201: "The Last Quarter of an Hour"

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After the beginning of Case Red, the overall situation for the French would quickly begin to fall apart completely. Come check out my keynote speech on the topic of Deception in February 2025: https://intelligentspeechonline.com/ Coupon Code: SECOND

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Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 201 - The Fall of France: “Last Quarter of an Hour”. This week a big thank you goes out to Marc, Christopher, Nick, and John for choosing to support the podcast by becoming members. They get access to ad-free versions of all of the podcast’s episodes and special member only episodes like the upcoming two part biography of Philippe Petain. You can find out more about becoming a member over at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. The German attacks of June 6th, and the start of the German offensive referred to as Case Red, would be the beginning of a very tumultuous week for the French army and the French government. It would begin along the Somme and Aisne rivers to the north and east of Paris, and over the course of just 4 days the situation would deteriorate to the point that the French government would be forced to evacuate Paris. But in the days after the first German attacks along the Somme there was still hope that the new German attack could be halted, and in fact it had been halted in some areas like at Amiens. On June 9th, General Weygand would send a message to all of the French forces “Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, the salvation of the country demands of you not only your courage, but all the obstinacy, the initiative, and the combative spirit of which I am capable. The enemy will soon be at the end of his effort. We are in the last quarter of an hour. Hold on tight!’” They certainly needed to hold on, but unfortunately for the French and British soldiers manning the defensive lines along the front, the enemy was far from the end of his effort, and in fact their attacks were just beginning.

In the northern areas along the Somme the first day of fighting had not gone well at all for the British and French troops that were involved. Due to a lack of troops the areas along the Somme north of Abbeville were not provided with enough troops to mount a series defense against the German aggression. The hope had been that if they tried to pull back to a line along the Bresle river that they could re-establish a defensive line to at least slow the Germans down once again. Unfortunately this would prove to not be possible due to a complete collapse of the forces around Abbeville after they were attacked by the 15th Motorized Corps commanded by General Hoth. While some French units fought well in this area, the Colonial Infantry of the 5th Colonial Infantry deserve special recognition, the collapse allowed the 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions to advance to the southwest without facing any real opposition. Weygand would travel to the headquarters of the French General Altmayer, who commanded the 2 Corps in this area of the front. Altmayer wanted to try and pull his entire army back further, just trying to find a way to keep his army together even if it meant retreat. Weygand would deny this request, saying that it was essential that Altmayer’s troops hold their ground while the French armies to the south were also fighting. Some major shifts were needed of Altmayer’s troops though, because the events of the first two days of the attack had opened the way for a German attack against Rouen, and so the British First Armored Division and the French 3rd Light Cavalry division would be shifted into a blocking position around Rouen. They theoretically benefits from the fact that they could anchor their defensive line on the Andelle river, but there were so many crossing points, and so few British and French troops that each one could only be covered by a small force. The Andelle itself was only a small stream along many points of its course in the areas around Rouen, which meant that even between the crossing points there was little that could stop a determined German attack. By the end of June 7th the 7th Panzer had reached a position just 35km northeast of Rouen and had already pushed back some of the French screening forces that were in its way.

The battle in the air was going just as poorly for the British and French. Along the lower Somme the British would be able to claim 4 downed Bf-109s, but this small number cost 11 Hurricanes. With the reluctance of the RAF and the British government to further reinforce the squadrons that were in France the losses on the 7th of June would leave the British with less than a full squadron of fighters actually based in France. The French Air Force did a little better throughout the day, destroying 16 German aircraft but at the cost of 17 French fighters. The French also lost 11 bombers, mostly while trying to launch attacks against the various German motorized columns that were on the move to the southeast of the Somme. None of this prevented a near total domination of the air over the battlefields by the Luftwaffe, who were able to bring a much greater number of aircraft to bare against the Allied efforts. This meant that even the successes for the French or British, where they were able to shoot down a few German aircraft here or there did little to curtail German flight operations across the majority of the front. One item of note that would occur during this time though was the fact that the first bombing of Berlin would occur on the night of June 7th, with a French Farman NC.223 bomber, which was actually a naval aircraft being specially prepared for the nighttime flight to Berlin where it would drop a 3 ton bomb load on the city. While the damage to the areas bombed was trivial, the bombing raid which required an over 3,000 kilometer round trip was still quite impressive.

Being able to drop a few bombs on Berlin did little to solve the growing problems that were being experienced along the Lower Somme. On the morning of June 8th the situation for Altmayer and his units continued to deteriorate. Altmayer would be forced to abandon his headquarters, with the effect of leaving his subordinate units with limited access to his staff until they had relocated, which was of course a constant problem for the French and every other army during the campaign. On the Andelle, the 7th Panzer was able to find and capture an unguarded bridge which allowed for them to quickly start moving tanks and troops across on their way to Rouen. The 5th Panzer would at the same time put more and more pressure on the British and French forces in front of them, and while the Allied units would fight some delaying actions they were simply delaying, not stopping the German advance. The decision was finally made to allow Altmayer to much further to prevent large groups of his units from being surrounded due to the advances being made to their south. There was just one problem though, General Fortune and the British 51st Highland division did not like the path of retreat that had been chosen, which was towards Rouen in the South. Fortune, much like every other British commander, felt that his best course of action was to stay as close as possible to the North Sea whenever possible. You know, just in case they needed to get on some boats. When Fortune’s request was forwarded to London it was denied, and Fortune was told to conform to the French movements towards Rouen, but unfortunately it was already too late, and the Panzer divisions under Hoth were already blocking the path. The reason that Rouen was so critical is that if the Germans were able to capture the city then they would have a bridgehead over the Seine river, and it was likely that any troops that were stuck north of the Seine would be trapped. This included the British 51st Highland division, with the only other possibility being that they could cross the river in some boats if they were available, but that was of course far from an ideal scenario. Orders were sent to try and get some boats together, just in case they were necessary, but far more importance was placed on holding Rouen. The problem with achieving this goal was in finding the troops to do it with. Due to a lack of reserves the Allied forces in the area were slim, and all that was available to meet any new German attacks were a few poorly trained and equipped infantry battalions. The good news is that the German tanks had once again outrun their infantry, and this allowed for a few small units of French soldiers, when they had anti-tank guns, to actually do far more damage than you might expect. For example one ad hoc battalion which was formed from new recruits was put under the command of a regular army officer, Major Alexander Syme and placed in a blocking position at the town of Isneauville. After arriving they were attacked by troops of the 5th Panzer Division, and they would be able to defend against 3 German attacks, through use of anti-tank mines and guns. Over the course of the attacks this small unit would disable 15 German armored vehicles of various types, a solid showing for a unit that had not even existed a few days before. But there were limits to what they could do, and Syme decided to withdraw his unit before it was totally overrun. While some of the small units on the outskirts of Rouen had been somewhat successful, it was clear that the German attacks of the next day would push into the city itself, and preparations were underway to meet that effort. In the air on the 8th the situation was much the same as the day before, with both the French and British able to inflict some losses on the Germans, but at a similar cost in their own aircraft. One notable change is that on the 8th RAF Fighter command would agree to send two more Hurricane squadrons to France, specifically to help provide some air cover to the British forces in the north. However, these two squadrons, while a welcome addition to the skies over France, did not even make up for what the British had lost over the previous few days. While the situation in the north was bad, the situation further to the southeast along the Aisne river was just as worrying by the end of the 8th. The Germans were able to capture the city of Soissons on the Aisne river on the 8th, which opened up the risk of yet another German area of attack. During the attacks on the city the Germans would be able to take advantage of the fact that the French defensive structure that had been put in place, which proved itself against the German armored divisions around Amiens, was quite weak to a more traditional infantry attack. What had been seen as a weakness of the German troops near Soissons, a lack of armored support, would end up being a strength and they would be able to overrun the French defenses far easier than the armored units. The French did not necessarily know it at the time, but the risk along the Aisne and towards Reims was about to drastically escalate on the 9th of June with the attack of the troops under General von Rundstedt.

Back in Rouen the defense of the city fell to General Gaston Duffour, who had been called out of retirement at the start of the war and was put in charge of the military region around Rouen. I am sure this was mostly considered an administrative post at the start of the war, being hundreds of kilometers from the fighting, but by June 9th it was in the front lines. To defend the city Duffour had a random mix of troops with some infantry regiments, some engineer units, a few anti-aircraft units, and some artillery. All of them were at various points of training, with most on the lower side. Other units would arrive in the city and he could advise them to do one thing or another, but everything was generally quite disorganized. The one bright spot was the presence of 4 new motorized cavalry groups, which were a new concept for the French. These groups were made up of around 200 troops, which did not need like a lot, but they were more powerful than their numbers would perhaps make it seem. The groups, abbreviated to GFCs were entirely volunteer units made up of enlisted soldiers, which meant that by and large they were better trained and motivated than other available French units. They were also true combined arms teams, with each group possessing tanks, armored cars, motorcycle teams, mortars, heavy machine guns, and motorized anti-tank guns. On a man for man basis these were probably the most effective units that the French army had at this point in the war, and Duffour would be given 4 of them to bolster the defenses of Rouen. He would spread them out and assign each one to defend some of the bridges along the Seine. The bridges over the river were critical, and would be the focal point of fighting over the following days. For example, early on June 9th troops of the 7th Panzer under the command of Rommel would attempt to capture the bridges at Elbeuf to the south of Rouen, only for them to be destroyed by French engineers before they could be captured. Then, when he approached some other bridges he would run directly into one of the GFCs, this one under the command of Captain Huet who had positioned two 25mm anti-tank guns in the village of Igoville. The French unit would also be supported by a company of the British King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. When the Germans approached Igoville they would quickly be fired on by the anti-tank guns and some vehicles would be destroyed. The fighting would then take place for about half an hour before both the French and British began to pull back to the bridges, which would be destroyed by the French engineers after they were across. Similar scenarios would occur on other areas of the Seine around Rouen, with French Engineers waiting as long as possible before destroying bridges before they could fall into German hands. While destroying some bridges was a good idea, and while small units around Rouen were doing their best to prevent the Germans from making an easy crossing, there were limits to what could be done against the German forces that were descending on the city of Rouen itself. The 5th Panzer Division would launch its attacks early in the morning on June 9th, easily pushing back some of the weak screening forces that had been placed on the outskirts of the city. They would then run into another of the GFCs, under the command of Captain Ricaud. The 200 men of the 5th GFC would delay the German attack by 4 hours, even though they were heavily outnumbered, and they would lose half of the unit in the effort. They were forced to retreat when German units were able to bypass them by using other routes through the city, where they were easily able to push through the defenses that were thinly manned by reserve units and a few old FT-17 tanks. By 11 AM most of the French units had been forced to the south of the Seine and the bridges throughout the city were destroyed, which helped keep the Germans north of the river, but meant that any of the Allied troops still to the north of Seine, especially those that were closer to the coast, were now trapped.

Hoth was able to recognize the tricky situation that the British and French closer to the coast were in and immediately redirected some of his mobile forces to move West after Rouen was captured, to fully trap any that remained north of the Siene. Once again Rommel was called upon to make this quick advance, and he would take his 7th Panzer and make about 70 kilometers in a single night, arriving on the coast on the morning of June 10th. This was a disaster for the British troops in particular, and Fortune had decisions to make, and he had to make them fast. Regardless of what his orders were, he wanted to get his men out and so he began to look for a place to try and evacuate as much of the 51st Highland Division as he could. The problem was that, with the Germans already having moved to the coast his operations were limited, and so the best option would be for the Royal Navy to bring his men off the beaches at St Valery-en-Caux. When I say the best option, that still meant that the option was bad, and the small beach that was present at the location would make for a poor conduit for troops onto ships. But that was all that they had, so once again the Royal Navy was called in to execute an evacuation mission, with this one code named Operation Cycle. Unfortunately for all of the British elements involved in the operation the Germans arrived first, and would be in position to begin shelling the British ships with artillery even before the 51st arrived on the coast, which caused the Royal Navy destroyers which had arrived to very quickly evacuate. Even when the 51st arrived on the morning of June 11th they would be unable to do the one thing that had made the evacuation at Dunkirk possible: keep the Germans away from the beaches, with traffic jams and communication mistakes greatly hindering the efforts of the British troops to establish and expand a perimeter. Of course it did not help that the Germans were doing everything that they could to prevent the evacuation, and by the 11th parts of three different German divisions were either on their way to St Valery or were already in contact with the 51st, including Rommels troops which had been able to fight their way into a position where they could fire directly onto the evacuation beaches, making the entire operation impossible. Given the situation, and the dwindling ammunition, both the French and British troops that were trapped around St Valery would surrender on the morning of June 12th. In total only about 3,300 Allied troops, about 2/3 of those being British, would be evacuated from the area before the surrender, with all of them being brought aboard ships from a small coastal town about 6 kilometers east of St Valery. Another part of Operation Cycle would see about 11,000 British troops evacuated from Le Havre on June 13th, with those troops being lucky enough to get out before the Germans were able to take control of the area.

The area on the lower Seine were not the areas where the French were having serious problems on June 9th, because 160 kilometers to the east, the Germans had been able to cross the river at Soissons. The primary German formation in this area was the 9th Army under the command of General Strauß. In terms of the overall course of the fighting, the most important difference between the fighting in this region and the fighting that was occurring further west was that there were very few German mobile forces attached to the 9th Army. This meant that the Germans could not outpace the retreating French, which often meant that instead of quick movements to surround and cut off the retreat of French forces they just sort of bludgeoned the French back across the front. The attacks of the 9th Army, along with those of von Runstedt’s Army Group A further to the east would be more reminiscent of the German attacks in 1918 than the armored attacks that were occurring further west. Part of this was due to the composition of the German forces, which were almost entirely infantry, but was also because the French defensive system of village strongpoints lent themselves very well to an infiltration style attack that had become famous at the hands of the German Stormtroopers of the First World War. That attacking system was built around the idea that strongpoints would be bypassed, surrounded, and then reduced through artillery and infantry attack, which the French tactics were particularly weak against, being instead constructed to stop the German armored attacks. In the early hours of June 9th, Rundstedt’s army would finally join in the attack, by throwing three infantry armies, the 2nd, 12th, and 16th at the French along a front 80 kilometers wide to the east of Soissons. This would give the Germans a considerable numerical advantage along the front, with the French commander along a portion of the front choosing to reorganize his forces at exactly the worst time, the night between June 8th and 9th. The goal of this reshuffle was not necessarily bad, he wanted to move one division into reserve to provide him with more flexibility to meet the German attack, but it would not be complete when the German attacks began on the morning of the 9th, and the disorganization of the defenders was the worst of all possible outcomes. Some French troops would still be on the move when the German artillery started dropping on top of them at around 3:30AM on the 9th. Along with the standard artillery shells a good number of smoke shells were mixed in, another tactic borrowed from the tactics of the First World War. This was used in many areas to cover assault crossings of the Aisne, which were almost entirely successful. In some areas the river was completely undefended, like along the areas defended by the 45th Infantry Division, which had already pulled one of its regiments back from the river because it was supposed to be replaced by a regiment from the 42nd Infantry Division, but that regiment had not yet arrived, giving the German infantry the gift of an unopposed crossing. Along much of the front the pontoon bridges were being thrown across the river with the goal of bringing more infantry across, as well as opening up the opportunity for the two Panzer divisions commanded by Guderian to get into the fighting. The goal of the German attacks was to break through the French defenses before the tanks were brought into play, under the belief that this would allow them to use their mobility without first wasting much of their strength against the French defenses as had happened at Amiens. The forwardmost units of the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions would begin crossing the river on the night of June 9th in preparation for joining the attacks the next day, but before they could do so the French were planning a counterattack. This would be launched by a group of forces that represented the entire mobile reserve of the French 4th Army. While the forces put together included French tank units, there was a serious lack of cohesion among the units involved, as they were mostly just thrown together, and the tanks that were available were at serious risk of breakdown due to use.

The news of the actions of the Aisne produced even greater worry at French High Command on June 9th, with Weygand saying to the French War Cabinet that the fighting along the Aise was one in which “Our armies are fighting the last possible defensive battle. If this attempt fails, they are doomed to rapid destruction.” The fighting was certainly desperate, but that quote is tinged by Weygand’s defeatism. Back on the front along the Aisne, in the early morning hours of June 10th, as the French were still preparing for their counterattack the Germans were further along in their preparations, and at about 5:30AM the German attacks started under a thick fog. This would be one instance where Guderian was simply impatient, because instead of waiting another day for the German infantry to continue to push back the French infantry and to reduce their strongpoints even further he wanted to get his Panzer units into the action. While the previous day of fighting had seen some of the French positions destroyed or neutralized by the German infantry those that still existed did exactly the same thing to Guderian’s tanks as they had done on other areas of the front, tore them apart. This meant that even though the French units were often isolated and immobile, they were able to slow down the German armored units and caused them to spend even more of their strength on mopping up operations. If the German Panzer divisions had held off for another day they would have been able to move over to the attack at a point where they could have better used their mobility. While the Germans were using their armored units a bit to early in their efforts, on the French side they were frantically trying to get into position to launch their own counterattack. The clock was ticking because it would be the counterattack that would relieve the various surrounded French units that had been bypassed by earlier German attacks, with their best hope being the attack of the French armor which were being positioned for the counter attack. Even though the Germans in some areas were prepared to meet the attack, in other areas their fire would be ineffective because they were facing the Char B1 bis tanks again. Just as in every other instances where the B1s were used, they would prove to be almost impervious to the smaller German anti-tank guns, with one tank during the French attacks on June 10th being hit by more than 100 3.7cm shells without suffering any serious damage. Unfortunately for the French tanks, no matter how well they did against the smaller German anti-tank guns it was always under a matter of time before larger German artillery was brought in and the Chars started to be disabled by direct hits from 88 and 105mm shells. Overall, the French counter attack would accomplish some of its goals, although they were generally limited to rescuing specific trapped French units in the areas defended by the French 2nd Infantry Division, but they were unable to make a larger impact. Much like in other areas, once the front began to be pushed back from the river that it was anchored on, in this case the Aisne, the French commanders in the area began to look behind them for the next obstacle that they could retreat behind. In this case it was the 4th Army Group commanded by General Huntziger who would order his troops to retreat back to the Marne river, which meant handing Reims over to the Germans. The first to receive these orders was the French 4th Army, but the retreat would also be issued to the 2nd Army.

The beginning of a collapse along the entire defensive front, and the loss of territory that would occur in the days after the start of the German attack began to turn the disagreements that had been happening among the French leaders into major disagreements. Weygand had, from the moment that the front had solidified on the Somme and Aisne come to believe that it was imperative that the line be held on those two rivers, and that it would be the final defensive line that the French army would be able to create. As it began to crumble, Weygand’s pessimism and defeatism were taken to another level, and it was amplified by the growing prominence of Marshal Petain who had been brought into the government to try and bolster French resistance but was in some ways doing the exact opposite. Reynaud, the Prime Minister, knowing that he was now surrounded by a more pessimistic set of leaders also brought in Charles De Gaulle to act as undersecretary of war. But there were limits to what De Gaulle, who at this point was a relatively junior officer could do against the much more senior Weygand and the veritable institution that Petain was among the leadership of the French military. While there were many conversations about the situation at the front, there were also discussions about what the French plans for further resistance might look like, with ideas such as the formation of a national redoubt in Brittany or even the retreat of the French government and military to North Africa. But of more immediate concern was what to do about Paris, because as soon as the Germans reached the Seine at Rouen it was only a matter of time before they also began to approach the French capital. At least initially Weygand wanted to defend the city from the Germans, with the military government of Paris Pierre Hèring being put in command of the defense of the city. However, he did not have very much to work with, with about 30,000 reservists in the city and then about 40,000 total troops from a variety of units that had retreated back towards the city over the previous days. The only good news is that there were two Colonial Infantry divisions that had just arrived from North Africa, and they could be expected to provide stout resistance as the French colonial forces always had up to this point in the war. Along with simply defending the city, these troops would also be responsible for defending the crossings over the Seine up to 50 kilometers to the west of the city. The good news is that if the city was defended it could provide valuable time for the rest of the French forces to recover from the previous days of attack, as a city the size of Paris would not be quickly taken either through siege or through an assault. The downside of defending Paris was that, well it would be destroyed. As the Germans approached the city, the desire to sacrifice Paris in the name of continued resistance began to wain, and instead the pessimists at French high command began to advocate for declaring Paris an open city to avoid its destruction. For many, the defense of France was entering its end game, and there was only one remaining option: an armistice.