193: Cut Off

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The British and French divisions that were cut off in Belgium had a real problem, and it was getting worse by the hour. https://intelligentspeechonline.com/ Coupon Code: SECOND

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Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 193 - The Fall of France - Cut Off. This week a big thank you goes out to Jeff, Mike, Ada, Nick, and Hidko for choosing to support the podcast by becoming members. Members get access to ad-free versions of all of the podcast’s episodes plus special member only episodes once a month. Head on over to historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members to find out more. 10 days after they had started their attack in the Ardennes forest, on may 20th the German forces reached the English Channel. They would then solidify their position and then expand the territory under their control in the days that followed. 45 divisions of the French Army, and majority of the British Expeditionary Force were all now trapped within Belgium. This set the stage for the next two phases of the campaign. Back at German high command, with the primary objective of the first phase of the invasion, they were already starting on plans for the next phase of the campaign, Case Red, the invasion of the rest of France. The first, and most immediate phase would be the efforts of both sides to resolve the situation of the cut off divisions. For the Germans that meant squeezing the pocket while trying to prevent any kind of seaborne reinforcement or evacuation. For the French and British that meant another counterattack attempt as soon as possible to punch through the German corridor to the coast. The goal was to launch this counterattack on May 21st, before the German forces could really solidify themselves along the edges of the advance of the Panzer divisions. Every day, every hour, resulted in a stronger German defense and sapped the power of the possible counterattack. A rapid and unified response was critical.

The need for decisive action was under cut at almost every turn in the days before the proposed counterattack. First up, in a real administrative error, the British moved their headquarters and then just did not tell the French. The movement of the headquarters was reasonable, at the start of the campaign the British HQ was based in Arras, a position that began to look a bit more vulnerable as the German attack developed. Therefore the decision was made to move to Boulogne on the coast. The headquarters would begin to move on the 17th, although it would take into the 18th until it was completed. However, nobody told the French liaison staff that had been present at Arras to work with the British, and in fact they would only find out that the British were moving after it was done, and then it took two days for the French to catch up to the British because it was unclear exactly where they had gone. This is just a small thing, but it unfortunately came at a very critical time when cooperation between the two armies was as critical as it ever would be. The replacement of Gamelin did nothing to improve the confidence of the British commanders in their continental allies. On May 20th Chief of the Imperial General Staff Ironside would travel to see the BEF’s commander Gort. Ironside could see the need for a counterattack, and ordered Gort to launch one as quickly as possible, before any consultations with the French. Gort would agree to try and get something prepared, probably with two reserve divisions and one tank brigade. While this was done Ironside went off to visit Billotte the commander of the French First Army Group. Billotte would agree to support any British attack to the south, but that isn’t the most important part of this conversation. Instead, you will notice that Ironside was visiting Billotte, not Gamelin or Weygand, and not General Georges both of which were above Billotte in the French chain of command. Ironside felt that action needed to occur immediately, and he had lost faith in French high command. While not going through the proper channels, the good news for the British and French is that Ironside’s ideas, and how Gort planned to implement them were not very different than what Weygand would eventually end up ordering.

But these orders would only be given after another round of confusion. After he took command of the French armies, Weygand immediately cancelled Gamelin’s counterattack plans which had been ordered mere hours before. Weygand wanted to go into Belgium to meet with the British and French generals to arrange and plan for his big counter attack. Weygand would arrive at Ypres for the meetings, the first of which would occur with the Belgian King Leopold in the middle of the afternoon. At this point in the campaign the Belgian forces were still fighting, just as they had done against the Germans during the First World War, and while the Belgian army was not as well equipped as the British and French it was doing its best. If there was to be a French and British counterattack the assistance of the Belgians would be required because they would have to take on more responsibility for the defense against the German forces that were closing in from the east. The French General Billotte would then arrive later, as he was simply delayed in arriving. Weygand would discuss the proposed counterattack with Billotte, but then Weygand had to leave to begin his trip back to the coast so that he could go back to French headquarters having never had a chance to speak to the British general Gort. This was a major problem for two important reasons. The first was that the British were to act as the spearhead of the upcoming attack, and their contribution and their actions would be the most important contributor to its success or failure. The second was because it caused Weygand to immediately question the contributions, and continued dedication, of the British something that the next few days of the campaign would only amplify. Gort did eventually arrive at Ypres, but would only be able to meet with Billotte. He had arrived so late due to several different delays. The first was a delay in the news of the meeting even reaching him, due to some problems in finding the BEF’s Advanced headquarters from one side of Lille to the other. Just a simple change that caused chaos because the British staff officers did not ensure that the French liaison officers knew where they were at all times. When the information arrived, Gort was actually meeting with his corps commanders at another location close to Lille, so another delay was introduced while the information was given to him. All of these issues simply pushed back Gort’s arrival in Ypres just enough to miss Weygand. Billotte did communicate all of the essential information though, but when he was briefed Gort’s response was non-committal. In his evaluation, Gort believed that the basic outline of the plan made perfect sense, but his concern was that the situation was so fluid, and rapidly changing every hour, that it might not be possible to bring together the required troops to make it happen. Gort’s views were also impacted by the British counterattack that was occurring on May 21st around Arras, which was in some ways a smaller version of what Weygand had planned. We will discuss some more details here in a moment, but it was not exactly a rousing success, and while Gort did not have perfect information he knew that it was having some challenges. But these doubts did not prevent Gort from agreeing to the plan, and that he would do his best to play his part.

While the British and French generals were trying to get together for a chat at Ypres, around Arras another counterattack was already underway. This was the counterattack that had been first discussed several days earlier, and which Ironside, Gort, and Billotte had sorted out on May 20th. What was initially planned as an effort by two British divisions and a tank brigade was downgraded to an attack by a much smaller force of two tank and three infantry battalions. The attack would also have far less artillery support than originally hoped, but there were 88 tanks, which was nothing to scoff at if they could get them moving. They would, theoretically, be working in conjunction with French forces of the 3rd French Light Mechanized division, but this cooperation was mostly theoretical, the French would add another 60 tanks to the effort. The French would attack, but there was very little linking to two attacks together. The goal of the attack was, as with seemingly every counterattack launched by the British and French, to advance far enough into the side of the German salient to isolate the German armored forces close to the coast. The British side of the attack would begin in the middle of the afternoon on May 21st, just as Weygand and King Leopold were meeting in Ypres and Gort was on his way to the Belgian city. When the tanks of the 1st Tank Brigade went forward, there was some immediate success. This was primarily driven by the fact that the standard German anti-tank gun at this point in the war was incapable of penetrating the armor of most of the British infantry support tanks, like the Matilda. This meant that there was initially little that the troops of the German 7th Panzer and SS Division Totenkopf could do about the British tanks that were moving in on them. Among the SS troops this caused some panic, a common reaction to inexperienced troops in such circumstances. However, the slow moving British tanks were very vulnerable when a battery of 88mm anti-aircraft guns were encountered, and the attack rapidly ground to a halt. In an ideal world these anti-aircraft guns could have been dealt with through the support of the British infantry, but they were separated from the armored attack due to German fire, which was not suppressed due to a lack of British artillery support. On other areas of the attack a similar sequence of events would occur, the British tanks would roll forward and overwhelm the first German troops they encountered who did not have anything that could damage the tanks. But then as they advanced further they would eventually run into German artillery. In one of these areas would be troops of the 7th Panzer, which at the time of the British attack would have Rommel in attendance. He would later write that during this attack “I brought every available gun into action at top speed against the tanks. Every gun, both anti-tank and anti-aircraft, was ordered to open rapid fire immediately and I personally gave each gun its target. With the enemy tanks so perilously close, only rapid fire from every gun could save the situation. We ran from gun to gun … All I cared about was to halt the enemy tanks by heavy gunfire.” These artillery efforts would eventually knock out most of the Mark 1 Matilda’s, although the Mark 2s were slightly better protected. However, even the best protected tanks could only continue the attack so long with few infantry in support and stripped of supporting vehicles. By the evening the British forces had been forced to pull back to where the attack began, during which they felt the brunt of attacks from hundreds of German aircraft. During the attack, which at the end of the day accomplished nothing in terms of territory gain, had cost the British 40 tanks and the French 20 tanks, although Allied infantry casualties had been light. On the German side, 12 tanks were lost, about 400 men were killed or wounded, and the British and French tanks did damage to a lot of non-armored vehicles. Losing vehicles and tanks were never good, but the greatest impact of this attack had nothing to do with the men at the front.

After the combined British and French attack on may 21st a wave of panic once again spread through German high command. Just like a few days earlier when concerns about a French attack from the south had caused frantic conversations that resulted in the May 17th halt order, once again the specter of possible Allied counter attacks, this time from the north and the south, caused discussions about another halt order and a movement of Panzer forces away from their further gains and back along the route that they had come. The gap between the Panzers and the Infantry was again the primary concern. Rundstedt, one of the primary advocates for the earlier halt orders would later write that: “A critical moment in the drive came just as my forces had reached the Channel. It was caused by a British counterstroke southward from Arras toward Cambrai, on 21 May. For a short time it was feared that our armoured divisions would be cut off before the infantry divisions could come up to support them.” It is worth noting, that just like in the earlier instances where this concerns resulted in a halt or a slowing of the advance, there was very little panic at the front, and in fact among the leadership of the divisions actually at the front there was very little concern. But the situation looked very differently at German high command, even though the German Chief of Staff General Halder pushed for continued action, sensing that the Allies were off balance and would not be able to mount a series counterattack. Hitler would use the attack on May 21st as evidence that his military intuition was better than that of his generals, and that they were underestimating their enemies and putting the entire campaign at risk. In this case Hitler was completely misjudging the abilities of the Allied forces on either side of the German corridor and Halder was much closer to accurate. Just like during the discussions before May 17th, Halder understood that there was still some risks involved in how the German forces were positioned but he still highly valued the pressure that the German forces could put on the retreating allied forces as long as they kept moving. This, according to Halder, was the best way to prevent a possible British or French attack, because it would prevent them from having the time to concentrate and launch such an operation. In this regard Halder was exactly accurate, and that was exactly the situation for the Allied forces. Halder of course could only advise and could not alter Hitler’s thinking, which resulted in the halt orders once again being sent out to the German leaders closer to the front. While all of the various movements either to or along the coast were interrupted there were a few diversions in particular that we will focus on in slightly more detail. First up was the 6th and 8th Panzer divisions under the command of General Reinhardt. These divisions had previously been moving towards the coastal ports but were not instead ordered to turn inland to attack the British forces that had just launched their attack at Arras. Reinhardt was not a fan of this change in where his troops were advancing, as they were not advancing back to the east to guard against a take that within only a few hours would no longer be a threat. The more famous change in plans was the orders given to the 1st, 2nd and 10th Panzer divisions. The 1st and 2nd Panzer were approaching the channel ports of Calais and Boulogne respectively while the 10th Panzer was targeting the port of Dunkirk. Dunkirk was at this point mostly undefended, and the 10th Panzer was not very far away from capturing it when the order came for the 10th to stop its advance immediately. This was once again another pause for 24 hours, just like the one from the 17th, and importantly for those who know where this story is going this pause was not the famous Dunkirk Halt Order, spoilers, the title of next week’s episode is going to be The Dunkirk Halt Order. However, in some ways this pause was even more impactful than the later halt order because during the 21st there was little standing between the 10th Panzer and capturing Dunkirk completely. This would have prevented the evacuation entirely, while the later order simply would have ended it prematurely. So in many ways, you can thank the brave British and French soldiers would advanced at Arras for enabling the conditions for the evacuation of Dunkirk. On May 22, when the advance resumed, the targets were shifted with Boulogne and Calais being the new targets of the 2nd and 10th Panzer, with the 1st Panzer just acting in support.

While the German armored units were renewing their advance on May 22nd, in Paris another meeting of the Supreme War Council was taking place. The purpose of these conversations, other than just a general discussion of the situation at the front, was for Weygand to make his proposal for his great offensive which would be detailed in his Operation Order No. 1 which would be issued on the 22nd. This plan, forever to be known as the Weygand Plan, was the output of 3 days of work and discussions among Weygand and his staff. There was nothing revolution about the plan that Weygand was putting forward, more French troops had been brought onto the southern side of the German advance and they had been formed into the newly created Third Army Group. They would attack north from the city of Amiens on the Somme river. In the north the forces that were trapped would attack south with the majority of their mobile and armored strength. Everyone assembled agreed that the Weygan plan was a good path forward and that it should be put in place. It was at this point that the theoretical plan had to deal with the reality of the situation which had diverged over the previous days, and it would diverge further almost by the hour. On the southern side of the German corridor the situation was generally in line with what the plan called for, but on the norther side, within the shrinking pocket it was not even close. The attacks of the previous days, at Arras and another French effort towards Cambrai had used up a major portion of the armored and motorized units that were available to the trapped armies. Even ignoring all of the tanks, trucks, and other vehicles that had been lost, those that remained were disorganized and would take time before they could be brought together again for another effort. During May 22-23 there would also be several planned withdrawals among the British and French forces as they tried to fall back in an organized way towards the coast. They could not risk being cut off from the channel ports, and so they always had to favor a retreat when their access to those ports was threatened. The displacement of various divisions and the difficulties in concentrating the required units together for the effort meant that the counterattack, which was originally planned for My 23 was delayed until the 24th, then the 26, and then the 27th at which point it was cancelled. By the 27th the basic idea of the counterattack was no longer valid due to the deterioration of the situation in the north, but even on the 23rd it was probably already doomed to failure. This was primarily due to the movements of the divisions we have discussed basically not at all throughout this series: the German infantry divisions. These divisions had been marching since the beginning of the invasion, and by the 23rd they were already reaching the areas around Arras, closing that gap between the infantry and the German armor and freeing the more mobile German divisions to move further west and north. One of the issues being faced by British and French forces during this period, as they frantically tried to defend against the continuous German advances were all of the French and Belgian refugees that were also on the move. The French would issue an official government proclamation which said: “The Germans … wish to create panic among populations to incite them to leave towns and villages – even those which are situated far from the combat zones. Their aim is in this way to block roads and hinder the manoeuvre of the Allied forces. Our military operations are being slowed down as a result. German planes are taking advantage of this to bomb and gun down both military personnel and civilian evacuees indiscriminately. Such bomb attacks are considerably aggravating the sense of panic in the population.” But the impact of this was not always apparent. One of the British defenders of Arras, Eric Cole of the 1st Welsh Guards, would write that “There were literally thousands of people, a never ending stream of refugees, some pulling hand carts, others with prams, [and] horse[s] and cart[s]. Young people, old people; it was a shambles; all rushing to get as far away from the enemy as possible. One poor old man threw himself in front of our truck. He wanted us to run [him over]. With difficulty, we got him to one side… [We wondered] how… an army [could] manage to put up a line of defence with such a crowd everywhere.”