187: Crossing the Meuse

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Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 187 - The Fall of France - Crossing the Meuse. This week a big thank you goes out to Luis for the donation. And as always this episode is brought to you by the members of the podcast who were joined this week by new members Mike, Justin, Geir, Zachary, Ryan, and Charles. You can become a member which will get you access to ad-free versions of all of the podcast’s episodes along with monthly member episodes, like the most recent episode where I discuss some of the research I did for these Fall of France episodes and give my reading recommendations. You can find out more over at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. In the afternoon of May 13th in many ways the fate of the German invasion of France would be decided at a few different areas along the Meuse river. At Sedan was the German soldiers of the Panzer Corps commanded by General Guderian, while to their north the corps of General Hoth moved towards crossing points near Dinant Belgium, 60 kilometers to the north of Sedan. In both cases these critical operations, getting troops across the river, pushing the French defenders back, and then establishing a bridgehead would not be completed by the famous Panzers, but instead by infantry units. It would be these small units of infantry and combat engineers, often heavily outnumbered, that would be called upon to provide enough space for bridges to be thrown across the river so that the tanks could start rolling. In these actions the tactics that were used would have looked out of place during the German Spring Offensives of 1918, or to quote Daniel Todman from his book Britain’s War: Into Battle 1937-1941 “The tactics used by German troops at the lowest level – infiltrating enemy positions, leaving strongpoints to be dealt with by follow-up troops, allowing junior officers to control the fire of automatic and heavy weapons – were not new inventions. They had grown up in response to the challenges of trench warfare between 1915 and 1917, and by 1918 had been employed to some degree by every army on that earlier Western Front.” This episode will focus on the crossing at Sedan, which was an operation that had been long planned for by the German commanders. The attacks at Sedan are an almost textbook definition of many of the concepts of pre-war German military theory all coming together in one single operation. Small unit infantry tactics, low level officer initiative, air support from the Luftwaffe, high flexibility, and fast responses to how the battle developed all of these would be on display in the 24 hours after the beginning of the crossings.

When his troops reached the Meuse at various points on May 12th and 13th Guderian believed that it was absolutely essential that the crossing happen as quickly as possible. This went against military orthodoxy, which called for several days of build up before trying to push troops across such an obstacle. And this delay was thought to be required for some really good reason. Instead, Guderian favored speed of actions rather than preparation and while it would end up working out for the German forces on this occasion, there was still some concern that things might not go well. The biggest problem was that with less than a day to prepare for the crossing, the German artillery was not going to be fully prepared. Due to the strung out nature of the German forces, many of the artillery guns simply had not arrived in the area yet, and they would continue to arrive until just minutes before the assault began. But even the guns that were there were in the area were hard up for ammunition, with Guderian’s commander General von Kleist writing at this time that for his entire army “my artillery only had 50 rounds per battery [in other words, about 12 rounds per tube] because the ammunition convoys were held up by the traffic jams on the roads in the Ardennes.” With only so many guns and so many shells available Guderian was forced to give most of the available heavy artillery to only one of his three Panzer divisions which were poised to make the crossing, with the 1st Panzer Division being the beneficiary of having more artillery in place. Along this area of the river the Meuse flows east to west, and so the German forces were arrayed roughly along an east to west line, with the 10th Panzer being on the east, or German left, the 1st Panzer in the middle, and then the 2nd Panzer on the west or the German right. The 1st Division would be responsible for attacking the French positions in the wide loop of the river that cut through the city of Sedan. In total the attacking from was only about 8 kilometers, and in that 8 kilometers there were 60,000 men and 22,000 vehicles, or at least there would be as the attack progressed and more and more men and vehicles arrived from their travels. However, the vast majority of these would be trapped on the eastern side of the river, and the bulk of the fighting would be done by small units of German infantry. On the French side, as soon as the Germans began to arrive on the other side of the river concern and apprehension grew for what was going to happen in the days that followed. The French defenders were racing to strengthen their defenses along the river and to get as many men and guns into position. They would have greatly benefited from a few more days of German delays, which is exactly why the German plan called for the crossings to be done as quickly as possible.

While artillery was a problem for the German forces at Sedan, they benefited from the near air superiority that the Luftwaffe held over the front by this stage of the fighting. During the opening days of the attack the Luftwaffe had primarily focused on attacking in the north in support of Army Group B, with only German fighters patrolling over the Ardennes to protect the German forces there from any Allied air attacks. However, this would all change as soon as the German troops arrived on the Meuse, and the entirety of Luftflotte 3, 1,500 total aircraft would shift to supporting the forces under Panzer Group Kleist, his meant that there were suddenly 600 medium bombers, 250 dive bombers, 500 fighters, and 120 heavy fighters available for action. A bit over half of that number would detailed to support the crossings at Sedan. Even that does not tell the entire story though, because each of those aircraft would fly multiple sorties over Sedan during the critical day of May 13th. This meant that there were over 1,200 sorties flown by German bombers over the few kilometers of front facing the attack of Guderian’s forces. They would also be executing a tactic that had been specifically developed for this moment by Guderian and Luftwaffe General Loerzer, a tactic that they called a rolling raid. This tactic had been organized earlier in May when the two generals had discussed how Loerzer’s 2nd Fliegerkorps could best support Guderian’s attack. The basic idea was that instead of a few large raids against the French defenders, which would inevitably result in lull periods between the raids, the Luftwaffe forces would stage constant smaller raids along the front. The goal was to keep essentially a constant air raid going throughout the day to wear down the French defenders then a few hours before the attack began there would be several hours of attacks against very specific targets mostly executed by dive bombers, then about 20 minutes before the river crossing a massive raid along the entire area of the Meuse. As soon as German infantry began to cross the river the Luftwaffe’s efforts would be moved back away from the river and would spend the next several hours focusing on the French rear areas, with primarily artillery and transportation targets in the hopes that the raids would disrupt French counterattacks. This was not the normal tactics for how the Luftwaffe was supposed to act in this situation, and it almost did not happen when on May 12th Kleist ordered the commander of Luftflotte 3 to change the plans over to the more typical set of large raids throughout the day. These orders were also forwarded to Guderian so that he knew what to expect, and he was very displeased. He believed that the rolling raid would give his men the best chance of success and it appeared that it was not going to happen. But then it did. Because when the first Luftwaffe planes flew over the front it became very clear that things were proceeding exactly how Guderian and Loerzer had planned them to. What Guderian would only find out later, after meeting Loerzer later in the day, is that he conveniently ignored the order from Kleist when it arrived. Although his excuse was that it had arrived too late from the headquarters of Luftflotte 3, and by the time that it arrived Loerzer was concerned that a change in orders would only cause confusion among the air crews that were going to take part in the operation therefore he just stuck to the initial plan.

It is of course impossible to know how things would have been different had the plans for the Luftwaffe forces changed, but what we do know is the effects of the plan as implemented by Loerzer. There are many French accounts of the impact of the Luftwaffe raids, and depending on the exact time of the battle that the accounts discuss, and the exact area where the person was on the front their experiences were quite different. For example here is Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud who commanded the 147th Fortress Infantry along the Meuse: “The bombardment was particularly heavy on the principal line of resistance, Sedan railway station, and on Torcy where numerous fires were started … [At noon] the aerial bombardment intensified and was interspersed with lulls until [1800 hours] … [T]he entire area, but particularly the principal line of resistance, was shrouded by a thick cloud of smoke. The attacks were implemented by successive waves, each including around forty bombers while fighters strafed the ground.” Pinaud’s account is reasonably level headed, but other accounts like this one from David Boyer of the 55th Infantry speak of a slightly more escalated level of concern and hardship: “In the minutes before the [German] attack, the explosions were so frequent that one could not distinguish between the individual blasts. I was deaf and could hardly breathe. I tried to make my body as small as possible, my hands over my head, my world shaking and swaying. I sobbed.” When the raids then moved away from Boyer’s position it would still take him time to recover and prepare to resist any kind of German attack: “When it ended, it took me several minutes to stand. My world was silent and my view obscured by smoke which, as it cleared, looked like I had been transported to 1916 Verdun – and then they came at us. I raised my hands hoping more to be shot than taken prisoner.” Remarkably, even with all of the bombing there was very little damage to the stronger French fortifications, not a single bunker would be destroyed by a direct hit, and only about 50 men were listed as casualties of these initial air raids. But what they lacked in bloodshed they more than made up for in psychological impact on French troops. One French officer would later write of the effect that the German air raids had on his troops that “The gunners stopped shooting and hit the dirt; the infantrymen dove into the trenches and remained there motionless; they were deafened by the crashing of bombs and screeching of the dive-bomber sirens. . . . Just 5 hours of this nightmare sufficed to shatter their nerves; they were no longer able to react to the approaching infantry.”

The first German troops across the Meuse near Sedan would not have the luxury of something like the bridge and would instead have to be transported via boats. The initial plan was for the German infantry to ride the boats which would be crewed by German engineers, but in some cases the engineers would not arrive in time and instead the infantry would be stuck paddling themselves across. One area in which the crossing was easy and which would allow for some quick successes for the Germans was in what was known as the Glaire Gap. This was an area to the north of Sedan where the Meuse takes a detour directly north, and then quickly cuts back south again creating a kind of peninsula which is relatively narrow. The French had planned to build some defenses in this area, but it had just not occurred before the Germans arrived, and then allowed for the German forces in this area to very quickly get across the river and then expand the area under their control without encountering any real French resistance. This was important because it allowed the units in this area, which were the 1st Rifle Regiment of the 1st Panzer Division to move multiple battalions of men across the river and began to really push deep into the French defenses, and it is not coincidence that it would be these forces that would experience the most success in the hours that followed. The fighting in this area generally took the form of small units of German infantry pushing forward against somewhat isolated French defenses, and even in instances where multiple French emplacements were mutually supporting as soon as one of them was silenced the domino effect began and they would begin to fall one after another. During this time the German units, as long as they were close to the river, would receive covering and supporting fire from German forces on the other side of the river, with everything from tanks, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and machine guns being used to provide as much support as possible. The quick and decisive movements of the forces of the 1st Rifle Regiment made it difficult for the French to really respond, and defenses began to be silenced and captured before any real response could be made on their area of the front. To the west the infantry troops of the 2nd Panzer division were a bit behind the attack at Glaire, as they did not begin the assault until 5:30PM, an hour and a half after the crossing of the 1st Panzer. The going was a bit tougher for the 2nd, as they did not have the advantage of an area like the Glaire Gap and so it was more difficult to mass a larger number of infantry on the other side of the river. But in the hours that followed they were able to slowly push forward, and much like to the east as soon as a few bunkers were captured the flood gates opened because it allowed German infantrymen to move across the river more freely. In the German center the Gross Deutschland Regiment was tasked with crossing the river in an area that was sure to be very difficult, and one of the major challenges was Bunker 104. Due to its position and its field of fire the bunker was the linchpin of the entire French defensive line on that sector of the front, and it would fire somewhere around 10,000 machine gun rounds before it was finally taken over 2 hours after the attack began. This was only possible due to the attacks happening further to the east, with the 10th Panzer attacking on the Gross Deutschland’s left and beginning to silence some of the French defenses that were also causing problems for Gross Deutschland.

Among those units of the 10th Panzer that were attacking across the river was a small team of infantrymen and assault engineers led by Walter Rubarth. For his actions in the hours that followed the crossing Rubarth would be one of the German heroes of the Meuse crossings. Rubarth and the troops under his command would get across the river in the opening moments of the crossing, silence one small French bunker, and then methodically work on one after another along the main line of French resistance. Their actions would be critical to the overall success of the German attack in their sector because they were one of the only groups of German troops that were able to successfully make it across the river and not be immediately pinned down by French fire. After disabling their first bunker they would move on to 3 more French positions which they would also disable. Rubarth would describe the entire series of events like this: “In a violent Stuka attack, the enemy’s defensive line is bombarded. With the dropping of the last bomb at 1500 hours, we move forward and attack with the infantry. We immediately sustain strong machine gun fire. There are casualties. With my section I reach the bank of the Meuse in a rush through a woodline.… Enemy machine guns fire from the right flank across the Meuse. … The rubber boat moves across the water. … During the crossing, constant firing from our machine guns batters the enemy, and thus not one casualty occurs. I land with my rubber boat near a strong, small bunker, and together with Lance Corporal Podszus put it out of action. … We seize the next bunker from the rear. I fire an explosive charge. In a moment the force of the detonation tears off the rear part of the bunker. We use the opportunity and attack the occupants with hand grenades. After a short fight, a white flag appears. … Encouraged by this, we fling ourselves against two additional small bunkers, which we know are around 100 metres to our half left. In doing so we move through a swampy area, so that we must temporarily stand in the water up to our hips.” Of the 12 man detachment, 6 would be casualties by the end of the attack, but they were able to play a major role in tearing open the French defenses that led to Hill 246 south of the village of Wadelincourt. This was seen as one of the most important areas on the 10th Panzer’s front, due to its ability to control the areas around it. For his efforts and those of his men Rubarth would be awarded the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross.

While on some areas of the front the French positions had to be dismantled in detail, in other areas many French positions would be bypassed by the forward units as they moved deeper into the French defenses. The 1st’s 1st Rifle Regiment, after pushing through the Glaire Gap would have the most success throughout the day, while to their left Gross Deutschland and the 86th Rifle Regiment were dealing with strong French forces around Hill 247 the 1st Rifle continue to push deeper into the French positions. They would capture Hill 201, then 336, and their advance would not slow but accelerate in during the night, with the forces eventually reaching the outskirts of the village of Chéhéry by dawn. During this time the men had only stopped a few times to eat a bit of food before being pushed forward as quickly as possible. The officers of the 1st Rifle knew that the most important thing that they could do was to take advantage of the French confusion and retreat and push as long and as hard as they possibly could. The French would eventually counter attack, but the more ground that they took would provide more time for the units that were following to get across the river and establish themselves. This constant effort would allow them to advance almost 9 kilometers in just 8 hours. When this distance was combined with the efforts of the units on the 1st Rifles left and right, taking critical areas that were closer to the river, the German crossing was in a very good position as the sun began to rise on May 14th. This position was greatly strengthened by the work of German engineers to bring more men across the river. Almost immediately after the first infantry troops moved across the river and began to capture French positions the engineers went to work. The first men had crossed the river in nothing more than rubber rafts, and the next step was to build some larger rafts that could move more men and large groups of supplies across the river. Several of these would be constructed along the front, with the fist one operating just a 5 hours after the first units had crossed the river. More rafts would be built and began transferring as many men across the river as possible while at the same time bridges began to be constructed. Bridges were crucial because while the rafts could carry tanks if they had to, the decision was instead made to prioritize the rafts to carry men, supplies, and smaller vehicles as quickly as possible. These were the critical anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and self-propelled artillery guns that would be so crucial to the German defense and which could not be transported by anything smaller than the rafts. Things would get even better in just 3 and a half hours, with construction completing at about 11PM on the 13th the first bridge over the river was completed. Once the bridge was complete the first tanks would move across the river, which was a critical moment for the future of the German attack. General Kirchner, commander of the 1st Panzer division would send out a message at the end of the day saying to the men under his command that “You are the spear point for the German attack. The eyes of all of Germany are focused upon you!”

On the French side, the 12 hours after the German attack began at 4PM on the 13th would be a period of major confusion from the units along the river all the way back to French high command. Gamelin and others still believed that the main German effort would be in the north, and that the actions near Sedan were nothing but a diversion. But down the list of French command, as you get closer and closer to the front this general confusion about German intentions begins to shift into both confusion about German actions and panic about the response of French units. Near the front the French forces were doing all that they could to resist the German attacks, and were not doing a horrible job, they were isolated, confused, and not the least scared but they were still fighting. What they really needed was for counterattack forces to be moved into place to hit the German forces while they were weak. And this was the French plans, but then those counter attacks would not immediately occur. There were many reasons for this, which we will dig into in detail in a few episodes, but at a high level, during the evening of May 13th, and then throughout the night and into the 14th, the French 55th and 71st Division would as a unit fail to properly respond to the German attack. This left the units at the front in a horrible position which would deteriorate rapidly, and then when the response did some on the 14th it would be delayed and understrength. The point of greatest danger for the German attacks had passed by the morning of the 14th, because the bridges had been completed and men and vehicles were streaming across the Meuse. By late in the morning on the 14th it would take a major French effort to push the German forces back across the river, or even to contain them, and unfortunately for the French troops at Sedan the crossings on that area of the river were not the only ones that the French had to worry about, because to the north of Sedan there were two other areas where Panzer divisions had crossed the river on May 13th, and their actions will be the focus of next episode.