188: Reinhardt and Rommel

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Have you heard of this Rommel guy? He seems to always be doing things.

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Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 188 - The Fall of France - Reinhardt and Rommel. While the crossing that would occur on Guderian’s front at Sedan have received the most publicity over the last 80 years, part of which is always due to Guderian’s own publicity skills, they were not actually the first of the Panzer forces to start crossing the river on the Ardennes front. That honor would instead be a small number of troops which had crossed the river at the village of Houx about 4 kilometers north of Dinant. This small crossing was just one of several made along the front from Sedan in the south to Houx in the north as the troops of the 5th, 6th, and 7th Panzer divisions all made their own crossings as they prepared to continue their attack into the west. As these crossings developed on the 13th through the 15th there would be growing concern among French military leaders that something had to be done, but at the same time, if you remember back to Episode 8, these same days were when the French troops in Central Belgium were fighting the battles of Hannut and Gembloux. On that sector of the front French troops were also facing German armored forces, and so it was still unclear to many French military leaders that the real point of German emphasis was going to be in the south. However, even if the Meuse crossings were not the main German attack, they would have to be dealt with, and so additional French reserves would be moved into position to counter any possible further advances of the 5th, 6th, and 7th Panzer divisions, although these attempts at containment would be less than successful.

Immediately to the north of Guderian’s forces around Sedan the target of the XLI Corps commanded by General Reinhardt would be the village of Monthermé which was about 25 kilometers to the northwest of Sedan. Reinhardt had two Panzer divisions under his command the 8th and the 6th, and from the very start of the advance they had a problem. Due to the lack of roads in the Ardennes the decision was made to place Reinhardt’s troops behind those of Guderian. Then when the roads opened back up again as the German units approached the Meuse the hope was that they would be able to move north and quickly come into line with Guderian to the left and Hoth to the right. However, as things would develop Reinhardt would be unable to really use both of this divisions because of a change in course for Guderian’s northern most division the 2nd Panzer. The 2nd would wander a bit too far north, taking up some of the loads that the 6th and 8th needed to use, and this resulted in the 8th Panzer Division really being left behind. The 6th Panzer division would still stay mostly on schedule, but the 8th would end up getting the short end of the stick and would not even reach the Meuse until the 16th of May, but which point other German armored divisions were already racing west from the river. Because of this situation it would be the 6th Panzer that would represent Reinhardt’s Corps at Monthermé, with the division commanded by General Kempf, who commanded Panzer division Kempf in Poland which featured heavily in episode 116 of the podcast. Even though the 6th Division would arrive at the the Meuse on the afternoon of the 13th, not too long after the forces to the north and south, they would have to deal with some less than ideal geography as they tried to cross the river. On this area of the Meuse, as opposed to the relatively modest elevation changes along some of its course, the Meuse moves through a relatively deep gorge, with the river making a tight loop . Reinhardt would write as his troops were crossing the river that “The terrain really scares you. The only road leading to Monthermé snakes down . . . into the deeply cut Meuse valley. . . . The riflemen are having trouble climbing down the steep slopes leading to the Meuse River while manhandling their heavy weapons. The rubber boats have to be taken down to the Meuse in the armored personnel carriers because it was impossible to carry them down.” The loop of the river created a peninsula which would be defended by a Battalion of the 42nd Colonial Infantry Regiment. This unit, and the entirety of the 102nd Fortress Division which it belonged to were some of the best in the entire French army and would not be any kind of pushover. They would of course benefit from the terrain that made the German attack difficult, and they would be able to trap the Germans within the peninsula which the loop in the Meuse made in the area that the Germans would cross.

The crossings at Monthermé would occur at roughly the same time as those at Sedan, however there would be some serious challenges with the first two attempts which ended up being unsuccessful and costing the units involved many casualties. The finally in the third effort a battalion of the 4th Rifle Regiment of the 6th Panzer division crossing the river and moving instantly into an attack on Monthermé. This third attack was largely successful because a single French machine gun which had caused so many challenges for the earlier waves had been spotted and then neutralized through direct tank fire. The village fell shortly after the first units successfully crossed the river, establishing a bridgehead that would be reinforced throughout the eventing and night. Even with the initial challenges at getting across the Meuse and then the quick move into Monthermé the ordeal of the German infantry was not over, because of the nature of the area where they had attacked. After crossing the river the German forces were trapped in a peninsula and when it came time to break out of that peninsula they ran into very strong French defenses. The defending troops were aided by the defenses that had been constructed in this area before the war, from these defenses they repulsed the German infantry. However, much like at Sedan it was really just a matter of time before the German infantry were joined by the German armored forces and the clock on their arrival began shortly after the first crossing at been successful. It was one again up to the engineers to quickly prepare crossings, in this case by repairing some of the bridges that the French had demolished, but not very well. On the morning of May 14th, as the 6th Panzer was still trying to get into position to begin its breakout attempt another timer started running. One of the agreements that had been made among the German command is that the Panzer forces would be independent until the infantry units behind had caught up. The delay at Monthermé was seen as a good excuse to make this happen, and instead of just the Panzer forces there, the entirety of Panzer Group Kliest would be subordinated to the 12th Army. This would happen at noon on May 15th, and when news arrived at Reinhardt’s headquarters of what was going to happen the 6th Panzer’s attack, scheduled for the morning of the 15th gained new importance. At 5AM these attack would begin, and in just a few hours they had pushed through the first two lines of French defenses and were moving through the reserve lines.

Once the attack and pushed through the French defenses the commander of the 6th Panzer, General Kempf was determined to ensure that it did not run into any new problems. To do this he created what was named Pursuit Detachment von Esebeck, which was a combined arms task force which included armored units, motorcycle units, engineers, and then mobile artillery and anti-tank guns. These Pursuit detachment had one goal and one goal only, to push through as quickly as possible and continue to advance, not letting anything that the French did stop it. The detachment would be unleashed in the middle of the afternoon and it would advance 55 kilometers by 8PM. This created a situation in which the French could not hope to adequately respond, the detachment barely had to do any fighting in its advance because it was simply advancing faster than French units could prepare to receive them. This would be a common sight over the next week as the German forces pushed for the North Sea, but here would be an early example of French units surprised again and again that German forces were in even in the areas they were advancing from. The biggest problem for the French is that this completely compromised their entire plan to halt Guderian’s push to the south. The French Sixth Army had been put in place behind the 2nd and 9th Armies, however, as it was moving into position to the west of the Ardennes Canal, in position to block the advance of Guderian’s forces, suddenly to the north the 6th Panzer was threatening to outflank the defensive position. Kempf’s rapid advance, along with the acceleration of Guderian’s advance once his troops were west of the Meuse, meant that any idea of subordinately Kliest’s forces to the infantry were shelved and instead the Panzer forces had their orders to push forward reiterated. Kempf and Guderian would even meet at the village of Montcornet, and their two bridgeheads would be joined together. While this was a tremendous triumph, and it preserved the independence of Panzer Group Kleist, it was also the first of what would turn into many examples in which the Panzer generals would if not disobey direct orders at the very least use their own actions to make orders not longer possible. Fortunately for the generals, and for the German army as a whole, these actions would almost always have a positive outcome during the fighting in France.

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To the north of Reinhardt was the final collection of German armored forces that were cascading towards the Meuse, the 15th Motorized corps under the command of General Hoth. The goal of the 5th and 7th Panzer divisions under Hoth’s command was a crossing point on the Meuse around the Belgian city of Dinant. While the Germans did not know it, this area of the front was not defended as well as it was supposed to be because the French 18th Infantry division had not all arrived to take up their positions along the river. The first crossing of the river would actually occur at around 11PM on May 12th when a reconnaissance group from the 5th Panzer found a crossing site near the village of Houx. This was nothing more than a 1 meter wide weir, or dam, across the river. This had not been destroyed by the French defenders nor was it guarded by any French forces, this was a tremendous find because it allowed German forces to move across the river quickly, without having to resort to using boats. By early morning on the 13th elements of 5th Panzer was on its way to getting three battalions of rifle infantry across the river at Houx, which was more than enough to reinforce the bridgehead that had been created by the smaller recon units. They would then begin to advance, not stopping until they had advanced 4 kilometers to the west. During this advance they would experience opposition from the French forces that were in the area, and in general these troops fought hard to hold back the German advance, but there were simply not enough of them. The French forces had discovered that the Germans had started crossing at Houx early on the 13th, but they did not have the power to counter attack immediately, and even with reinforcements inbound the German reinforcements arrived first. Even the arrival of some French armored units could not turn the tide against the German infantry. Unfortunately for the French commanders, this fighting at Houx was not even the point of greatest danger along this sector of the front, but it did distract them and pulled in French reinforcements that may have been better used to the south, where the 7th Panzer was about to make its own crossing of the river.

The plan for the 7th division was to try and cross at two different points. The northernmost crossing point was a bit south of Houx with the other was even further south just north of Dinant at the village of Leffe. In both areas the troops that were attempting to cross would run into strong French resistance which made the possibility of a crossing on the morning of May 13th anything but a sure thing. In some ways this is where the myth of the German General Erwin Rommel begins, although his actions in North Africa a few years later would be far more famous. Rommel was in command of the 7th Panzer division, and he spent the day bouncing back and forth between the two crossing points arranging for support for those that were trying to cross and then trying to provide a bit of a morale boost to the soldiers and officers. There would even be a moment where it would take personal command of an infantry battalion at a critical moment, with Rommel later recounting that: “I now took over personal command of 2nd Battalion of 7th Rifle Regiment and for some time directed operations myself. . . . I crossed the Meuse in one of the first boats and at once joined the company which had been across since early morning.” On another occasion he would personally assist some engineers that were trying to build a bridge across the river, wading into waist deep water. In many way this was closer to Rommel the assault unit commander which had been seen at Caporetto in 1917 than the general that would be seen in North Africa, but it is hard to argue with results. Both of the crossings would eventually be successful, with the forces of the 6th Rifle Regiment crossing south of Houx while the 7ths Rifle Regiment crossed at Leffe. The crossings south of Houx were able to link up with the units that had moved across over that Weir at Houx bringing together the forces of the 5th and 7th Panzer. Then in the south the smaller bridgehead was manned by troops of the 7th Panzer only, although efforts were being made by the afternoon of the 13th to bring together all of the bridgeheads. On the French side, and I know you are getting tired of me talking about this, but the French would dither away their chances throughout the day to attack the Germans when they were at their weakest. This area of the front was commanded General Corap’s 9th Army, however his ability to react to the situation was hampered by the fact that this area of the front was defended by the 18th Infantry division which still did not even have all of its troops in the area. Reinforcements could have been rushed into the area, but there were some communication challenges along the French chain of command. At each step up the chain of command, from the very front all the way back to Army command, each step of the chain seems to have believed that the officer under them had to be exaggerating, and that the situation could not be as bad as they were saying. This resulted in them altering their understanding of the situation before they then communicated up the chain, where the same situation would occur. This meant that by the time that the message reached General Georges, the commander of the entire Northeast Front, he was simply told that a battalion had got in trouble at Houx, instead the real situation was that there were elements of 2 Panzer divisions crossing the river and pushing onward. Near the front several different officers at different levels tried to arrange for a counterattack, but it was challenging with the forces available. One counter attack, which involved a collection of random units from a variety of different commands actually got close to pushing to the river before running out of steam after dark, which it had to be called off because of concerns that the tanks which were leading the effort had become disconnected from their supporting infantry. There was a hope though, and this was due to the presence of the French 1st Armored Division nearby at Charleroi only around 35 kilometers away.

The 1st Armor was commanded by General Bruneau, and his division started moving at roughly midnight on May 14th, about 24 hours after the first German troops had crossed the river at Houx. This division was previously being held in reserve for the armies further north, with the assumption being that they would be required to replace some of the French forces that were fighting near the Gembloux Gap as the campaign developed, it was mostly just a coincidence that they were positioned to even attempt a counterattack. The challenge was the fact that the 1st Armored could not move at anything close to fast. They would move about 15 miles, so still 10 miles to the west of Dinant over the course of the 14th, although not all of this was down to the French tanks or soldiers but was instead due to delays that had been caused by miscommunication. Some French forces spent most of the day just kind of handing out waiting for orders to arrive, but even when they did the French Char B1 tanks generally had terrible fuel mileage and had to be refueled. This then ran into the problem that the French used special fuel trucks for this purpose, and those trucks had very poor cross country performance, and apparently the roads in this area of Belgium were not good enough for them. All of this meant that the 1st Armor was not really ready to begin any kind of counter attack until about 9PM on the 14th, but orders were generally pretty clear that this attack had to happen, with General Corap telling General Bruneau that “You must counterattack this evening with all that you have. That’s a formal order.” However, even with this very clear order, it was simply impossible for the French armor to get organized and ready to attack before May 15th. Unfortunately for the French chances, this allowed time for a German bomber attack to hit several of the fuel convoys that were moving forward to try and keep the French tanks running. This was exacerbated by the French fuel trucks, which really limited the French flexibility when it came to how they could move fuel forward. But even with the fuel situation, the battle of Flavion on May 15th would still occur with the German armored forces being able to use their better tactics to counteract the fact that none of the German tanks could actually disable a Char B with their guns. Instead the German tanks used their far superior coordination, with their more modern radio equipment allowing them to get around to the flanks of the French tanks and at times even to coordinate with other artillery and anti-aircraft units so that they could use their larger guns to disable and destroy the French tanks. The disastrous day would result in only 36 of the French tanks still working by the end of the day, given the fact that the division had started the day with 170, that was quite the reduction.

The reason for the failure of the French counter attack was that much like at Sedan the German engineers had done everything in their power to get the German armor across the river as quickly as possible. Unlike at Sedan Rommel did not wait for a bridge to be built before tanks were across the river, and whereas Guderian had prioritized supplies and support units during the period were ferries were the only way to move across the river, Rommel included tanks on these ferries. But everyone knew that to really support and expand the bridgehead tanks would be required, and tanks would require a real bridge. Frantic building would allow the first German tanks to cross the river, but there was only enough material to build one bridge that was really capable of handing the armored traffic. This bridge would be placed in the 7th Panzer’s sector, primarily due to the demands of Rommel who was able to convince Hoth to give him the bridge. This allowed him to give priority to his forces as they moved to cross the Meuse, with the tanks of the 5th Panzer given a lower priority which would give the 7th the premiere position in the advance. While this would not have a major impact on the course of the campaign, and in many cases a German tank was a German tank it did not matter who commanded it and how it got across the river, the priority given to the 7th Panzer would do nothing but help Rommel’s later reputation, as it gave him the ability to push forward quickly after the crossing was secure.