located in Barcelona, knew that there was a large increase in Nationalist activity behind the front, but they continued to believe that the enemy’s troops had to be as exhausted as their own. They were unable to replace troops that were on the front, and which had already played a large role in the Teruel actions from the previous months this left them deeply unprepared for what was the come.

When the attack opened, almost from its first moments when the artillery started, it would go poorly for the Republican defenders. On March 9th, the artillery would begin at 6:30 and by the afternoon one of the divisions involved had advanced 36 kilometers, had overrun the second line of Republican defenses, and had taken Belchite. Not every part of the attack would result in such a dramatic advance, and in other areas the advances would be much more reasonable, and in a few areas they would even be halted completely. But all along the front even where there was initial success in the defense, those units were forced to retreat as everything fell apart around them. As the retreat morphed into a rout in many areas the orders came down to take advantage of the situation and the instructions given to the attacking units were to continue as quickly as possible. This would continue along two axes, one that would continue to push south of the Ebro river, with the goal of reaching the coast as quickly as possible, on the other side of the Ebro the advance would push towards the Cinca river, with the goal of establishing positions for the inevitable push into Catalonia. On the Republican side there was complete chaos, some units would try to make a stand at various points only to be overwhelmed, others had completely fallen apart and were in a full scale retreat. On commentator would note that “The panic occurred almost simultaneously throughout one Army Corps and spread like a contagion through the other.” Weapons were thrown away, all attempts to restrain them were ignored, and as the retreat continued the units began to just melt apart as desertion rates skyrocketed. There was really nothing that could be done to prevent the Nationalist advance from continuing and on April 15th the Nationalist forces would capture Vinaroz on the coast, cutting Catalonia off from the Republican territory in the south. Adding onto all of the casualties that had been suffered during the Teruel attack another 50,000 troops would be either casualties or captured. The equivalent of 10 Republican divisions were either destroyed or were made combat ineffective. It was a defeat that the Republicans would never recover from. Next episode we will discuss some of the fallout from the massive Republican defeats of late 1937 and early 1938, before looking at the final Republican attacks on the Ebro.