199: The Battle of Abbeville

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What were the Germans going to do to finally defeat France? What was going to happen to the critical Abbeville bridgehead? Come check out my keynote speech on the topic of Deception in February 2025: https://intelligentspeechonline.com/ Coupon Code: SECOND

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Transcript

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 199 - The Fall of France - Failure at Abbeville. this week a big thank you goes out to Einar, Nathan, Joe, Mark, Peter, Christopher, and EelkovdM for supporting the podcast by becoming members. Members can get access to special member only episodes, like the latest episode on a British report entitled “British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality” with that eventuality being the defeat of France. You can find out more about becoming a member over at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. During the last week of May the Germans had a problem, their attack into France and Belgium had gone very, very well and the BEF and a major portion of the French army were now trapped. The hard marching German infantry divisions had moved into positions where any kind of break out attempt was impossible and it was clear that operations in the north had transitioned into a mopping up exercise. Back at German High Command this meant that focus shifted away from the operations in the north and instead to what would come after, and into what would be known as Fall Rot, or Case Red. The basic outline of this plan was contained within Führer Directive 13, which would be issued May 24, 1940. The goal of Fall Rot was simple, the destruction of any remaining British and French forces and at least the initial plans were far more focused on this goal than the capture of French territory. This would be accomplished by first pushing German forces over the Somme river and advancing to the Seine river to the south, this would break the French defensive lines and bring the German forces into contact with Paris. However, that is where the attacks would end in this area of the front, using the Seine as a pause point while the second phase of the attack was launched. The goal of this second effort was to push south to Reims and then to attack the Maginot Line from behind. Overall, the plan was very focused on military objectives, the destruction of the French and British forces, and not applying additional pressure to the French government to possibly surrender. If they had known about the rise of defeatism among French leadership a more aggressive path may have been chosen that would have brought even quicker results. The attack would be scheduled for the first week of June, which would result in frantic activity behind the lines as the German forces were prepared.

If the German forces were going to launch the attack during the first week of June, a timetable that Hitler demanded be met, giving just 10 days to begin the attack after the May 24th directive, there were two major problems they were going to need to solve. The first was relatively straightforward, they had to get all of the mobile units out of the front line as quickly as possible. One of the developments that the podcast has been tracking was the separation of the German armor and motorized units from the foot marching infantry divisions, and how long it was taking for the infantry to catch up. This meant, most importantly, that after the Germans reached the coast at Abbeville, and captured some bridgeheads over the Somme river the armored units were forced to hold those bridgeheads. They did a fine job at holding them, withstanding French and British counterattacks, but they were a poor tool for the job and their continued stint in the front line prevented them from the rest and reorganization that was required before a further attack could be launched. This was a problem that could only be solved with time, with infantry divisions replacing the mobile units as the infantry arrived at the front. When they arrived units were shuffled and the mobile units were allowed at least a few days rest, with most of the armored units in particular getting between 3 and 4 days of rest before they were moving back to the front line to prepare for the next effort. Once this was completed, and the mobile units were able to move out of the front line, the more difficult problem had to be solved: how to replace what had been lost during the campaign. While the campaign had been quick, and the path from the Ardennes to the North Sea had been traversed in only a matter of days, their actions had taken a serious toll on the German mobile formations. Often this toll was not in destroyed vehicles and tanks, but instead just simple breakdowns or very minor battle damage. Ideally there would be tank recovery and repair units in place to take of these, but the Germans at this point in the war were desperately short of these units, having prioritized combat troops in the lead up to the attack into France. This meant that for vehicles that had any kind of serious damage the only option was to send them all the way back to Germany for repair, because the facilities simply did not exist closer to the front. This type of movement was just added to the long list of things that had to be moved through the areas behind the front, with men, ammunition, supplies, replacement vehicles, and countless other items all being pushed forward over the damaged Belgian and French infrastructure. This damage had been caused by the actions of both the Allies and the Germans, and not just due to aerial bombing or attempted demolition, but just simple wear and tear. The slow degradation of transport infrastructure due to simple overuse and abuse would be a much bigger part of the story in Russia, but even here in France and Belgium it was already a major concern during periods of frantic activity like the last week of May 1940 as so much material was being pushed forward as quickly as possible. Along with the simple and straightforward resupply operations, there were also some efforts to reorganize the German forces based on lessons learned from the earlier attacks. The biggest change was that the mobile forces were reorganized into five motorized corps, with 2 Panzer divisions and 1 motorized infantry division. Previously the motorized infantry divisions had been kept in their own corps, apart from the armored units. The hope with this change is that the armor and motorized infantry would be able to work more closely together, which had been a major problem during the first weeks of the campaign. For the French, they actually had a pretty good understanding of what the Germans were planning, with the expectations among French High Command being that the Germans would launch a two pronged attack, with one using the Somme bridgeheads to push to the Seine while another pushed south towards Reims, which was pretty close to exactly what was planned. Attempts were made to prepare the French forces, or what remained of them, but there was precious little time for the French Army to reorganize itself along the new defensive line, and to prepare to meet a possible attack towards Reims.

With all of the planning and preparations at a high level, fighting would continue along the front throughout the last week of May and into June. Even if these actions were not part of a larger offensive, they would still have important ramifications for the future attack because, if the French could eliminate even one of the German bridgeheads it would make their future defensive operations much easier. While there would be some level of action at each of the bridgeheads, the bridgehead at Abbeville would receive particular focus during the last days of May. The Germans had been able to expand the bridgehead over the Somme to around 8 kilometers in depth and up to 14 kilometers wide with the area held, at least initially by some motorized infantry regiments with support from artillery and 4 88mm flak guns. They would be faced by a combined British and French force which would be organized into two different groups with the relatively simple objectives of slamming into the German forces and pushing them back. The two forces would both feature a British armored brigade from the 1st Armored Division and a French Light cavalry division. This meant that each attacking force would contain about 90 tanks, 180 combined, which was a powerful force but it would be hampered by two problems. The first was the challenge often faced by British and French forces, coordination, which at times made it difficult at the small unit level to properly work together and support one another. The second problem is that neither of the attacking forces had much understanding of what they were about to face, with the British and French forces arriving in the sector just before the attack which did not allow much time for reconnaissance or to gain any understanding of the terrain. The attack was scheduled to begin early on the morning of May 27th, and after a very brief delay the British tanks would begin rolling at around 6AM. The first attacks were hampered by early morning fog, which caused the British tanks to move forward slowly and cautiously. There would then be several instances where they encountered early and strong resistance that would inflict serious damage on some of the armored units. One example of this was the 10th Hussars which would begin the attack but then encounter a German outpost line not far from their initial jumping off point. Among the units on this line was the 14th Panzerabwehr Kompanie, or anti-tank company, of the 25th Infantry Regiment. They would have a 3.7cm anti-tank gun near the village of Huppy which the 10th Hussars were advancing towards. The Germans had early warning of the attack because they were able to clearly hear the sound of the British tank engines before they arrived, and this allowed them to be prepared when the tanks of the 10th Hussars appeared just after 6:30AM. What would follow is a textbook example of what a well prepared, highly motivated, anti-tank unit could do against an unprepared enemy. The Germans waited until the British tanks were just 200 meters away before opening fire, and then started rapid firing which quickly knocked out 2 tanks. At only a few hundred meters it did not matter what part of the British tanks the Germans were hitting, because the anti-tank gun could penetrate even the thickest of the frontal armor. What would follow was 20 minutes of the Germans firing and moving their anti-tank gun faster than the British tankers could coordinate their return fire. In those 20 minutes the gun would fire almost 100 rounds and destroy 10 of the British tanks. More importantly for the overall course of the attack, these type of actions often resulted in exactly what the Germans wanted, the 10th Hussars were forced to retreat. This was due not just to the German fire but also to some mechanical breakdowns among the British tanks which meant that just over an hour after they began their advance the 10th Hussars only had about half of their tanks still running. There were multiple instances of these types of actions along the front lines, for example near the village of Bois de Limeux the British tanks of the Queens Bays would be hit hard by another anti-tank gun which quickly destroyed severla tanks. Even when a few of the tanks were able to outflank the position and continue their advance they just rant into two of the 88mm flak guns which tore them apart. In total they would lose 12 tanks, and again more importantly they would end their attack by retreating back to their start line. A few of the British armored units did better, with for example many of the units of the 3rd Armored Brigade on the western side of the bridgehead having more success. Unfortunately as they advanced they found that they did not have enough supporting infantry with them, and as the German forces recovered from the attack the British tanks were forced to withdraw. By the end of their efforts the British 1st Armored division had lost 120 tanks, fully 2/3rd of the 180 tanks that they possessed, although only around 60 of those were due to German actions, with the rest being due to mechanical issues. Either way it meant that the 1st Armored Division lost most of its combat capabilities for very little gain. A number that puts things in perspective is that the British would end the day with 120 tanks out of action, which outnumbered the number of German wounded from the fighting, with the Germans having just 40 killed and 110 wounded during the British attacks. While the British had made little progress, the French units that joined them in this first attack made some headway both on the 27th and early on the 28th, but most of these gains were on the periphery of the bridgehead, primary at the extreme ends of the German territory and did not include any real gains directly towards Abbeville.

While the fighting was occurring on the morning of the 27th, both sides were bringing in reinforcements which would continue the actions in the days that followed. On the German side, the infantry troops of the 57th Infantry Division were arriving and they were able to move across the river and into the bridgehead to relieve the motorized infantry units, which were primarily being moved off the line to prepare for Fall Rot. Fortunately for the Germans, these troops arrived, and relief operations were completed, before British and French forces could renew the attack. This was because the Allied efforts were delayed until new forces arrived in the area, specifically the French armored forces commanded by De Gaulle, and the British 51st Highland Infantry Division. These forces would not arrive in the area until the middle of the afternoon on May 28th, primarily due to the fact that by this point in the campaign the French armor were only moving at night due to concerns about the constant and dangerous German air attacks. The British division had been transported all the way from the Saar region in eastern France, and over the course of a week it had been on many journeys by road and rail to make the trip. The end result of these travels is that the division needed time to assemble and reorganize before it would be able to enter combat. This was a problem, because the longer the British and French waited to go for another attack the stronger the German resistance would be, and therefore De Gaulle decided that the best course of action was to launch an attack as early as possible. This attack would begin on the same afternoon that his forces began to arrive, May 28th. De Gaulle had a solid force under his command by this point, including just about every type of French tank, some armored cars, anti-tank batteries, three battalions of infantry and artillery support. He was also provided with additional artillery support for this attack, pulled from French Army level artillery reserves. As he was planning his attack, De Gaulle was balancing preparations and speed, but he did have good information about what had happened the day before. This meant that the basic outline of the German positions were generally known which made the planning for the attack a bit easier. The key piece of information that the French did not have at this point was that the Germans had been able to swap out the divisions and that instead of the motorized infantry he would be facing the newly arrived 57th Infantry. They brought with them more anti-tank guns, and just in general more men. The plan that was developed was a simple concentric attack on the German positions, with the French attempting to attack from a multitude of directions simultaneously to overwhelm the German defenders. It would occur as quickly as possible, with some of the tank battalions, particularly those of the slower moving Char B1 bis tanks being provided with just 30 minutes to refuel and prepare for the attack after they arrived at their jumping off points.

The primary point of emphasis for De Gaulle’s attack was the same village of Huppy that the 10th Hussars had attacked the day before. or this attack 32 of the big Char B1 bis tanks were committed along with several units of French infantry. Just as important was the presence of French artillery, and the French 105mm howitzers would fire 6,000 rounds at the village in just 15 minutes before the attack began. The French would attack with their standard tactical doctrine, with company size groups of tanks followed by infantry. There was one primary reason that this attack would be successful, when the attack of the day before was not, the French tanks could shrug off the German anti-tank fire without receiving any real damage. This came as a major shock to the German infantry troops within the village, who believed that when they opened fire their guns would be effective, just as they were against almost all types of Allied tanks, with the Char B1 being one of the few exceptions. And so instead of being destroyed quickly when one of the anti-tank rounds hit their front armor, the Chars just kept coming. The tanks were not completely impervious to the fire from the German guns, there were areas of the tanks that were vulnerable to the anti-tank fire, but it often took many hits. For example one of the Chars, named Jeanne d’Arc would take 30 direct hits while it destroyed 2 German anti-tank guns before its 75mm gun was damaged by another shell. Even without its main gun it continued towards the German positions and physically destroyed several German positions. With little that they could do to stop the French tanks, the German forces fell back to a local Château before eventually surrendering a 9:30PM. When the losses were totalled the French had recaptured Huppy with just 6 dead and 12 wounded. Before the German forces surrendered the French armored units were already pushing further ahead, with their next objective being a Les Croisettes crossroads. During this phase of the negative side of the Char B1 bis tank came into play, and when they moved into the final attack on the crossroads just 6 of the 19 tanks were still running, with almost all of the losses coming from the tanks having mechanical problems. The Jeanne D’Arc was not one of them, and it was still running, even without its gun, and would once against just physically destroy some German positions, with all of its weapons damaged by the time that the crossroads was taken. Just the one tank would be around 90 times before its luck ran out and instead of a 3.7cm round a round from an 88mm gun hit the tank, with the much larger ammunition finally putting the tank out of action and wounding some of the crew. Even after a successful attack, the French tanks were eventually forced to surrender the crossroads and retreat back to Huppy due to a simple lack of fuel and ammunition. While the attack at Huppy was generally quite successful, for many of the French units that attacked they ran into some of the same problems that the British had the day before. Just one well placed German anti-tank gun could cause havoc among the armored forces, as long as that gun was capable of quickly damaging the tanks that it was facing. For example in one area an attack of 20 Somua S35 tanks was quickly halted by a single 88mm flak gun that was being used in an anti-tank role, with 17 of the French tanks destroyed. Overall this attack would be a mixed bag, with some French successes balanced against some failures, but at least some territory was held at the end of the attack, which prompted De Gaulle to begin to prepare for another effort on the 29th.

What remained of the French armored forces would spend the night refuelling and replenishing their ammunition stocks for the next day of action. Along the front the attacks would kick off just after 7AM with a point of particular focus being continuing the attack along the route towards Les Croisettes and beyond. In this area 7 of the Char B1 bis tanks were still operational. On another area of the front French armored units and colonial infantry units were attacking towards another village, with the armor units equipped with the far smaller and lighter R35 tank. Here is a quote from Lieutenant René Bardel, a platoon leader of an R35 unit: “As soon as we started, the khaki coats jumped behind us and followed across the plateau … the infantry seemed to be particularly eager this morning. Smoke now hid the hedgerow in front of us. The German machine guns hidden there were firing madly, keeping our infantry down on the ground. At full speed our platoon attacked them – this was the tank’s job! The red bursts of our 37mm guns flashed all along the hedgerow; earth, branches flew up. But the enemy held their ground. A sudden shock rang out on my armour and a flame flashed into the turret. We had been hit! I hastily trained the turret to the right and there, between two trees, I saw the white flash of a 37mm AT gun firing at us. Of us two, who was going to die? I would prefer that it was them. One shot after another, I fired three shots, the cases falling down into my tank …Suddenly a firework display lit up under the trees. I had probably hit their ammunition box…I fired half a magazine from my machine gun and another shell… I had got them!” Real progress was being made, but it never seemed like there were enough tanks, because generally as the tank units melted away due to German fire, so did the hope of any further French victories. This would happen time and time again, with the 88mm guns destroying a number of R35s which slowed and then halted the attack, and then in another area 4 Char B1s leading another French advance before being fired on by 10.5cm artillery guns that were firing directly at the tanks, eventually disabling 3 of them. In both cases, once the tanks were out of action the attack ended. By the end of the day, with very few tanks still remaining operational, all that De Gaulle’s attacks had done was compress the German bridgehead down further towards the center of Abbeville. It had not made the kind of progress that would seriously threaten the bridgehead or its ability to be used for future attacks. The French units involved in the attacks were quickly running out of the ability to continue their attacks, and the German resistance did not seem to be wavering. De Gaulle would give it one final go on May 30th, focusing his remaining armor against the important Mount Caumont, but this attack quickly ended with more tanks were disabled by German fire. While the destruction of the French tanks, over 100 would be lost during the 3 days of the attack, is the most obvious reason for the attacks to end, the French infantry units were also suffering from mounting casualties with some of the units suffering half of their strength in casualties. On the German side, losses were also mounting, with over 1,000 casualties in the 57th Infantry division and every single one of their 3.7cm anti-tank guns out of action, along with 2 of the 4 88mm guns that had been so critical to the defense. While the attacks on Abbeville at this point had done little but inflict serious losses on first British and then French armored forces, Weygand believed that the actions of the previous days had pushed the Germans close to collapse and so he wanted to launch one further attack. For this another French armor division was brought in, the 2nd Armored Division, a division that had previous suffered heavily losses but which had been rebuilt by the addition of several new armored companies with Char B1 bis tanks, Char D2 tanks, and some H39 light tanks. By the time it was committed to an attack at Abbeville it had 140 tanks in its order of battle, but due to mechanical breakdowns and other issues when it was in position to attack only around 100 of the tanks were still available.

Even after two failures, the Allied efforts at Abbeville were not over. The next plan would be led by the British Major-General Fortune, the commander of the newly arrived 51st Highland Division. The basic concept was not much different than what came before, with multiple simultaneous attacks on multiple different areas of the bridgehead. There would be multiple days of delay before this final effort could be made though, and the attack would not start until June 4th, which did give 4 days for the Allies to prepare, but also for the Germans. During this time the 57th division reinforced its positions and also placed multiple new minefields directly in the path of the upcoming offensive. This meant that when some of the armored units, including one of 21 Char B1 bis tanks started the attack they very quickly ran into a minefield. These minefields had two important consequences, the first was that they simply disabled multiple French tanks, but it also had the effect of once again separating the tanks from their infantry support. This was the constant problem experienced by Allied armor during these attacks, and once again it would be their undoing. Some of the French tanks actually made it to their objective, the summit of Mount Caumont that they had been striving for since the first attacks by De Gaulle a week earlier, but once they arrived at the destination they would be forced to retreat because they did not have any infantry support. The British attacks would be similarly unsuccessful, and by the afternoon it was clear that the Abbeville bridgehead would survive for at least another day. This also meant that 3 total allied Armored divisions, 1 British and 2 French had been mauled in their attacks against the bridgehead, for little real gain, three powerful units that would have been really nice to have as counterattack forces if the Germans were to attack, like they would on the very next day, June 5th.