205: Surrender

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With the fall of the Reynaud government, Petain rapidly moved into armistice negotiations with Germany, although calling them negotiations might be inaccurate.

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Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 205 - The Fall of France - Surrender. This week a big thank you goes out to Christopher and JA for choosing to support the podcast by becoming a member, members get access to ad free versions of all of the podcast’s episodes plus special Member only episodes roughly once a month. Head on over to historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members to find out more. After the fall of the the Reynaud government on June 16, 1940 in favor of one led by Petain and Weygand the fighting in France was on the clock, and the start of armistice negotiations were only a matter of time. This was also not just due to political reasons, but also the continued deterioration of the situation at the front, with some of the German divisions hitting distance records for a single day advance during the middle days of June, including the staggering 240 kilometer advance that Rommel would make with the 7th Panzer on June 17th, eventually arriving at Cherbourg on June 19th. Also on June 17th, on the complete other side of France, Guderian reached the border with Switzerland after advancing from the north. While these gains were impressive, by this point the French Army was firmly in the mode of retreating as quickly as it possibly could, putting forth very little actual resistance, to major advances were expected.

Before Reynaud was forced to resign from his position of Prime Minister he made one very important decision that would have a long lasting impact on the overall course of the history of France. On June 14th the French government was on its way to its third home of the war in Bordeaux, putting more space between itself and the German divisions moving west. At this point Reynaud fully intended to continue the war, and would send a telegram to Roosevelt in American asking for assistance, although the belief was that actually receiving meaningful help from the Americans at this point would very unlikely. Instead, according to later accounts, for Reynaud this telegram was mostly just for the future records of French actions during the war, just getting it in the log book for future history books, or podcasts I guess. When the government reached Bordeaux Reynaud would meet with Charles De Gaulle, who was at this time the Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Army, with de Gaulle being informed that Reynaud intended to continue the war from North Africa and therefore De Gaulle was being sent to London to ensure that British assistance was properly arranged and organized. The fact that de Gaulle was given this assignment, and was therefore out of France when the armistice negotiations began, was a critical part of the foundation and justification for the Free French movement which de Gaulle would lead for the remainder of the war. Because he wanted to continue fighting in Northern France, Reynaud then met with Weygand and requested that he ask the Germans for an immediate cease fire in France, with the idea that the forces that still remained in France would be surrendered, but that Reynaud and the other French ministers would be able to form a government in exile. This would have been very similar to what had already happened for the Norwegian, Dutch, and Polish governments, all of which had went into exile in Britain. However Weygand refused, with one of the reasons being that he and his associates would lose all of their influence within the French government if he went forward with the plan. Weygand would be left behind in France to surrender the army and himself to the Germans, and the Reynaud would absolutely replace all of those ministers that supported an armistice with those who favored his course of action to continue the war. Weygand simply did not want this to happen, and so he refused to play his part, and by this point enough of the other ministers within the government had come to Petain’s side that there was little that Reynaud could really do to push forward against such opposition, even from those outside the government who saw their path into power through Petain, like Pierre Laval who would be a critical member of the Vichy government. This slow amalgamation of resistance to Reynaud’s choice of resistance would cause him to consider a threat to resign on June 15th, after losing a vote in the cabinet, but he did not at that point, believing that it might have the effect that he desired. But since we are clearly reaching the end of our series on the Invasion of France, I think it is worth taking a moment to discuss what might have happened in two different cases, one of which was if the French government had moved to North Africa and then the other was the somewhat famous Offer of Union that was discussed at least briefly between Churchill and Reynaud.

Reynaud’s argument about continuing the resistance from North Africa did have some merit, and unlike the governments in exile from some of the other nations the French government would be exiling itself from France, but not from French controlled territory of North Africa where a serious amount of French military manpower could be sourced from. The goal was to begin transferring troops to North Africa by June 20th, and then to move troops as quickly as possible because it would take about six days for troops to be loaded up from ports in Southern France, then moved to North African ports. If a new defensive line could be formed around the southern ports, with the French army retreating as quickly as possible a significant number of men and material could be expected to make it to North Africa. There were also a good number of aircraft that were making the trip every single day by the middle of June, with 30 to 50 planes per day rolling out of factories in Southern France that could immediately make the trip. More importantly for both the future of France and the overall war against Germany was the presence of the French fleet in the Mediterranean. When Italy entered the war the French Navy was roughly equivalent to the Italian Navy, which meant that the French Navy combined with the British naval resources in the Mediterranean would have given them complete superiority over movement within the sea. This would have completely changed the course of the war, even if the French might have had some challenges keeping all of their navy at sea and supplied. The French Navy was Italy’s greatest first, but the greatest fear of the Germans was simply prolonging the war against the French. It was likely that the German army would have needed a few additional weeks, maybe another month to finally capture the rest of France, and then they would have had to deal with whatever the French decided to do afterwards. In the short term this would not cause a German defeat, but it would simply require more resources and more time, which would prevent the German military from doing anything else, like turn its eyes against Britain which was always the plan after France was defeated.

Speaking of Britain, another topic that would be discussed was an offer of union by the British to the French. The origin point for this ideas was probably on June 14th when a memorandum was sent to the War Cabinet that suggested that the Uk and France could be brought closer together, even closer than their current alliance through the joining of the two governments. There would be common citizenship, and joint bodies for defense, foreign policy, and economics, however both nations would maintain their own separate parliaments. The report, written by the Secretary of State for India Leo Amery, would state that the best hope for victory over Germany lay in ’the real, complete, immediate and enduring unity of the two countries, acting as one, without regard to separate interests, and the dramatic and spectacular expression of this unity in action, in speech and in formal assembly and ceremonial’. When Churchill was first informed he would write that “I was somewhat surprised to see these staid, stolid, experienced politicians of all parties engage themselves so passionately in an immense design whose implications and consequences were in no way thought out. I did not resist, but yielded easily to these generous surges which carried out resolves to a very high level of unselfish and undaunted action.” De Gaulle thought this was a fantastic idea and that it was the best path forward for France. On June 16th, as the idea was still being formulated he would speak with Reynaud over the phone saying: “I have just seen Churchill. There is something stupen- dous in preparation affecting the entity of the two countries. Churchill proposes the establishment of a single Franco-British Government, with you, perhaps, M. le President, as head of a Franco-British War Cabinet.” The initial note then led to further discussions and drafts around the concept, with it being agreed that a formal note should be written and dispatched to the French government. De Gaulle’s conversation Reynaud made this effort more urgent, because Reynaud that it was critical that any type of proposal be provided as quickly as possible otherwise he might not even be in position to make it happen. He would help with the drafting of the final note that would dispatched. I will read it out here in full, “At this most fateful moment in the history of the modern world the Governments of the United Kingdom and the French Republic make this declaration of indissoluble union and unyielding resolution in their common defence of justice and freedom against subjection to a system which reduces mankind to a life of robots and slaves. The two Governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union. The constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defence, foreign, financial and economic policies. Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will become a citizen of France. Both countries will share responsibility for the repair of the devastation of war, wherever it occurs in their territories, and the resources of both shall be equally, and as one, applied to that purpose. During the war there shall be a single War Cabinet, and all the forces of Britain and France, whether on land, sea or in the air, will be placed under its direction. It will govern from wherever best it can. The two Parliaments will be formally associated. The nations of the British Empire are already forming new armies. France will keep her available forces in the field, on the sea, and in the air. The Union appeals to the United States to fortify the economic resources of the Allies, and to bring her powerful material aid to the common cause. The Union will concentrate its whole energy against the power of the enemy, no matter where the battle may be. And thus we shall conquer.” While the offer of union was certainly an imaginative idea, and contained within it some of the same ideas that would form the foundation of the European Union, it was also a wartime expediency that was bound to cause problems.

The presentation of the idea of an act of Union with the British would be the third in a series of defeats for Reynaud over the course of June 15 and 16. The cascade of failure would start with Roosevelt’s response to the French letter of the previous day in which Reynaud had asked for American assistance. The answer was firmly in the negative, as expected, with Roosevelt being very non-commital about any real aid, which was really demanded by the views of many in the American government that were set firmly against any kind of intervention. The second major setback was a response from Churchill to the question of whether or not the British would release the French from one of the clauses in their agreements, importantly the one dealing with negotiating a separate peace. As with many military alliances, the British and French had included a clause that when they entered a war against an enemy neither side could negotiate a separate peace with that enemy. Given their situation the French ministers who were pushing for an armistice wanted London to release them from this part of their agreement so that they could pursue discussions with Germany. When this request was dispatched to the British government Reynaud fully expected, and was kind of hoping for, a rejection from the British leaders. But instead, the response was a permissive one, with the one caveat attached to such permission being that the French fleet needed to be moved to British ports to prevent them from falling into German hands. The presentation of the proposition of Union then landed like a damp squib, with the French ministers being split. Those that supported the continuation of the war saw it as a lifeline just like de Gaulle did, those that were already pushing for an armistice simply saw it as a way for the British to take control of France and to rob the French of their colonies. Basically, they viewed the entire idea with distrust and simply a way for the British to continue to profit from the suffering of the French. In the end the concept was not even put to a vote before the cabinet, but what was voted on the topic of beginning armistice negotiations with Germany, with Reynaud finally giving into the hopelessness of his situation and choosing to resign.

The resignation of Reynaud was probably inevitable after the continuation of France’s military defeats during June and he would be replaced by the man everybody expected to replace him: Petain. The process of negotiating the armistice began basically immediately, with the French sending a message to Spain for the Spanish government to forward to Germany. Then just after noon on June 17th Petain would speak to the French nation on the radio, during which he would say “with a heavy heart, I tell you today that it is necessary to stop the fighting.” While this was not the end of the fighting, it was certainly the end of any real organization for the French Army, even though it would not be until June 19th that the German response to the French request for negotiations would arrive. As with the French the Germans would go through the Spanish to deliver their message, that they were open to begin negotiations. Then late on June 20th the French delegation would cross the lines, led by General Huntziger, the same man in charge of the defenses around Sedan that had been so critical to the overall course of the campaign. Negotiations is the wrong word for what followed, and instead the Germans simply dictated the 24 articles of the treaty that would be signed, which Huntziger would then relay to the French government in Bordeaux. We do not need to go through every article of the treaty, but five of them stand out in terms of overall impact to our story. The first article required that the French end all hostilities with Germany, the basic requirement for any kind of armistice. The second article revolved around drawing lines between the areas of Northern France which would be occupied by Germany and those in Southern France which would not be occupied. The fifth banned further French armament production, and the surrendering of all intact military equipment. Article 8 required the French fleet to surrender itself to German or Italian ports. And then Article 18 stipulated that the French government would be financially responsible for all German occupation activities. While the French ministers were hoping to actually be able to negotiate, when it became clear that this was not going to happen the only option was to accept. Before that happened Admiral Darlan did order that every seaworthy ship in the French fleet to put to sea and to head for North African or British ports. While Darlan agreed with the need for an armistice he had no desire to see the French ships used by the Germans, even if the Germans were giving their assurances that they would not be. In the evening of Jan 22nd Huntziger was given permission to sign to the terms, and the shooting would end at 12:35AM on June 25th. The fighting was over, 1.5 million French soldiers were in captivity, but the invasion of France was over, and France had been defeated.

For the Germans, the armistice with France achieved many different objectives, particularly as it related to France’s ally Great Britain. The first was that it left Germany in control of the entire coast of Northern and western France, which provided Germany with direct access to both the English Channel and to the Atlantic. These positions would be critical if the war continued, because it would allow for more direct attacks against the British home islands as well as better access to shipping lanes of the Atlantic. The second, and most obviously, is that it ended resistance from the French military which was of course great for the Germans because it allowed the German Army to begin to rest and refit for either the invasion of Britain or whatever the future may hold. The third, and perhaps less obviously, was that it provided a template and an example for what the British might expect when it came to negotiations with Germany. While allowing the French to maintain control of southern France and its colonies allowed the Germans to gain French acceptance faster, and prevented further fighting, it would also make it clear to British leaders that a rather lenient peace was possible. Germany could point to the French armistice as an example that they would allow the British to maintain control of their islands and to their imperial possessions around the world. But this third reason would not end up mattering, and the overall course of the French war effort would not go in quite the way that the Germans hoped. An important part of that difference would be the actions of Charles de Gaulle. When it became clear that Petain would be coming to power, De Gaulle would arrange for a flight out of Bordeaux and back to Britain. He would also find space for his family on one of the final civilian ships leaving Brest. Once in London he would begin to work directly with the British governments to build support among Frenchmen both in France and around the world to build what would become Free France. De Gaulle wanted to use the BBC for this purpose, to make a verbal appeal over the radio, something that some within the British War Cabinet were concerned would anger Petain. Eventually he would be allowed to make his appeal, which would come to be known as the Appeal of 18 June, here is the full text of that speech, translated into English, obviously:

[!quote] The leaders who, for many years, were at the head of French armies, have formed a government. This government, alleging our armies to be undone, agreed with the enemy to stop fighting. Of course, we were subdued by the mechanical, ground and air forces of the enemy. Infinitely more than their number, it was the tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans which made us retreat. It was the tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans that surprised our leaders to the point to bring them there where they are today.

But has the last word been said? Must hope disappear? Is defeat final? No!

Believe me, I speak to you with full knowledge of the facts and tell you that nothing is lost for France. The same means that overcame us can bring us to a day of victory. For France is not alone! She is not alone! She is not alone! She has a vast Empire behind her. She can align with the British Empire that holds the sea and continues the fight. She can, like England, use without limit the immense industry of United States.

This war is not limited to the unfortunate territory of our country. This war is not finished by the battle of France. This war is a world wide war. All the faults, all the delays, all the suffering, do not prevent there to be, in the world, all the necessary means to one day crush our enemies. Vanquished today by mechanical force, we will be able to overcome in the future by a superior mechanical force.

The destiny of the world is here. I, General de Gaulle, currently in London, invite the officers and the French soldiers who are located in British territory or who would come there, with their weapons or without their weapons, I invite the engineers and the special workers of armament industries who are located in British territory or who would come there, to put themselves in contact with me.

Whatever happens, the flame of the French resistance must not be extinguished and will not be extinguished.