198: Picking Up the Pieces

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The evacuation of Dunkirk was underway, but discussions had already started for what the British and French would do next.

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Transcript

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 198 - The Fall of France - Picking up the Pieces. This week a big thank you goes out to Bill, Ray, Kev, Andy, SL, and Quin for choosing to support the podcast by becoming members. You can find out more about becoming a member over at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. While the events at Dunkirk were occurring in the last days of May 1940, in London and Paris there were many decisions to make about the next phase of the campaign. The failure of Weygand’s plan of a counter attack from the north and the south of the German corridor that had cut off the French and British troops in the north meant that preparations had to be made for the expected German attack into the remaining areas of France. What was needed between the two allies was a singular purpose and the belief that together they could find their way through the coming crisis. Neither of those were present between the British and French governments after the middle of May 1940. Among French leaders there would be a growing belief that the British had one step out of the door, and were going to abandon them as quickly as they possibly could, just like the BEF had abandoned the French during their time of need in Belgium. On the British side, after the initial shock of the German attacks wore off, there were many who believed that the only viable path forward for the survival of Britain was to stop the bleeding in France and to instead preserve whatever military strength Britain had left. This is one of the ways in which the more pessimistic, and soon to be better classified as defeatist, French leaders like Weygand and Petain were not wrong. They could see in the actions of the British that they were beginning to hedge their bets, and to bias their actions towards reducing what might be lost in France. Whispers of betrayal and abandonment were not far behind. History would show that the prudence of the British leaders was the correct move, but the French leaders did not know that and it would have been challenging to explain to them that the path to victory was also the path on which the French military would be decisively defeated during the first weeks of June. This episode marks in some ways the beginning of the second part of the saga of the fall of France. The first part was a tale of military unpreparedness, miscalculations, and defeat. The second part has its own military failures, but more importantly those military failures would be accompanied by the complete the utter collapse of the French political will to resist. And in that collapse two French names stand out among the crowd in terms of how they influence and interacted with events: General Weygand and Marshall Petain.

Back on May 17th General Weygand had been recalled from his posting in Syria to take command of the French army. He would replace General Gamelin, the long time leader of the French Army, who had seemingly been overtaken by events as the German attack through the Ardennes had developed into a race to the sea. Weygand’s elevation brought with it a renewed belief in French victory, and confidence, and nobody was more confident in Weygand than Weygand himself. In the French Press Weygand’s previous work with Marshall Foch during the First World War was highlighted, the same Foch that had been the Supreme Commander of all Allied forces during the victories of 1918. Unfortunately for the French Army Weygan ascension would not be the key to victory, in some ways for the same reasons that Gamelin had also found the situation so difficult after the German attack. Both of the French Generals had served as Chiefs of Staff quite admirably during the war, Gamelin with Joffre and Weygand for Foch. But when they themselves were in charge, when they were the Supreme Commanders and not the man behind the man, they were found to be wanting. They lacked the ability to have clear purpose, communicate their intentions, and coordinate the massive mechanisms of war in 1940. In their defense they were in the most challenging situation any military leader can find themselves in, dealing with a rapidly deteriorating army that is experiencing nothing but defeat. The mistakes of the French military, you could convincingly argue, were made in the mid 1930s, and by the time that the German armored divisions were reaching the North Sea at Abbeville, there was not way to correct their course. But fortunately, at least according to the French press on May 17th, it was not just Weygand that was being elevated to save France, but Marshall Petain. In all conversations about Petain in 1940 it is absolutely critical to separate in our mind the Petain of 1918 and 1940 and the Petain of Vichy. After the First World War Petain was a national hero, he was the Victor of Verdun, he had saved the French army in 1917, he was one of the great heroes of the First World War. And in 1940 he was back only this time as part of the government as Minister of State and Vice Premier, he would bring the Verdun spirit back to the French Army, he would make the Army invincible yet again. Or at least that was the theory. Unfortunately for the French, the Petain of 1940 was very different than the Petain had had stood in his command post at Verdun in 1916. And instead of the unbreakable soldier of France, Petain brought with him a pessimism and defeatism that would be the hallmark of the weeks between his appointment and the armistice. Until June 1940 Petain was the hero of France, but in June 1940 he was beginning his Villain Era. Before 1940 Petain was the Victor of Verdun, the Savior of France, after he was the Villain of Vichy, the Nazi Collaborationist.

While Weygand had arrived back from Syria riding a wave of hope and optimism, very few things would really go well for him as he tried to enact his plan to reverse the German successes of the first two weeks of the campaign. This plan, known to history as the Weygand Plan, would never really get started due to a variety of challenges and mistakes from Weygand and those under his command. One of the perfect examples of mistakes and unfortunate developments would be the meeting in Ypres on May 21st. This meeting, that was supposed to be the meeting in which the Belgians, British, and French that were trapped in the north all came together to prepare for a major attack to the south would be a comedy of errors. The French commander Billotte was late, and the British leader Gort would not arrive until after Weygand had already left. And so there were multiple meetings between the various commanders, each relaying information to the other in a high stakes game of telephone. Hardly the inspiring moment that I am sure Weygand imagined when he arranged the meeting. And then after the meetings were over, Billotte would killed in a car accident while he was being driven back to the headquarters, meaning that the command of the French forces for the attack would fall to General Blanchard who was not even at Ypres. Just an absolute comedy of errors and unfortunate moments. In the end of the attack that was discussed at the Ypres meeting would never actually occur. The final death of the Weygand plan was a problem not just because it meant that the troops in the north would continue to be surrounded, and would either have to be evacuated, be killed, or surrender, it was also a problem because it was the plan. The plan, the only plan that the French high command really had to try and save the situation, to reverse the disasters that had started on May 10th and then not really stopped. For Weygand and other military leaders they were suddenly left in a situation in which they only saw defeat in the future, they could find no path to victory. At this same time the views of the French political leaders were spiraling around pessimism and on a fast track to defeatism. These two groups then fed off of one another, at a time when a bold stand by either the politicians or the military might have resulted in the solidification of French resistance, there were few people able to fight against the stream of defeatism that was racing through the corridors of power. The new Prime Minister, Reynaud, was one of the few voices that spoke out firmly in favor of continued resistance, rejected peace, and was looking at options to continue the war even if the majority of France was overrun. The strategy with the best chance of success was probably a retreat to France’s North African colonies. Major General Edward Spears was during these critical days the representative of the Churchill government in France, and as such he would be able to provide an interesting viewpoint on the conversations that were occurring at this time. In one instance Spears would be in a meeting attended by many of the French leaders Reynaud, Petain, Weygand, Admiral Darlan, all of the major players. Also in attendance was Major Fauvelle, a representative from the headquarters of General Blanchard, commander of the French forces that were at that time with the BEF in the north, Spears would later say that: “The idea of defeat, or even the shadow of such an idea, never crossed my mind, but, as Commandant Fauvelle told his story in fragments, revealing an appalling state of affairs, and as I realized that his catastrophic defeatism seemed to some extent at least to be accepted as the reflection of the real position, I felt cold fingers turning my heart to stone… In my view nothing short of throwing Fauvelle out of the window would have been adequate.” Spears may have been moved to this view due to the fact that Fauvelle clearly advocated for a French capitulation as soon as possible. During this meeting Spears would also claim that Weygand said to Reynaud that “This war is sheer madness, we have gone to war with a 1918 army against a German army of 1939”. On the one hand that is a pretty solid analysis by Weygand there, and would be the basis for many criticisms of the French army, its leadership, and its preparations before the war. On the other hand, maybe a little late for that realization. In a meeting later that night, which Spears was not invited to, the conversations which also included the French President Lebrun, were focused on the possibility and desirability of an armistice. Reynaud would later write that it was the series of meetings on May 25th that convinced him that there were others within the French leadership that had already given up on the fight, saying “if I did not know all, at least I knew… that Pétain and Weygand were in favour of asking for an armistice on the day the battle of France was lost, and of allowing the Government to be captured in Paris.” This defeatism was a major problem for the future prospects of French resistance, but it also had a negative impact on what they claimed was critical to successfully resisting the next German attack: greater British support. With the evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk, the French repeatedly and adamantly insisted that the British needed to send more troops to France as quickly as possible. There were still 3 BEF divisions that were available, and that had not gotten caught on the wrong side of the German push to the Sea, these were the 1st Armored Division, the 51st Highland Division, and then a thrown together force that had been given the name of Beauman Division. When combined with all of the supporting troops there were somewhere around 140,000 total British soldiers still in France after Dunkirk, but the French wanted, and really needed more. If the French and British had been outnumbered before the start of the war, the situation was only worse by the start of June, and the only avenue for more troops that could arrive in time was from Britain. These requests were generally met with a positive response from the British government, with assurances given that a second BEF was being created but that it would take time. Another important request from the French was that more British airpower make its way to France, particularly given the very high rate of attrition experienced by the Allied air forces during the first 3 weeks of the campaign. On the topic of air power, even if Churchill who was generally a supporter of sending more forces into France, wanted to send more aircraft, particularly fighters, to France he would experience stringent opposition from many within the RAF including the Air Chief Marshal Dowding. At its most basic level the RAF leaders did not belief that they could both defend Britain from German air attack and send more fighters in France where it was very likely that they would be lost. They instead believed the best course of action was to keep them at home, even if it contributed to France’s defeat because what would come after would demand the maximum possible resources to defend the home islands. The concerns on the British side about the risks involved in sending more resources to France, and the French belief that the situation was doomed fed off each other in kind of feedback loop. The French believed that it was essential that more help arrive, but at the same time the defeatism of the leadership made the British less likely to send more troops out of fear that they would just be lost. The British resistance, or more appropriately their assurances without firm action, made the French leaders who were already advocating for an armistice even more certain that it was the only option, which then made the British less likely to send more troops out of concern that they would be lost. There would eventually be a second BEF sent to France, but as we will discuss in a few episodes it would prove to be far less committed to the Allied cause than the first one had been. The outcome of this would be conversations at the Supreme War Council of British and French leaders where there was a lot of discussion happening but not a lot of firm commitments. Here is a note from a meeting that was held on May 31st, 1940, so right around the time that the evacuations from Dunkirk were reaching their high point, and at a time when everyone’s eyes were turning to what the Germans might do next: “The Supreme War council took note that the British Government, without making any definite promise, would consider immediately, in the light of the discussions which had taken place: a. What reinforcements could be sent to France, with particular reference to the impending battle on the Somme and Aisne, and how soon they could be made available. It is a fight against time. b. What air support could be afforded to this battle; and that they would communicate the results of this consideration to the French Government at the earliest possible moment.”

While conversations were occurring between political and military leaders in France and Britain, there were still men at the front facing the German lines that had been created along primarily the Somme river. The process of trying to create this defensive line had been a frantic scramble to bring French troops up from Southern France and bring together as many reserve formations as possible. All of these forces would be placed under the 3rd Army Group which would eventually consist of around 40 infantry and a handful of both armored and motorized divisions. There were two major problems for the French defensive effort, the first was the fact that the Allied forces were now heavily outnumbered. At the start of the campaign the two sides had been roughly equal in terms of total forces when the Dutch and Belgian forces were taken into account, but both of those nations had surrendered. Then the losses of troops in the north had cut the number even further, which meant that by the time that the new defensive line was being created there were only around 60 total French and British divisions available to match up against over twice that number of German divisions. A great way to make up for that numerical deficit was to anchor a defensive line on a river, like the Somme, it would make it more difficult for the Germans to attack and allow the Allied numbers to have a greater impact. The problem was that the Germans had already been able to establish bridgeheads over the Somme at several key locations, moves that had been made by the German armored divisions during the frantic race to the sea. The most important of these bridgeheads were at Perrone, Amiens, Abbeville, and then right along the coast at St. Valery-Sur-Somme. The importance of these bridgeheads was well known to the French and therefore Weygand ordered counterattacks to be launched as quickly as possible to push the Germans back across the river before their next attack. But there were simply not enough troops to both man a solid defensive line and launch the kind of attacks required to push back the Germans, and the attacks did occur could best be described as a series of uncoordinated efforts that did not have any real chance of success. Once the first attacks failed, there was very little chance of success for any further attacks because during the last week of May a wave of German infantry divisions began to arrive along the entire front along the Somme. These were the infantry divisions that had been marching West since the beginning of the campaign, and they were able to take over the line from the various armored and motorized divisions that had been holding the bridgeheads. While these German divisions were tired, having marched up to 50 kilometers per day since the start of the campaign, they still provided the numbers to secure the bridgeheads, which was a serious problem for the French because it removed most of the utility of the Somme as a barrier against further German aggression. The wiser path, once it was clear that the bridgeheads would not be reduced, might have been to retreat back to another natural obstacle, but the only viable candidate was the Seine river. Withdrawing to the Seine was ruled out by Weygand because it would expose Paris to the fighting, which he did not want to do. The other problem with the Seine was that it would have exposed the Maginot Line to attack from the rear, and the Maginot Line, for all of its future reputation, was the only part of the French war plan which had, up until the end of May actually worked as expected. While I think Weygand’s views about the Siene line are somebody defensible, what is not defensible is the fact that he refused to construct a fallback defensive line behind the Somme line. His justification was that if the line on the Somme broke then it would not matter if there were fallback positions because an orderly retreat would be impossible. This was something of a self fulfilling prophecy though, because there would not be an orderly retreat because there were no positions to fall back to, which could be used to justify the rejection of the idea of building a fallback line. As it was, on May 26th Weygand’s plan to defend along the Somme positions was approved, and the French forces prepared for the coming storm in what was referred to the Weygand Line. All they could do was hope that the outcome of the Weygand Line would be better than the Weygand Plan, unfortunately for the French it would not be.