192: To The Coast!

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Things were going very badly for the French, but then the Germans gave them a bit of a breather.

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Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 192 - The Fall of France - To the Coast! This week a big thank you goes out to Matthew, Ryan, and Jeffrey for choosing to support the podcast by becoming members. Members get access to ad-free versions of all of the podcast’s episodes plus special Member only episodes once a month. You can find out more about becoming a member over at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. By May 17th something really interesting was happening among the leadership groups on both sides of the invasion of France. In Paris and London there was real fear that the French Army had already been defeated, and that there was little that could be done to stop the German forces that were moving West. Troops were on their way from other areas of the front as quickly as possible, but those movements would take time and nothing that the French Army had done in the first 4 days after the crossings of the Meuse seemed to make that much difference. However, on the German side the mood was not a feeling of elation and victory but instead of stress and concern about what the French might do in the days that followed. Since the very beginning of the campaign there was concern among high ranking German generals and political leaders that the German Panzer divisions would be at major risk of disaster as they advanced to the west. Most of this was due to the speed that they were able to push forward, with some of the Panzer divisions making jumps of 50 kilometers or more in a single day. There were a very limited number of motorized infantry divisions that could up that kind of pace, and so the armored spearheads were leaving the bulk of the German forces, which were infantry behind. And so while the Panzer divisions continued to move west away from the Meuse they were creating concerns among both German and Allied leadership for completely different reasons. However, unlike the French and British who did not feel like they could do anything to stop the German advance, the leaders on the German side absolutely could do something to stop the advance, it was simply an order away. On May 17th that order would be issued.

Two of the primary drivers of the concern among the German leadership were General von Rundstedt, the head of Army Group A, which controlled the sector of the front where the Meuse crossings had been made and Adolf Hitler himself. For von Rundstedt the reason for this concern was due to the French forces that were building up along the Aisne river on the south side of the growing German salient. These were the troops that were being brought in from the southern areas of the front and which were trying to line the southern end of the salient in the hopes that it would prevent it from expanding too much further west. Hitler shared these concerns, but that should also be mixed with Hitler’s general reaction to such situations, up to this point in the war when things were going too well he would often get cold feet, which had happened time after time over the previous years, even though in most cases he ended up going through with things. In many accounts both during the war and after, the German generals make it clear that it was Hitler and his personal order that caused this first halt. Guderian would note his disappointment that it would be Hitler who would make this order, after he was so enthusiastic in his support for Manstein’s bold plan before the beginning of the operation. Hitler had wanted a bold stroke, until the bold stroke was in progress, and now he let caution get the best of him, at least in Guderian’s mind. It is worth nothing that not everyone at German High Command shared these concerns, for example General Halder, Chief of the General Staff, believed that fears of a French counterattack were largely overblown and in fact the conservative actions proposed by Hitler and von Rundstedt would simply allow them to recover from the attacks. Even though Halder would advise against it, there was little that he could really do to prevent some kind of halt order from being issued. He would try, with some attempts at creative interpretation, like by trying to alter the order form Hitler so that it only applied to rear area troops, basically anything but the armored spearheads, but this would not work. Instead Hitler just reiterated what he wanted, and that was for the Panzer divisions to stop immediately. While this did resemble some of Hitler’s earlier moments of concern and caution it was also new in one important way, this was the first time that Hitler had serious interfered with the events of the invasion of France. During the first week of operations his actions had been limited and he had not truly altered the course of operations, but now he would decisively change the course of the campaign for the first, but not the last time. Halder, in an attempt to give an alternative, suggested that if the concern was the French forces on the southern flank of the advance, why didn’t Guderian just wheel south and attack them directly. This could solve too problems at once, prevent the kind of flank attack that Hitler and Rundstedt were so concerned about while also preventing the issue that Halder was trying to avoid, which was a recovery of the French forces due to a pause in operations. Such a southern wheel was a bold plan, there was no doubt about that, and Hitler was against it for that reason. One of the interesting developments during this period was that the two Panzer divisions that had started the war making their attacks in central Belgium, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions were able to finally move through the Gembloux Gap. This was important because it allowed them to join up on the northern side of Hoth’s Panzer Corps which brought all of the German armored divisions together in one continuous line from the 3rd and 4th Panzer in the north all the way to the 10th Panzer in the south, 9 Armored divisions in all. But not matter exactly how many armored divisions they had, the core of the problem though was that when the German attack had been launched, while there was a basic outline for what the armored divisions would do, the exact specifics had not been agreed upon. This was most important for Panzer Group Kleist, which was on the southern side of the German forces that were advancing and which was theoretically most at risk from a French counterattack. On the morning of May 16th concern had risen to the point where Rundstedt felt like he had to act and he would issue an order that the troops under his command would halt the bulk of their forces on the Beaumont-Montcornet Line and they would only be able to send only small advanced detachments beyond that point. The next major obstacle would be the Sambre and Oise rivers, and they would not be crossed unless he specifically approved of them. This order, which would be sent out from Rundstedt’s headquarters on may 16th is an interesting one because it was simply too slow in arriving. Over the course of May 16th Kleist’s Panzer divisions were hard charging forward already, with Guderian’s divisions advancing in some cases 40 kilometers on May 16th alone, which pushed them beyond the Beaumont-Montcornet line even before the order arrived that they should stop at that line. In fact, both the 1st and 2nd divisions were already at the Oise river by the evening of May 16th, and they had captured three bridges to allow them to cross as early as the next day. They were joined by the 6th Panzer division to their north. During these advances Guderian and the commander of the 6th Division General Kempf would actually meet in the afternoon in Montcornet as their forces continued forward. These advances were possible because along the entire sector of the front the German forces had broken through the chain of hills to the west of the Ardennes Canal, which the French had been trying to fortify. Once they got beyond those hills the greatest enemy of the Panzer returned to rear its ugly head, traffic problems. A major reason that Guderian and Kempf met in Montcornet was not just because they needed a hug, but instead because they needed to sort out which divisions were using which roads if they wanted to be able to continue forward. During their advances on May 16th, for some reason Guderian was experiencing communication difficulties that prevented the halt order from being properly delivered by radio. And therefore took until an officer hand delivered a written copy of the order in the early hours of May 17th before he received the order and had to properly respond to it. By the time that it was delivered the forces under his command were already reinforcing their bridgeheads across the Oise in preparation for future operations. Guderian would later write that “I never received any further order as to what I was to do once the bridgehead over the Meuse was captured. All my decisions, until I reached the Atlantic seaboard at Abbéville, were taken by me and me alone. The Supreme Command’s influence on my actions was merely restrictive throughout.” which is probably the mildest thing he said about the orders he received during this phase of the operation. The specific order that was delivered was not just that Guderian’s forces would stop, but also that it would take up defensive positions until the 12th Army, which was moving up behind but was falling behind very quickly, arrived to occupy defensive positions along the southern edge of the front. Kleist had joined Halder in advising that this order would not have the result that was hoped, but there was little that he could do against very direct orders from above. Guderian was ordered to report to the airfield near Montcornet the next morning so that an in person meeting could happen between Kleist and Guderian, a meeting which would discuss the future course of the campaign.

What occurred when Guderian and Kleist met at the airfield would result in a really interesting story to tell, at the very least. During their discussion Guderian asked to be relieved of command, which Kleist accepted without hesitation. However, as news of this information cycled up the chain of command there were concerns that such a resignation would not be a good idea given the current stage of the campaign. Therefore General List, the commander of the 12th Army, which was the army following behind Panzer Group Kleist, was dispatched to talk to Guderian. He was empowered to reinstate Guderian and to try and smooth things over. As a bit of an olive branch Guderian was told that he could launch a reconnaissance in force as long as he did not move his corps command forward from the position around Montcornet. This was all that Guderian needed, because the concept of a reconnaissance in force could be creatively interpreted to give him a tremendous amount of power when it came to what was actually going to happen. Such creative control is always what Guderian wanted. By the end of the day some of Guderian’s forces were already moving west again, doing nothing but reconnaissance, obviously. I think at this point it is clear that I generally agree with some of the German armored generals that the halt order was not a good idea, but there was some merit in at least slowing the advance of the armored divisions to the west, even if that merit was not found in the risks of a French counterattack. This was because, a major problem for the German divisions was that it was difficult for all of supporting troops of the German divisions to keep up with some of the forces at the front. For example, one of these units that were in a challenging position were the bridging units, which for many reasons had problems being as mobile as the German tank formations. This was one of the reasons that the Oise river crossings were so important for Guderian and other German units, because if the French had managed to destroy the bridges over that river it would have taken some time for bridging units to catch up and be prepared to help the tank units make the jump across the river. Another growing problem is that everytime one of the armored divisions had to leave troops for behind to defend a point in the line the strength of the forwardmost units was reduced. This would greatly reduce the infantry strength of the forward most units, leaving them at great risk in certain situations.

While the various Panzer divisions were running wild over the roads of France there was one force that was sent to counterattack them near Montcornet. This force was the 4th Armor Division commanded by Colonel Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle would of course have a major role to play in the war after 1940, given his leadership position of the Free French government and then his adventures in French politics after 1945, but before the war he was mostly just seen as a relatively radical French military officer who was at odds with many of the commanders of the Army. But he was still given command of the 4th Armored Division. On May 10th 1940 when the German invasion started the 4th Armored Division did not really exist, and it was mostly a theoretical unit after in the days that followed it was rapidly thrown together with whatever armored units were available. By the time that its counterattack started on the morning of May 17th de Gaulle had just under 100 tanks under his command along with some supporting infantry and artillery. When the attack began moving forward it would do so at what was maybe the best position along the entire front, as its attack route took it right behind the 1st Panzer division that was still pushing forward, into exact the gap that men like von Rundstedt and Hitler were worried about, which was the areas behind the forward panzer divisions but in front of the advancing support troops. At the time that de Gaulle attacked, unbeknownst to the French, Kleist, Guderian, and Kirchner, the commander of the 1st Panzer division were all meeting in Montcornet. And with the very limited number of German troops between the French tanks and their objective there was a real chance that they could push forward and capture the German leadership, which would have caused all number of problems. The first part of the attack went well, but the German forces were in part saved by the quick thinking actions of a supply officer from the 1st Panzer Division, von Kielmansegg. Kielmansegg rapidly collected a group of engineers and other random troops that were in the vicinity and they threw up a mine barrier. They were also able to collect a few anti-tank guns, some anti-aircraft guns, and even a few tanks that were were on their way back to the front from a repair depot. The fact that all of these were thrown together by a relatively junior German officer saved the situation, well along with the fact that the French were not advancing as quickly as they hoped. The problem was once again fuel, because the French Char B1s did not have enough fuel to reach Montcornet and so they had to stop to refuel along the route. This refueling took several hours and it gave time for the German forces to put their line in order so that they could meet the renewed French advance. Eventually the attack was called off after De Gaulle had lost 23 of his tanks without reaching Montcornet. This would be one of the great what ifs of the campaign, because if de Gaulle had a larger number of smaller tanks he might have been able to outpace any possible German response on his way to Montcornet, perhaps even capturing the German generals. As it was, de Gaulle’s efforts can only go down as another instance where the French equipment ended up letting them down due to their lack of mobility at a time when mobility was the greatest asset a military could have. While the attack against Montcornet was not the last French and British counterattack, and far from the last one that was planned, it was the last real effort that had a chance of preventing the Germans from reaching the English channel, instead of just trying to cut them off after their objective had already been completed.

May 18th was one of the calmest days of the campaign, at least along the line in France where the German divisions of Guderian, Hoth, and Reinhardt had previously been advancing. That did not mean that nothing was happening, as all along the front of the German advance the German units would use various units to try and tidy up their line along whatever natural obstacle they had stopped at the day before, which for many were the Escaut river. While the German Panzer generals strongly disagreed with the pause that they were put under during the day, it was very useful for the next phase of the attack. Since May 13th many of the units had been constantly on the move, either attacking or preparing to attack, and the day pause allowed them to rest and resupply. This allowed them to get everything reach for their next effort, which would be another jump towards the Channel, in some cases across the old Somme battlefields where so much blood had been shed during the First World War. They would be able to embark on that stage of the campaign with fulls stomachs, full gas tanks, and a bit of rest. Meanwhile the day did see the French making some efforts to solidify the line in some areas, but there simply were no longer enough troops available in the area to really build up a defensive line that could stop or even slow the Germans. There were some attempts at counterattacks, particularly in the north against the 7th Panzer divisions from French units further north, but in all cases these attacks did not achieve very much other than expending more French resources to little gain. One of the continued challenges for the French forces during these attacks, and during this phase of the campaign more generally, was the air superiority that the Luftwaffe enjoyed. This made it difficult to get nay kind of air support from British and French aircraft, while also making German air attack a constant point of concern and danger. Bigger plans were afoot at French high command though, with Gamelin beginning to plan for a major French and British counterattack with the goal of terminating the German advance entirely. He just had to find the troops that could make it happen, which was quite difficult by this point in the invasion.

What Gamelin did not know is that manpower was not his biggest problem, but instead time. Because on May 19th the German advance to the channel would resume, with Halder at German High Command getting permission for the advance to resume in full. All of the forward most Panzer divisions would begin a frantic series of advances over the following 2 days, headlined by the efforts of the 1st and 2nd Panzer and their push for the coast. Over the course of those two days some of the Panzer divisions would advance a staggering distance, including a push by the 2nd Panzer division on May 20th which would see it end the day at the mouths of the Somme river at Abbeville by evening. And these forces were far from the only problem for the French and British because the three German Panzer corps involved in the advance had split out into three different groups, with each advancing along a different axis, from Guderian’s forces on their way to Abbeville in the south and Hoth’s corps moving to Arras while Reinhardt’s was in the center between them. Along the path the German forces would once again experience brief periods of staunch resistance from French and a few British units, but they were all hampered by the fact that they had little firepower and almost no support. But this did result in small instances which were costly, for example on the 20th the 7th Panzer Division would run into French forces around the city of Arras that caused more casualties than they had suffered when crossing the Meuse. While the forces of the 2nd Panzer were the first to reach the coast at Abbeville, others followed rapidly, while other units began to fan out to capture additional territory for future operations. This included the movement of some units north from Abbeville towards Noyelles. Other units would move to and capture Amiens, which included its bridges over the Somme which would be so important for future operations.

While the German advance was restarting on May 19th, Gamelin was performing his last acts as the commander of the French Army. He drafted his orders for Georges troops to prepare for their counterattack, something that he actually wanted Georges to do but he did not appear to be capable. The result was was Order Number 12, which in general was a counterattack combining a movement by the forces of the French army under General Bellotte to be joined by British forces in the area. These troops would attack from the north, hoping to push south to cut into the German advance and to cut it off. At the same time the forces of the 6th Army, freshly arrived from Southern France, attacked north from the Somme river. If everything went well the two forces would meet and cut off the advanced German forces entirely. It was exactly the kind of major counterattack that the Germans were afraid of. Gamelin would then end the order with the words ‘Everything now is a question of hours.’ The plan would never actually be put into action, but there are some immediate problems with the concept of the attack, particularly Gamelin’s call for the usage of a strong mobile and armored force without really specifying where such forces could be found and then a need to maintain air superiority at least in the north, something that the combined air forces of the British and French were probably just incapable of doing by this point in the campaign. The reason that we will never know what the result of this attack would have been was due to the fact that at 9PM on May 19th Gamelin was relieved of his command. He was to be replaced by General Weygand. Along with Gamelin’s dismissal Daladier was also removed from his position of minister of defense to be replaced by the retired Marshal Petain, more on him in later episodes. Weygand was nothing if not confident that he could save the situation, and he made it clear that he would immediately cancel Gamelin’s planned counterattack even though the orders had already been distributed before Gamelin’s dismissal. He instead planned to launch his own operations, but would find that his ability to really control and shape the situation were greatly complicated by the general lack of information about what was happening at the front and the large amount of contradictions he received in the information that he did have. He also felt that Gamelin had been at least partially concealing how bad the situation really was. Gamelin would later claim that when he left his headquarters he would be accompanied by Weygand who would show him a folder and say that ‘I have the secrets of Foch.’ Gamelin would write that ‘I could have retorted that I had those of Joffre and that they had not sufficed for me. But Marshal Joffre had no secrets.’ This story seems 100% apocryphal to me, it is just too neat and tidy. But there is perhaps no better way to explain the failures of the French army in 1940 than this probably apocryphal anecdote. Two of France’s leading military leaders, calling back to the days of their relative youth when they were the Chiefs of Staff of the French heroes of the First World War. Looking back, instead of forward.