243: Beda Fomm

Description

Following the fall of Bardia and Tobruk, General O’Connor split his forces in a bold gamble — sending the 7th Armored Division racing across the desert to cut the coastal road at Beda Fomm ahead of the retreating Italian 10th Army. The resulting battle was a desperate two-day struggle in which a thin British force fended off repeated Italian armor attacks before the entire Italian column finally surrendered.

The destruction of the Italian 10th Army at Beda Fomm marked the end of Operation Compass and prompted Hitler to dispatch Erwin Rommel and the Deutsches Afrika Korps to Libya, fundamentally changing the character of the North African campaign.

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Transcript

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 243 North Africa 1940 Pt. 7 - Beda Fomm. This week a big thank you goes out to Nancy, Andrew, and Tyler for supporting the podcast by becoming members. Members get access to ad-free versions of all of the podcast’s episode plus special member only episodes roughly once a month. Head on over to historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members to find out more. After the capture of Bardia, the British had accomplished two significant things with their attacks since the start of Operation Compass. The first was that they had pushed the Italians out of the Egyptian territory that they had captured earlier in 1940, and they had also captured the first major Italian stronghold along the Mediterranean coast of Libya. This was a tremendous success for an operation that was originally planned to be nothing more than a raid. On the Italian side, the situation looked very bleak, with the Italian 10th Army down roughly 2/3 of its strength . However, for the course of the war in the long term, the most important impact of the fall of Bardia had nothing to do with the British or the Italians, and instead would occur in Germany. With the fall of Bardia, due to concerns about the ramifications of a British Libya and British control of the Mediterranean, Hitler would make the decision to send assistance to his ally. This decision would start the ball rolling towards the creation of the Deutsches Afrika Korps, and its famous commander Erwin Rommel, entering into the war in North Africa. But their arrival would take time, and before that arrival the Italians would lose even more territory to the British advance.

Of all of the locations of the North African campaign throughout the war, if you were to rank them by how famous they are I am not sure exactly where Tobruk would fall, but it has to be on the list somewhere. During early January 1941 it was held by the Italians, and it would be the next major target for the 6th Australian division as they advanced to the west from Bardia. The main reason that Tobruk would be so important to the campaign over the following 2 years was because of its harbor, which the British commander, General O’Connor, wanted as a way that his troops could be supported by the Royal Navy as they continued to push further west. The town was about twice the size of Bardia, and the Italians had spent the time to build up defenses that were similar to what they had constructed at Bardia, which the British had already defeated. This meant anti-tank ditches, barbed wire, and minefields along with protected positions for Italian infantry and machine guns. The one major benefit that Tobruk had over Bardia was that the Italians had also brought some large naval guns ashore for the defense which added to the available firepower. On the British side the force make up would also be the same, with the 6th Australian division supported by the Matildas of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment. The Australians had surrounded Tobruk on January 10th, but there would be an 11 day delay before the final attack could be launched. This delay was required due to simply needing to bring up supplies, particularly in the form of artillery ammunition which would be essential to the British efforts once the attack started. While this delay was required, there was also some level of urgency in the preparations, because even if the Italian forces in eastern Libya seemed to be on the ropes, there were reports that additional Italian forces were being assembled in Tripoli and that the Germans were possibly going to join the Italian invasion of Greece. The infantry assault was planned to start just before 6AM on January 21st, and so the day before the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy made their presence felt by the garrison, trying to soften them up and prepare them for the attack the next day. At the appointed time the artillery started firing, and much like at Bardia engineers were sent forward to begin clearing obstacles and filling the anti-tank ditch so that the tanks could move forward. The perimeters defenses were quickly cut through by the attack, and the British would find that some Italian units quickly surrendered while others would persist in the fight for much longer. But as soon as the first attack made it through the perimeter, it was really only a matter of time before the entirety of the defenses were rolled up. It was over by midday on the 22nd of January, just over a day from when the attack began. There were more Italians than there were attackers, but once the defenses began to be rolled up the pace of surrenders increased until eventually 27,000 Italians would give themselves up. These forces would just be one of the items that would be captured, with the general haul of guns, tanks, and other equipment. More important that any of that was the fact that the water distillation plant, which could produce 182,000 liters of drinkable water every day was undamaged, and in the desert water is life. There were also large amounts of food and petrol captured due to the supplies that the Italians had shipped in via the harbor but had not yet used and failed to destroy. For all of this, a considerable amount of booty the 6th division lost just 49 killed and 306 men were wounded.

The capture of Tobruk, much like Bardia and Sidi Barrani before it, caused Wavell’s eyes to once again drift further west to the next major target. The Italian 10th Army appeared to somehow be in an even worse position and there was little standing between the British forces and Benghazi, the next great prize. But to make the jump to Benghazi would require an advance of further than the British had advanced up to this point during the operation. And O’Connor was wanting to be even more ambitious than just continuing to advance along the coast, hopping from one coastal town to the next all the way to Benghazi. Instead he wanted to split his forces, with some moving along the coast just as they had done up to that point in the campaign. But the other group would instead cut across the desert. This was a bold move, and the troops that went across the desert would have to advance several hundred kilometers before the reached the coast again at Beda Fomm. But if they could make the jump, then they would be able to cut off the retreat of all of the Italian forces between Tobruk and Benghazi. It would be a tremendous victory, and the risk seemed worth it due to the complete lack of real resistance from the Italians outside of their coastal fortresses up to that point in the operation. These decisions would set the course for the next part of the campaign, and first we will discuss the events along the coast, at the town of Derna.

Derna was around 120 kilometers to the west of Tobruk along the coastal road. It was the expected route of the British advance, and in recognition of this, Italian reinforcements had been sent from the west to bolster the defense of the 60th Infantry division at Derna. These reinforcements had not at this point been engaged in the campaign and would arrive before the British would arrive for the attack. They would also have 120 tanks with them, which provided the Italians with a numerical advantage in medium tanks for the first time since the start of the war. This meant that when the forward portions of the 6th Australian division arrived outside Derna they found the Italian positions to be well prepared and defended. To make matters worse, the terrain around Derna was very rugged which greatly benefited the defensive troops. One of the key points in the defense was the airstrip outside of the town, with it being attacked by Australian infantry throughout the day on January 25th. The key difference maker would be the British artillery, which would support the infantry as they ground forward first through the airstrip and then onto the ridges overlooking the town. Eventually the Italians would be forced to surrender, and suddenly the British would have Derna in their possession and would almost immediately begin to push further to the west. They would also have to find a way to handle the 100,000 civilians that had been in Derna at the time of its capture, which was the first time that they would have to deal with a significant number of civilians within what had previously been part of Italian Libya.

While the 6th Australian was moving towards Derna, to the south the 7th Armored Division was pushing towards its first major objective through the desert, the town of Mechili. The greatest challenges on this advance were related to the location. Maps were scarce, supplies were scarce, and the distance that had to be travelled was long with the distance between Tobruk and Mechili being over 100 kilometers. The biggest issue was tank endurance though, and throughout the days leading up to and then after Mechili the mechanical drop outs in the 7th Armoured Division began to mount. On the 24th of January the leading armored elements would approach the Italian positions at Mechili with their primary goal being to cut the track that led north from Mechili towards Derna to prevent the arrival of any Italian reinforcements. When they attempted to make this move they would be met by a strong Italian response, including a force of Italian M13/40 tanks which were a reasonable match for the light British tanks that were supposed to be cutting the track. However, as heavier British vehicles began to arrive the tide turned against the Italians. Over the following days, as more British forces arrived they attempted to surround the Italian garrison at Mechili, with the Italian forces put in the position of either abandoning their positions or being cut off. They would decide that the best course of action was to retire to the west, a retirement that would continue until they reached the coast.

The coast was also the destination of the British forces that had moved through Mechili. But as they began pushing west they ran into a problem, the commander of the 7th Armored General Creagh felt that his forward elements were advancing too slowly. The problem was the speed of the tanks, as they were never necessarily fast, and a combination of mechanical issues and refuelling needs meant that the entire column had to move at the speed of the tanks. Creagh wanted to reach the coastal road at or near Beda Fomm as quickly as possible to trap the maximum number of Italian forces to the north of Beda Fomm. He had already sent the armored car detachments racing ahead, which was exactly what they were designed for, but they would not have enough strength to cut and hold the coastal road if they arrived. The plan, and the hope, was that there would be a large number of Italian soldiers trapped to the north but they would all be desperate to breakthrough any British roadblock. A small armored car detachment would simply get overwhelmed if they did not have support. Therefore the decision was made to detach only the fastest collection of vehicles, which were the wheeled trucks and send them forward as quickly as possible. They would try to catch up to the armored car units, and they would leave behind the slower tanks. This was a bold move, because it still carried with it risk that the detached units would also be overwhelmed without the support of the British armor. But it was a risk that Creagh felt that he had to take, with the hope that they could hold out until the armor and the divisional artillery arrived to support them. It would be up to the British forces that arrived at the coastal road to the north of Beda Fomm to hold out long enough for them to arrive.

The first British forces would arrive on the coastal road on February 5th. These were the armored cars of C Squadron 11th Hussars, and they had arrived at the road about 15 kilometers north of Beda Fomm. They quickly took up positions and over the following few hours a few more British units trickled in to assist in the defense. The good news is that, at least at that moment they were well supplied as they had brought their supplies with them on trucks, but it was also well known that they were well ahead of the main column and whatever men and supplies they had would be all that was available for at the very least until late the next day. This set in motion a chain reaction of events that would result in the Battle of Beda Fomm which would last until February 7th. As soon as the British forces were in place, on the Italian side chaos reigned. The retreating Italian forces, were not prepared for any kind of action and had simply been trying to move along the road as quickly as possible. The first actions by the British forces were not defending against Italian attacks, but simply firing on unsuspecting Italian vehicles. The first trucks had no idea that the British were even there when the firing started. This meant that when they were confronted by the British roadblock they simply halted, resulting in a massive traffic jam that quickly extended over 30 kilometers to the north. The first real effort by the Italians was made later in the afternoon of the 5th. Again the Italian forces were caught by British fire before they could really begin their attack and it was quickly over. While the situation had been developing around the first set of British forces to arrive, other units were also trickling in from the east. This included more units of the 7th Armored, including the 7th Hussars which brought with them their own light tanks along with a handful of Medium tanks that were still in good repair. They quickly moved up along the road and caught the Italian units from the side and rear, causing all kinds of havoc in the Italian units that were still largely unprepared for action. During the night on February 5th there had been a few efforts to attack the British forces on the road, but all of these efforts were poorly organized and not well supported by artillery . These ad hoc efforts would continue on the morning of February 6th, but the same mistakes were made. Troops were assembled and thrown at the British without any real effort made to determine the size and positioning of the British forces or to arrange enough supporting units to provide the infantry with support. Supplies, particularly of fuel for the vehicles, were the biggest problem for the British on the 6th. Every drop of petrol had been siphoned out of every captured Italian vehicle, and everything had been given to the British tanks, with other vehicles, including the artillery haulers, being almost completely immobile as a result. The British also only remained in control of the situation because of the disorganization of the Italian forces. They had trapped a large column, and that included many M13 medium tanks, which the British had very little answer to. If they could be organized and thrown into the attack it was likely that they could break the British positions. Another problem was also developing to the north, because the northern group of British forces were also now acting as a roadblock to prevent further Italian forces from approaching from the north, and if they did not hold it was likely to result in a cascading effect that would doom the roadblock further south.

On this northern roadblock action would revolve around a small hill that would be given the nickname the Pimple. From the hill the British could see a collection of Italian forces that stretched to the north, packing the road and then spilling out onto both sides. Brigadier John Caunter commanded the 4th Armored Brigade which occupied this position and he was determined to hold it as long as possible. All of the British moves over the previous days had placed the Italian commander, General Bergonzoli, in a horrible position and it was difficult for him to see an easy way out. The most surefire way to push through the British forces to his south was to bring the Babini armored brigade from the north and simply punch through. And that almost certainly would have worked, however that brigade was currently defending against the advance of the Australians towards Benghazi and moving it would essentially force the Italians to give up the city. With that unit rejected, the best course of action seemed to be to try and bring together enough armor within the column itself to push through, and these orders were given. The first effort was made by 10 M13s which moved off the road and proceeded south towards the Pimple alongside the road. They had the unfortunate luck of being the first attack against the British tanks on the Pimple, and it would go very poorly. The British cruiser tanks, over a dozen of them, were perfectly positioned to engage the Italian attackers and they were able to quickly destroy or disable all 10 of the Italian attackers. Other small units of M13s would then be engaged by other British units from a variety of different angles off the road as they tried to move forward. The various actions during this time are the perfect example of what a small, but very well organized and positioned, unit can do against a larger but uncoordinated group. The Italian tanks simply never had a chance as they were constantly being engaged by British forces that they could not even really see, and which were using the cover of the surrounding hills to move safely while the Italians were constantly exposed. But while the Italian armor attacks were hopeless, while they were occurring more and more organization was occurring on the Italian side. Most importantly the Italian artillery was starting to assert itself on the battlefield, and they would quickly destroy several British tanks as they began to drop shells on the British positions on and around the Pimple. Efforts were made by the 3rd and 7th Hussars to increase their harassment of the Italian column, as they were positioned even further north than the Pimple. But when they were confronted by an overwhelming number of Italian tanks and infantry units they were forced to back off. More pressure mounted on the cruiser tanks on the Pimple, with the added stress of dwindling ammunition stocks. In the afternoon the position would have to be abandoned due to a lack of ammunition when, just in time, a group of ammunition trucks arrived near the position. Over the next hour the tanks cycled back away from the line to refill their magazines, and further to the north the 7th Hussars, having moved further north, were attacking the rear of the Italian column. By the middle of the afternoon there were multiple actions happening along the front, and the British positions were in danger of being overwhelmed entirely. Italian units had also moved off the road to the west, away from the Pimple, and had begun to pass southwards towards the southern roadblock, putting it in danger as well. The combination of Italian artillery and infantry attacks had also pushed the British off of their positions on the Pimple which now was being used by the Italians to push the British further back. In the north the British 7th Armoured Brigade arrived to assist the 7th Hussars, and the cruiser and light tanks of the brigade began to cause complete havoc among the Italian forces at the end of the column. But this did not necessarily help the British further south, and in some ways it just pushed the Italian forces to attack southwards with renewed vigor. Fortunately some units of the 7th Armored Brigade would also be able to make their way south to reinforce the British units that had been fighting throughout the day. As night fell, the British units would frantically resupply and repair their vehicles, with the belief that the fighting would resume the next day.

At the southern roadblock, dawn on February 7th would be the point of greatest risk. On the morning the Italians would make one last desperate attack to try and force their way through the infantry units that were blocking their path. This time they were supported by Italian artillery which would rain shells down on both the British infantry and more importantly their anti-tank guns. It would develop into a confusing close quarters melee with Italian tanks moving among the British infantry positions while being fired on by British artillery which was knowingly firing into their own lines in the hopes of destroying the Italian tanks. Smoke began to overwhelm the battlefield, and it became a kind of battle of attrition between the Italian tanks and the British weapons that could destroy them. There was a point where only a handful of Italian tanks remained, but they were destroyed by one of the last anti-tank guns, which had to be manned by the battery commander, his batman, and a cook because the crew had been destroyed. When these final tanks were disabled it would prove to be the last gasp of the Italian attacks. Further north the British armored units on and north of the Pimple had begun another series of harassing attacks, and further south suddenly Italian units began to surrender. Lieutenant Joly had been observing the attack and would later write: “Gradually I became aware of a startling change. First one and then another white flag appeared in the host of vehicles. More and more became visible, until the whole column was a forest of waving white banners.”. Suddenly along the entire column Italian units began to surrender. 25,000 Italian soldiers were soon in British custody, with 100 medium tanks, 200 artillery guns, and 1,500 wheeled vehicles of a variety of types. They had been so close to breaking through and being able to make their way south and away from the British positions but the various British units had held on just long enough to cause them to give up hope. Immediately the men of the 7th Armored began to organize, take stock of their new supplies and vehicles and prepare for the possibility of a further advance to the West, possibly all the way to Tripoli.

Over the previous 2 months of Operation Compass the British, Indian, and Australian troops had advanced 800 kilometers from their starting point in Egypt to Beda Fomm and slightly beyond. They had completely destroyed the Italian 10th Army, the vast majority of which had surrendered to them at various points along the way. 130,000 Italian prisoners were now on their way eastwards for imprisonment for the rest of the war. Along with those captured over 5,000 Italians had been killed, and an additional 15,000 had been wounded. On the British side casualties had been shockingly light with only 500 killed, and under 1,400 wounded. Overall a massively imbalanced set of numbers which were mostly caused by the general disorganization of Italian resistance during some of the larger actions, and the quick surrender of the larger Italian forces in their prepared defenses at places like Bardia and Tobruk. Both sides were preparing for a British advance on Tripoli, with the Italian commanders in Libya trying to arrange their remaining forces to meet the advance, while the British units furthest to the west the 7th armored and 6th Australian already preparing for the next jump. But there were mechanical limits to the British advance which had been reached by the time they had reached Beda Fomm. While a shockingly small percentage of the British forces had become casualties, the rate of attrition among their vehicles was staggering. Somewhere around 80 percent of the vehicles that they initially moved forward from Sidi Barrani were out of action by the time that the fighting was over at Beda Fomm. Some of these had been destroyed by the Italians but the vast majority had simply broken down, having been pushed well beyond their expected service mileage. Some of those vehicles were already on their way back for repair, but when they arrived back at the workshops in Egypt much of them would simply be abandoned as lost causes. The ranks of vehicles in the forward units had been replenished at Beda Fomm, but those vehicles that had been captured were also well worn and were unreliable. But more important than all of this was the fact that the desire to continue the advance deeper into Libya simply was not present in the high command. Something could have been thrown together, a strong naval presence could have been pushed forward to assist, but at a theater level, British attention was suddenly and decisively drawn to the north. Wavell, had moved on and the next efforts of the British forces in the Eastern Mediterranean would not be to reinforce success in the deserts of North Africa, but instead to try save a new entrant into the war from defeat. The British were going to Greece, where the next great defeat would be experienced, a debacle that would see the British pushed out of Greece at the cost of also almost fatally weakening their forces in North Africa