173: "Your troops havent been defeated!"

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While the Norwegians were trying to hold back the German attacks, they believed that help was on its way.

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Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 173 - The Invasion of Norway - “Your troops haven’t been defeated!”. This week a big thank you goes out to Stephen for the donation and to Gavin, Sean, Christopher, Ian, Jerzy and Frostie for choosing to support the podcast be becoming a member, you can find out more over at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. In the days after the German invasion of Norway began there were many conversations that would occur in London and Paris as the two nations tried to determine how they would respond to the German attack. During these discussions there were large operations planned against both Trondheim and Narvik, but assembling the forces and getting them to their destination would take time. Time was not something that the Norwegians had the luxury of. Back in Norway the German attack would continue as German troops from Oslo and southern Norway tried to reach the isolated landings that had occurred in Central Norway while the Norwegian defense forces attempted to prevent this movement. In these efforts they would receive some assistance from the British, but no where near what was hoped for, or in reality what was needed to successfully stop the German advances. During this episode we will look at these German attacks and the various small actions taken by the British against German positions along the coast of Central Norway.

After the Germans had successfully landed their troops in Norway they were left with several isolated positions surrounded by the sea on one side and the Norwegian countryside on the other. Some of the smaller German forces were so small that they could not realistically break out of the beachheads and instead they were told to sit in place, defend themselves while they waited for larger German forces to arrive. These orders were given to the troops at Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim. While they waited the primary German attacks would be executed by the forces is Oslo, where the better part of two divisions were in place and ready to begin their attacks. These efforts would see each of the divisions advancing out of Oslo in different directions, with the 196th division driving north with the goal of eventually making it to Trondheim. At the same time the 163rd division would attack to the southwest with the goal of linking up with the forces that had landed at Kristiansand and Bergen. While the objectives at a high level were assigned to these divisions, on the ground they did not operate as a division, or even really as battalions and regiments. Instead the Germans would shift to a battlegroup system where smaller groupings of German troops were created for specific missions based on the expected size of Norwegian resistance and the transportation opportunities or challenges on the way to the objective. These battlegroups would prove to be very flexible, which was critical to the success of the operation because they were able to adapt to specific challenges presented by Norway’s geography, weather, and transportation system. The German attacks would begin on April 12th, and by April 14th they had already been able to capture some of their first major objectives, with Norwegian villages captured in both directions. The speed and success of the German operations presented a serious problem for the Norwegian defenders because they were still in the process of getting mobilized and organized. Remember, there was a lot of confusion caused by the exact path that the Norwegian leaders took to mobilization, and this delayed its overall execution. But it was happening, something that had caused the Germans to rapidly begin their attacks, out of fear that if they allowed the Norwegian forces to fully mobilize it would be much more challenging to then break out of their defenses around the capital. For those defenses General Ruge, the Norwegian commander, planned to use the 1st and 2nd Norwegian division, both of which would concentrate roughly in the areas that the two German divisions were attacking through. If the Norwegians had enough time to mobilize this was actually perfect, with German strength attacking directly into Norwegian forces. If the Norwegians had enough time to mobilize they would have a chance to slow the German advance, allowing time for Allied strength to arrive and for the pressure on the isolated German beachheads to build. The Norwegian’s did not have enough time to mobilize. By the 15th the Germans had already taken control of much of the area that the 1st Division was going to defend to the southeast of Oslo, and not only did this territory move over to German control it also reduced the manpower available to the Norwegian defenders. Every population center that fell into the hands of the Germans reduced the available manpower for the Norwegian army, and by April 15th large areas of south eastern Norway were irrevocably in German hands. On that same day General Ruge would send out the following general order for all Norwegian forces in southern Norway: “Our task in southeastern Norways will be to play for time. Operations to be conducted in the immediate future will therefore aim at: Holding the enemy by blocking the access routes with defences in depth, which can be manned with reduced forces; Holding such positions until the enemy manages to bring up vastly superior forces, and meanwhile prepare massive demolitions in the rear; Retreating swiftly from one position to another, preferably at night, making use of all available means of transportation, an simultaneously carrying out demolitions on a massive scale.” At the same time Ruge was pushing the Norwegian government to give the highest possible priority not to the defense of Southern Norway but instead to the recapture of Trondheim. Ruge’s theory was based on the prospect of British and French aid, with Trondheim having the harbor facilities and the airfields to make the best use of whatever supplies and forces the Allies could send. The defensive efforts elsewhere were merely designed to buy time and space for the counterattack against Trondheim and then the arrival of reinforcements from the sea. This was good in theory, but unfortunately for the Norwegian forces, they were very rapidly running out of time.

In preparation for the attacks the German sea transport capabilities had been utilized to bring men and supplies to Norway as quickly as possible. This was expected, and there had already been plans to shuttle supplies to Oslo quickly after the invasion to enable follow on operations. Along with the merchant ships, the Luftwaffe’s airlift capabilities were also used, especially as a way to transport men to Norway, with almost 30,000 total soldiers transported via the Luftwaffe during the Norway campaign. After their initial advances the Germans would at times experience some solid Norwegian resistance, although that was not consistent across the front. However, they would be able to use their greater firepower effectively in many of these engagements, and would also try to retain their mobility even in adverse conditions. A great example of this was the frequent tactic they used during the advance which would see the main mass of the German forces concentrated on applying pressure to the Norwegian defenses, primarily using their guns and artillery. At the same time German ski troops would work their way around the defender’s positions, using their mobility even in the snow to surprise the Norwegians. Once the flanking ski troops made their presence felt, the bulk of the German forces would attack through the Norwegian positions. In other attacks the Germans would simply use their greater firepower to blast through the Norwegian defenders, who were particularly susceptible to German armored vehicles of any kind, with anti-tank weapons almost completely absent from the Norwegian arsenal. From the time that the German attacks really got rolling on April 13th the overall course of the attacks was consistent, with the German forces inexorably marching to their objectives, with town after town falling in their path. In some cases the Norwegian defense would be strong, in others it was non-existent, but no matter what the outcome remained the same. One of the few instances where the outcome was different was when the Germans tried to speed up their advance on Trondheim through the use of an airborne assault on Dombås. The airborne operation was quickly, as it would turn out too quickly, thrown together as the overall situation in Norway developed. Along with helping to speed the German advance to Trondheim it also had the possibility of trapping a large number of Norwegian defenders between the advancing German infantry and the airborne units. The operation would begin on April 14th when 15 German aircraft carried about 185 men, each with only 3 days of rations and limited ammunition. What became very clear over the 5 days that followed is that there was no lack of fight in the Norwegians, and they were not just a pushover, instead the main German advance was successful due to overwhelming material superiority. The airborne operation started poorly, with only 63 of the 185 paratroopers actually being able to assemble south of Dombås where they were meant to defend a road intersection. Those that were able to make it to the crossroads were in for five days of fighting during which they repelled two major Norwegian attacks before they simply ran out of ammunition and supplies and had to surrender. The attack at Dombås was a failure, but it did have impacts far larger than its five day doomed defense, it introduced the idea into the minds of Norwegian, British, and French military planners that the Germans could be planning any number of small airborne operations anywhere, resulting in countless wasted resources guarding against another attack like what was seen near Dombås.

As the Norwegians continued to resist the German advances they suffered heavy in casualties, although they were primarily listed as missing or captured. The Germans were also suffering heavy casualties, but the sticking point for the Norwegians would continue to be the fact that their troops were completely helpless in the face of the German advances in armor and in the air. The clashes during this early phase of the fighting often took the form of small isolated clashes between smaller groups of German and Norwegian troops as the geography of the country made it difficult to concentrate large units. In these clashes the Norwegians were losing, maybe not every single one individually, but as a whole they were being ground down and as the days progressed the Norwegian units were collectively running out of steam. This would all be solved if, and only if, the British and French could quickly land forces in Norway to assist the relieve the Norwegian forces. They had promised the Norwegian government that help was on the way, with a personal promise from Chamberlain being given to the Norwegian government on April 14th that help was on the way. The immediate result of this message would be the dispatch of two Brigades of the British Army, which would be sent over to Norway originally as part of the cancelled operation to attack Trondheim. The troops of the 146th and 148th Brigade would still land south of Trondheim even though their operation to actually attack Trondheim, operation Hammer, would be cancelled. They would be in contact with Ruge and the Norwegians and they would request that the British move south towards Lillehammer. This would be approved by British military leadership, as they did not really have much else for the British units to do, and the units would meet up with Ruge and some Norwegian officers in the early hours of April 20th. For Ruge and other Norwegian leaders this was the first time that they would see the help that had been promised by their allies in the conflict against Germany, and they had high expectations….and they were immediately disappointed. The 146th and 148th Brigades were territorial units, which meant that they were not as well equipped as the brigades of the regular divisions. All of the available Regular divisions were in France at this time, and so the Territorials were sent to Norway and unfortunately for the Norwegians the Territorials were short on the exact kinds of equipment that were most desperately needed by the Norwegians, as one of Ruge’s officers would explain: “These were not regular troops … and we were alarmed to see that they were only armed with rifles and light machineguns … No antiaircraft guns, no heavy antitank weapons, no artillery, no vehicles …” I am sure the help was welcome, and the British units would be put immediately under the command of the Norwegians, eventually spreading out among Norwegian units, but they did not have the transformative effect on the battlefield that was hoped. Instead they just slightly boosted the number of infantry troops available, but without resolving any of the major problems that the defenders were already experiencing. I think the best indication of the British and French commitment to Norway was that the British Lieutenant General Massy was named as the commander in chief of all of the forces operating in Central Norway. He would never actually make his way to Norway, and would instead exercise command from across the North Sea in Britain.

While the contribution of the British army was disappointing, in the air they were also trying to make a contribution through the bombing of some of the airfields that had been captured by the Germans. The first raid would be on April 11th with six Wellington bombers targeting the Sola airfield near Stavanger. The next day 12 more Wellingtons would make the trip, but both raids would be attacked by Bf-110s and Ju-88s in their attempts to drop their ordinance. The raids were largely ineffective, partially due to the enemy aircraft, but also due to the bombs that the British bombers carried. Airfields are remarkably resistant to bombing, as would be shown in many bombing raids during the war, just as the German bomb crews from the Battle of Britain. And in the this case most of the bombs that were dropped by British bombers were less than 500 pounds in size, which meant that even if they hit the target, unless they hit a plane or a building any damage caused was easily repaired. There would be further attempts to bomb Sola over the following weeks, mostly either cancelled or hampered by weather over the target, with the last raid launched on May 8th resulting in most of the bombers not even able to find their target. But the bombers were not the only weapons attempting to damage the airfields at Sola, and an operation would be launched by the Royal Navy to move into position to bombard the airfield. For this task the heavy cruiser Suffolk and its 8 inch guns was accompanied by 4 British destroyers on April 17th. To execute the bombardment the Suffolk would make three passes near the airfield, during which over 200 8 inch shells were fired, but most of their shells did not even land on the airfield, let alone anywhere important. The real damage done was to one administration building and 4 seaplanes and 4 He-115s. While this did represent some damage, the entire bombardment was a great example of the challenges of naval bombardment, which would be much less effective throughout the war than any Navy wanted to admit, and the difficulties of causing real damage to airfields which were such large and dispersed targets. Worse than the lack of damage caused was the fact that as soon as the bombardment started the German bombers at every other airfield within range were prepared and launched on an attack against the Suffolk and its escorts. 28 total aircraft would be launched, although only 12 would actually find the British ships. Unfortunately for the Suffolk this included several aircraft of KG-30 the Luftwaffe formation that had the most experience in attacking naval targets. They knew what they were doing in their Ju-88s and came in for attacks from multiple directions simultaneously, the worst possible scenario for the Suffolk,. At around 10:37AM a 500kg bomb would hit the Suffolk just in front of the X-turret, and it would penetrate deep into the ship before exploding. This explosion caused damage to the engine room bulkhead, and caused an explosion in the cordite room below the X-turret. This cordite explosion then vented back up into the X-turret, where further explosions would cause the turret roof to be lifted up, disabling not just X but also Y turret. Along with the internal damage caused by the explosion, it would also cause hull damage with 1500 tons of water quickly filling the ship, which reduced its speed down to just 15 knots. Over the next several hours, the Suffolk simply got lucky that the German aircraft were unable to land any further bomb hits, because there were points where the Suffolk could barely even defend itself, including a lengthy period of time when the steering motors broke which meant that it could only continue in a straight line. Just before 2PM an effective British air screen would finally be put in place with the arrival of two squadrons of Blackburn Skua fighters. The ordeal for the Suffolk was finally over, with the damage caused to the ship hardly worth the damage that had been caused to Sola and the German aircraft.

One of the major challenges faced by the Royal Air Force in all of their efforts during the Norwegian campaign was the fact that they did not have a good airfield in central or southern Norway to operate from. Many of the best airfields were under German control, and so other options would be investigated, including the use of frozen lakes as makeshift airfields. In theory this could work, as the ice provided a relatively flat and smooth surface that could be used for landing and take off. The first attempt would be made at Lake Lesjaskog, which is about midway between Bergen and Trondheim. On April 23rd British ground forces would arrive to assist the Norwegians in getting the snows cleared and a runway prepared, and then the following day 18 Gloster Gladiator bi-planes arrived from the aircraft carrier Glorious. The landings went well, but overnight the problems started. The first problem was due to the weather because Norway is a very could place in April, and the Gladiators were not prepared for such conditions, resulting in various pieces of the aircraft freezing overnight. These issues did not cause serious problems for the aircraft, it just meant that it took longer for them to be ready to fly as it required more work from those on the ground. That is where the second problem comes into play in the form of Luftwaffe attacks during the day. The Germans had learned of the British basing efforts and dispatched bombers to attack the British positions. Early in the morning of April 24th a series of bombing raids were launched, resulting in the destructions of 10 of the 18 Gladiators while they were still on the ground. Others would be destroyed or damaged throughout the day, leaving only 4 operational British fighters by the end of their first day in Norway. It was not exactly a great way to start, and proved how difficult it would be for the Royal Air Force, or any British aircraft, to operate from Norway unless there was a serious effort launched by the British to not just get the aircraft to Norway but also in the numbers required to resist any and all German attacks. What would quickly become clear was that the Royal Air Force was not willing to commit these resources, and due to this reluctance the Gladiators would be the only serious attempt to put aircraft ashore in Norway, with Lieutenant General Massy writing in his official despatch of the events in Norway that “During the afternoon I became aware of the previous day’s failure of the Gladiators to operate from a shorebased aerodrome, and it then became evident to me that the chances of our getting any air support which would enable us in any way to compete with the German air menace had practically vanished.”

For roughly two weeks after the first British troops landed in Central Norway that the number of troops and resources committed to helping the Norwegians increased. This included the landing of a few Regular army units, and attempts like at Lesjaskog to bring British airpower into the fight. During this time the British, French, and Norwegian military officers worked closely together to try and stem the tide of the German advance, to a greater and lesser degree of success. All of the troops fought hard, but there was a limit to what they could do given the resource imbalance between the defenders and Germans that persisted even as more British and French troops arrived. Until April 28th the commitment to operations in Norway continued, but the political resolve in London to continue the defense was rapidly in decline. This would result in Chamberlain and the British leaders deciding to evacuate central and southern Norway. Reynaud and the French were displeased, with Raynaud writing to Chamberlain that “One must think big or stop making war, one must act fast or lose the war.” I am not here to defend Chamberlain and the British leaders in this decision, but what had become very clear over the preceding days was that the British were at a decision point. They either had to go all in or walk away, they could not continue what they had done over the first weeks of the Norwegian campaign, which was to try and maintain control of the situation with the absolute minimum of resources committed. General Massy would write in his report on decisions taken at this time that “On the 25th of April […] As it appeared to me then, the possibility of landing further troops or of maintaining the troops then ashore depended entirely on our being able to obtain control of the situation in the air. Without it I had little doubt that any further operations would become impossible and that we should be compelled to evacuate our forces from Southern and Central Norway.”. But with the failure of the attempts to base naval aircraft off of makeshift airfields, and the resistance of the Royal Air Force to a greater commitment, particularly of front line fighters if they could find a way to get them there, there was only one option, and that was to get out. Meanwhile back in Norway General Ruge and the Norwegians had no idea that they were about to be abandoned, and they still believed that the attack on Trondheim was still the plan. Ruge had even brought together 4,000 men specifically for an effort to attack Trondheim as soon as the British were ready, not knowing that the attack had been cancelled. The British General Paget was the senior ranking British officer that was actually with Ruge in Norway during the actions in April, and he would receive the evacuation orders on April 28th. The orders that were delivered to Paget specifically stated he should not tell the Norwegians, but not only was that just mean spirited, it was also completely impossible. There was simply no way that Paget could extract his men from Norway without not just the participation but also the support of the Norwegians, they controlled the road transport, the rail transport, they would have to be relied on for flank and rear protection. Paget therefore simply ignored the part about not telling the Norwegians. Eventually Ruge would understand, and to the credit of all of his officers and men they would greatly assist the British units in getting to the coast and in their evacuation. But when he was first told about what was happening, he would share the sentiment of leaders of several countries before, and unfortunately for many, leaders of several countries after the Norwegian campaign when he would say to Paget. “So Norway is to share the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland. But why? Why? Your troops haven’t been defeated!”