194: Boulogne, Calais, and The Halt Order

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The channel ports were critical for the BEF, and the Germans knew it. Come check out my keynote speech on the topic of Deception in February 2025: https://intelligentspeechonline.com/ Coupon Code: SECOND

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Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 194 - The Fall of France - Boulogne, Calais, and The Halt Order. This week a big thank you goes out to Joseph, James, Grace, Pat, Kyle, and another James for choosing to support the podcast by becoming members. They now get access to ad free versions of all of the podcast’s episodes and special member only episodes once a month. Head on over to historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members to find out more. On a programming note: next week’s episode will be the last normal podcast episode for a few weeks. I am taking a trip across the pond to the UK and France for a few weeks and so you will be hearing a few interviews throughout September. The normal episodes will resume the first week of October. In related news, I am taking restaurant recommendations which you can send to the podcast email or through social media, for eastern London and Reims, as I will be in both cities for a few days. And if any of my listeners have any control over weather in England, good weather on September 14th would be appreciated, as I will be at the Battle of Britain airshow at IWM Duxford on that day. That is enough about me, onto the episode. While there was a British Expeditionary Force on the continent the channel ports would always be important, they were the path of supplies for the British troops while in France, and they were also the best way for any supplies from Britain to reach the fighting. After the German forces reached the channel at Abbeville, and then the counterattacks against the German corridor on May 21st failed, the remaining ports that had access to the Allied pocket in Belgium became not just important but critical to the the continuing existence of all of the divisions trapped on the northern side of the corridor. Initially there were three major ports: Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk, and the Germans were fully aware of their importance. All three of them were priority targets for the Panzer forces of Panzer Group Kleist, and of Guderian’s 1st, 2nd, and 10th Panzer divisions. Boulogne would fall in just a few days, Calais would hold out a little while longer, and Dunkirk, well Dunkirk is of course a much bigger story.

This episodes begins in Boulogne, where the Britsh 20th Guards Brigade, a bit over 1400 men in all, under the command Brigadier Fox-Pitt would begin to disembark from the ships that had brought them from Britain on May 22nd. The Guards were one of the forces sent by the British government to Boulogne and Calais out of concern that the Germans were going to quickly capture the two port cities and then advance further along the coast to completely separate the BEF from the sea, a situation which would lead to disaster. These British reinforcements would add to the defense of Boulogne, which was already defended by a few elements of the French 21st infantry division, more French forces were on their way but their train had been delayed. This delay was a major problem, and the arrival of the British forces would have meant nothing except for the actions of a few soldiers of the French 21st Divisions 48th Regiment. Late in the morning of May 22nd, the German forces were approaching the village of Nesles-Neufchâtel to the south of Boulogne. The good news was that the French had positioned 4 75mm and 4 25 mm guns in this area, which was near the headquarters of the 48th Regiment. The bad news was that very few of the actual infantry units of the 48th Regiment had arrived, and therefore the only way that the gunners could be supported was by bringing together the headquarters staff of the 48th. And so the drivers, secretaries, and other administrative staff was brought together and all of the French forces were positioned around a critical crossroads where they would wait for the Germans to arrive. This thrown together force would at least slow the German advance, and after the Germans had lost 2 tanks they were forced to take the time to outflank and disable the anti-tank guns before they could continue. However, it was always going to be about slowing and not stopping the German attack, and they would continue north. On one of the roads another 2 German tanks would be disabled by another French anti-tank gun, with the gun apparently firing until the very moment that the German tanks were at point blank range, a testament to the bravery of the French gunner. But by the early morning hours of May 23rd the Germans were ready to launch their attack on Boulogne itself, and as soon as the troops of the 2nd Panzer began their attack Fox-Pitt and the French forces in the area were forced to fall back. They would be able to hold out for the day of May 23rd, but then during the night the British forces called in the Royal navy to evacuate as many British troops as possible, leaving only a few hundred behind. There was a problem though, the French general Lanquetot, who was the commander of the French forces in Boulogne, had not been informed that the British troops were being evacuated. When he found out about it, he was quite reasonably very angry, and openly talked about a British betrayal. Even though they were heavily outnumbered the French and remaining British forces would continue to fight on over the following day, during which Boulogne would be the scene of brutal house to house fighting as the Germans slowly pushed the defenders back. The French garrison would hold out until the morning of May 25th at which point they would surrender. It was the first of the three channel ports to fall, and the evacuation of the British forces on the night of May 23rd would be one of the strongest pieces of ammunition used by anti-British French leaders in the days that followed.

Over the course of this entire series we have been tracking the pauses enforced on the German armored divisions by German High Command. This first occurring on the 17th of May, then on the 21st as well, and in both cases the paused were for about 24 hours and were put in place when concerns about possible Allied actions grew to a point where there was concern that the divisions at the front would be cut off before the slower infantry divisions could arrive. In both cases there were strong opinions on both sides, and the decisions get some light criticism from historians, but nothing compares to the criticism leveled against the German leaders who supported the third halt order of May 24th, which is often referred to as the Dunkirk halt order. Conversations about this new halt order really got rolling in the evening of May 23rd, and it originated at the headquarters of von Rundstedt. The idea seems to have originated from conversations between Rundstedt and the commander of the 4th Army, von Kluge. Due to a reorganization of forces a few days before, the 4th Army had all of the German armored divisions under Rundstedt’s command. The order that was given was very similar to the previous pauses, with the plan being for these divisions to pause for 24 hours while infantry forces continued marching, with the hope that they would be able to close up, or aufschließen during that time. The only German forces that would continue their attacks the next day would be two infantry corps around Arras which were pushing back the British forces that had attacked in that region over the previous days. The duration of this new pause was very clearly set to be another 24 hours, and the Panzer Groups under Kleist and Hoth were told to prepare to continue their attacks on the 25th of May, just like what had happened during the two earlier pauses. It is at that point that the new situation on the night of May 23rd began to diverge from the earlier instances. When news arrived at German high command of the orders that von Rundstedt had given they were very concerned. Both Halder, the Chief of Staff, and Brauchitsch the Commander in Chief of the Army began to intervene. Instead of overruling Runstedt’s order, which would have been very heavy handed and probably would have required his replacement, Brauchitsch instead wanted to remove the Fourth Army from Army Group A, which meant that Rundstedt would not longer have any armored divisions under his command. The 4th Army would instead be moved under Army Group B, commanded by General von Bock, which had started the war attacking through the Netherlands and Belgium. Bock had a very different view of the situation when compared to Rundstedt and those views could not have been more different when it came to the possibility of an allied counterattack. On May 25th the situation report from Army Group A would state “One cannot rule out the possibility that the enemy is conducting his movements according to a uniform plan with the intention of breaking through the Fourth Army and its subordinate mobile troops by attacking from north and from south in order thus to restore contact between his separated army elements.” While at the same time Bock would write in his diary at roughly this same time that “I had no worries of this sort whatsoever; if they were ever at all justified, they have become completely invalid ever since the Eighteenth and Sixth Armies got the English by the throat, making them happy just to escape with their lives." Bock was very close to correct, and by May 25th the minds of all of the British and French commanders of trapped divisions were devoted to how to extract their forces from the growing disaster, not how to launch a major counter attack. While Brauchitsch wanted to move the 4th Army over to Bock, for reasons that seems pretty clear based on the opinions of the two Army Group commanders, Halder was concerned that making such a move so late in the campaign could cause problems.

Halder was correct, but mostly because Hitler was about to get involved. The problems started when Hitler arrived at Rundstedt’s headquarters on May 24th to discuss the situation and his plans to continue the attack. When he arrived he learned that the Rundstedt had been ordered to hand over the 4th Army to Bock. Hitler then did, well Hitler things, and immediately declared the orders for the 4th Army to be null and void and that they should be completely ignored. He made this decision because Rundstedt’s thoughts on the situation were very similar to Hilter’s own, with Hitler having been concerned about a possible allied counter attack for several days. Later on the 24th Hitler would issue his specific order for where the forces should halt, with the important part of the order being that the troops to the east of Dunkirk, which were part of Army Group B could continue the advance, at the same time the infantry corps around Arras could also continue, but all of the mobile divisions to the west of Dunkirk had to stop their advance immediately. This new order really just meant that the previously ordered halt was to continue into the next day, even though it was originally only supposed to be in force on the 24th. Importantly, and this is another example of Hitler just causing problems, he would also make it clear that he gave Rundstedt the full power to decide when to continue the attack. This gave Rundstedt a tremendous amount of power, with Hitler’s backing he could basically ignore any orders that he did not like from German high command, a power that he would quickly take advantage of. Brauchitsch and Halder would try and get around the halt order by giving some directions to Army Groups A and B which used the very specific words “the go=ahead is given” instead of the word ordered to try and get around any problems. But Rundstedt simply refused to pass on this order to his troops, ending any chance of some sort of creative circumvention of Hitler’s halt order. Then the halt order continued, not just on the 25th but on the 26th as well, and in fact things would not resume until early on the 27th. In some ways it seemed like Rundstedt, having the backing of Hitler, prolonged the halt longer than he originally would have just to prove a point.

When the attack resumed on the 27th the situation around Dunkirk had completely changed, for reasons that we will discuss next episode, and instead of it being lightly held the British and french had spent the previous two days frantically moving troops into defensive positions around the city. This meant that when the German attacks restarted they quickly bogged down due to the resistance that they faced and it would take many more days before Dunkirk would be captured, during which the evacuation of troops from the port would continue. Looking back now, the halt order on the 24th was the second time that the advance towards Dunkirk was paused, possibly preventing the Germans from capturing it before any evacuations could take place. The capture of Dunkirk was not certain though, the German armored forces, particularly those of Guderian, were once again stretched, with large portions of Guderian’s artillery tied up in the attack on Boulogne and Calais. So it is possible that maybe they would not have been able to reach Dunkirk, and they would have been stopped by French resistance. However, it is worth noting that some of the criticism of the extended halt order also comes after the campaign, particularly in later writings by Guderian. Because critically, the German leaders on May 23rd and 24th did not know that the British were going to try to stage a massive evacuation, and the impact that such an evacuation would have on the course of the war. That understanding would only come later, after Operation Dynamo had been completed.

While all of the conversations and orders, and counter orders, and Hitler needing to be involved was happening among the German military leaders, at the port of Calais the fighting would continue. Calais would receive British reinforcement just like Boulogne, with Brigadier Nicholson’s 30th Motor Brigade arriving on May 22nd. They would join the forces that were already in Calais, which had a larger than normal garrison during the campaign because it was the largest port of supply for the BEF, with the stockpile of rations in the city being particularly large. Another two battalions of British reinforcements arrived on May 23rd to increase the size of the defending forces which allowed Nicholson to set up two defensive lines. The first was simply a screen to slow the advance and then an outer perimeter which was based on a ring of 19th century fortifications. These defenses were mostly manned and ready when the German forces arrived outside the city on May 23rd. As German pressure mounted around Calais Nicholson made the decision to begin to collapse back to an inner perimeter that he had mapped out when he arrived which would drastically reduce the amount of territory that his troops were trying to defense, which of course also drastically reduced the length of their front. At 3AM on may 24th Nicholson received a message from the War Office which indicated that his troops would at some point in the new future would be evacuated with the exact message saying “Evacuation decided in principle. When you have finished unloading your two MT [motor transport] ships, commence embarkation of all personnel except fighting personnel who will remain to cover final evacuation.” Then at 6AM Nichsolson would be able to communicated with the War Office via telephone, and during the conversation he was told that the evacuation probably would not occur for at least 24 hours, but was still the plan. The belief that evacuation would occur would continue throughout most of the day of May 24th, as the fighting continued throughout the inner perimeter that had been established. However, back in London the decision to evacuate Calais would be reversed on the 24th and this information would be given to Nicholson late on the 24th. There were two primary reasons for this change in policy, which would result in the eventual death or capture of all of the British forces at Calais. The first was due to the belief that the continued resistance at Calais was playing an important role in slowing the German advance towards Dunkirk. The British were focused on evacuating as many troop as possible from Dunkirk, and so any delay of German forces moving that direction was very valuable. The minutes from a meeting of the British War Cabinet meeting spell this out quite clearly, with the minutes document from a meeting on the 25th stating that ‘It was essential to hold on to Calais for as long as possible. If we attempted to withdraw our garrison from Calais, the German troops in Calais would immediately march on Dunkirk. A message should be sent to our troops in Calais telling them that every hour that they could hold out would be of immeasurable value to the British Army.’ The second primary reason for the continued defense of Calais was the actions of the French. Around the same time that Nicholson received the information early on May 24th that his forces were to be evacuated this information was passed to the commander of the French troops in Calais Commandant Le Tellier. He would then telephone General Fagalde, who had been put in command of all of the French forces that were defending all of the channel ports. Fagalde did not believe that the ports should be evacuated by anyone, and that the fighting should continue as long as possible, and that the British should continue fighting whether they liked it or not. These concerns then moved up the chain of French command, resulting in political pressure on the British not to once again abandon the French defenders of another city like what had happened at Boulogne. Looking back, the reasons that the British forces were left at Calais are important because they help us understand the course of the campaign, but for the men who were left to fight on, the reasons that they were still there mattered not at all. Early on May 25th there would be an attempt by the Germans to arrange a surrender, but Nicholson would replay that ‘The answer is no, as it is the British Army’s duty to fight as well as it is the German’s.’ At 7:55PM on the 25th, the commander of one unit, that had lost contact with Nicholson would communicate directly with officers across the channel in Dover “From Rifle Brigade Calais. Citadel a shambles. Brigadier’s fate unknown. Casualties Rifle Brigade may be 60 per cent. Being heavily attacked and flanked, but attempting counterattack. Am attempting contact with KRRCs fighting in the town. Are you sending ships? Quay intact in spite of very severe bombardment.” General Schaal, the commander of the German assault forces of the 10th Panzer division was working under a bit of a compressed timeline, because he was told that if his forces were not making real process by the afternoon of the 26th his units would be called off and the Luftwaffe would be brought in to simply destroy the entire city with bombing. This would not happen, and by 2PM the German forces were making their final assaults into the city. For the British and French forces, by the middle of the afternoon of the 26th the defense was simply falling apart. Orders began to go out in some units that officers and men should try and hide until dark and then stage a breakout. New arrived at the the Citadel, where the British had setup their headquarters that the French forces had surrendered at 3PM. Lieutenant Evitts, a signalmen among the headquarters staff would record Nicholson’s reaction when he was informed of the French surrender “The bitter agony of defeat lay unmistakably written on his face. Now he was about to suffer the humiliation of surrender… The French naval liaison officer again came into the fort. This time he went straight to the Brigadier and spoke quietly to him. Then Colonel Holland, after a few words with him, came over to me and said: ‘The Germans have reached the Fort. I want you to go out and take the first ten men with you; there you will have to surrender.” The defense of Calais was over, and with the fall of Boulogne a few days earlier there was only one channel port left: Dunkirk.