186: To the Meuse!

Description

A critical part of the German plan for the invasion of France was to reach the Meuse as quickly as possible.

10 Years of Podcasting Update: https://www.patreon.com/posts/10-years-of-107050529

Listen

Transcript

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War - The Fall of France - To the Meuse! This week a big thank you goes out to Jarosław, Michel, James, Linda, Sanford, Wallace, and Stefan for choosing to support the podcast by becoming members you can find out more about supporting the show over at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. As a reminder, there are new monthly member only episodes being released, with the most recent member episode being a biography of Hermann Goering from his early life until he because President of the Reichstag in the months before Hitler became Chancellor. You can find out more about the new member episodes and future plans in the link in the show notes. For the German forces under Army Group A, the period from May 11th to the 13th would be just as critical as the first day of the attack. It would be over the course of those two days when they would make their approach to the Meuse river, which they hoped to cross before the French really understood what was happening. To do this they needed to advance quickly, pushing through any delaying forces that were in their way. This would then set them up to cross the river at a handful of different points on the 13th, after which they could continue their advance. Speed was important to prevent the French from bringing forces to defend the river crossings, but for the French to do so they would need to understand what was happening and react in time. This would not occur, and therefore the French defenses and the defending troops that had been put in place before May 10th were critical. Both of these topics will be discussed in this episode, which will set us up to discuss the crossing the Meuse next episode, with the crossing of the Meuse being one of the pivotal events up to this point in the war.

The speed with which the armored and motorized units under General Heinz Guderian could reach the Meuse river at Sedan was a critical marker of success and failure for the German offensive. They had to move quickly through the Ardennes bottleneck and get across the Meuse and into open country as quickly as possible to make it more difficult for the French to react. This was always going to be a challenge, and during the first few days of the attack the heroes that rose to meet that challenge were the engineers of the various mechanized units that were trying to make that advance. They were everywhere throughout the Ardennes during these days, removing anti-tank obstacles that were put in place by the Belgians, clearing obstacles that were blocking roads, and most importantly rapidly replacing bridges and fixing crossings across various water obstacles. They would work closely with the units that had been assigned to be traffic police throughout the German advance, which were just as critical to the advance. They would not just monitor traffic but they were constantly trying to find alternative routes for some units based on the traffic jams or changes in plans. These tasks would have been challenging under the absolute best of circumstances, but war is rarely the best of circumstances. The situation was made even worse when Guderian, already frustrated with how slow things were moving thought he saw an opportunity that required a slight reorganization of his forces. The units of the 1st Panzer division were involved in fighting at various points during the day, and the 10th Panzer was also engaged but less frequently. During the day on the 10th Guderian decided that there might be an opportunity for some of the units of the 10th Panzer to change their direction and move through an area which was previously not assigned to a German armored unit. He would ask General von Kleist, Guderian’s immediately superior if he could take some of the southern units of the 10th Panzer and then move them north to attack on the other side of the division. Under normal circumstances this would have been a reasonable change, but in the confined areas of the Ardennes with only so many roads it was a major headache for the traffic police as they had to suddenly find space for hundreds of vehicles moving in the wrong direction. This movement, which would occur on the 11th of May would just exacerbate some of the traffic problems that had already caused the Panzer divisions to miss their objectives on the first day of the attack. One of the major problems, which would continue into the 11th, was some of the stubborn rear guard actions of French and Belgian forces throughout the area. These were never structured in a way that could permanently halt the German attack, but in the confined areas where flanking options were often limited, it could certainly slow the forward-most units down in ways that were just really annoying. Of course the French and Belgians knew that none of these small blocking forces could prevent the German advance, and so they were already prepared to retreat in various areas. Once of these was occupied by the French 5th Light Cavalry division which would be retreating back across the Semois river where they planned to mount a serious defense. The Semois was called a river, but in many areas in this part of its course it was not very deep or wide, and so its ability to halt the German advance was greatly less than it was in other areas. They would face the 1st Panzer division, which was by far the forward most Panzer division at this time, being one of the few large mobile units to meet its objectives for the 11th, which was to reach the Semois. This would be represented in the division diary for the day, which would read “A feeling of superiority over our western opponents arose in the division on this day – a day in which it encountered for the first time French forces along the second Belgian resistance line. The division has reached its goals planned for it on the second day – far in advance of its sister divisions – without regard for its flanks and in spite of the slow progress of the day.” At this time it would really just be the forward most units that had even see the French and Belgians, and the vast majority of the men of the German divisions had done nothing but march for two days.

During the day of the 11th there were also encouraging reports reaching German High Command that the French were not reacting in any major way to the German advance through the Ardennes, with there being few reports of serious French rail activity in the area, which meant they could not move large units in to block the German advance.

A great example of how some of the fighting occurred on the Semois would be at the small city of Bouillon. On this particular area of the front were the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Panzer Company of the 1st Panzer Division. They were far ahead of any kind of infantry support but they were continuing to push forward into the outskirts of the town. They would make it across the river over two bridges with the 2nd and 4th Company actually making it across, but this proved to only be partially good news. At that exact moment 20 German bombers attacked, and launched their bombs against the German troops, having mistaken them for French tanks. These bombs were then joined by French artillery which would force the 3rd and 4th companies to retreat, mostly due to the fact that they were not joined by their infantry and they were finding it difficult to make progress through the city. The 2nd company held on a bit longer, before they were also forced to retreat back across the river, giving up their gains from their previous efforts. Another German attack was the planned for the next morning, with far greater support for the tank units, however the previous evening, believing that they had done their job the French defenders instead decided to voluntarily withdraw from their positions. This meant that the German attack the next day fell on a Bouillon with no French troops. The capture of the Bouillon, along with the capture of several other crossings of the Semois would set up Guderian’s Panzer units for the next phase of the campaign, the advance from the Semois to the Meuse. This phase of the advance would be relatively easy, with the terrain not really supporting a stringent defense, and the French units in the area mostly just wanting to retreat across the Meuse as quickly as possible to set up defensive lines along the river to prevent a German crossing.

That did not mean that there was not resistance from French units in the area though, as there were a few areas where the French resistance was actually quite firm. Often these were based around specific blockhouses and pillboxes that had been built in this area to defend against the exact type of German attack that was happening. These were generally positioned a few kilometers to the east of the Meuse, and were positioned to try and slow the German advance to the Meuse. One of these was about 3 kilometers north of the village of St. Menges. This blockhouse was disguised as a simple forest home, and it would take several hours for the German attack to push through the French defenses. Another pillbox was located nearby, and this one had an anti-tank gun along with some machine guns. The troops in this area had even been able to plant some mines at some important points which further strengthened the defense. There would be multiple attacks on this specific set of defenses over the course of May 12th without much success, and it was only when a German tank got to point blank range with the pillbox and was able to fire directly into it at the French defenders were finally overcome. In all cases, the problem with all of these smaller defenses is that they were always overwhelmed by superior German forces at some point. It was really just a matter of how long they could delay the Germans in their advance. But that did not prevent them from causing serious headaches for the German forces that were tasked with subduing them, a task that would take a good portion of May 12th.

While the 1st Panzer Division was pushing ahead of most other units, in the trail behind them was a mass of German units all trying to push forward as quickly as possible. None of these desired an open road more than the units of the 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions which were a part of the Panzer Corps commanded by General Reinhardt. Reinhardt’s corps was always going to have a hard time getting through the Ardennes because it was echeloned behind the troops of Guderian’s corps, strictly due to the limited roads in the area. But after the first two days of the attack they were finally starting to break free, which then immediately led them into having to contend with enemy troops and various obstacles. Also away from the 1st Panzer that was advancing on Sedan, to the north the 2nd Panzer was making its way to Mouzaive, where it would be able to capture a bridge over the Semoise at the Belgian city of Mouzaive. Obviously capturing a bridge is always important, but the bridge at Mouzaive was particularly important for a reason that the Germans did not even fully understand. This specific area of the front was the boundary between the French 2nd and 9th Armies, with such boundaries always being a point of weakness for an army. This meant that when the troops of the 1st Panzer Brigade of the 2nd Panzer division crossed the river they were moving into an area of specific weakness for the French army. By the end of the 12th essentially all of the French defenders to the east of the Meuse had already moved west across the river, or were on their way to do so. By the evening on that day the German forces all along Guderian’s front were either at the river or getting close, and the French would destroy the bridges across the Meuse before the Germans could use them. The speed of this advance had completely defied expectations, with even many of the German commanders not believing that the Meuse would be reached so quickly, with the 1st Panzer division having reached the Meuse, a 115 kilometer advance, in just 2 days. I feel like it is worth repeating and re-emphasizing that even on the German side this speed was not expected by anybody who was not the leader of a Panzer division or corps, like Guderian. Halder believed that the crossing of the Meuse would only occur on the 9th day of the offensive, and now it was scheduled to begin on the 3rd. The French were of course equally surprised.

The forces under Guderian were not the only German forces pushing for the Meuse as quickly as possible, to their north the 2 Panzer divisions of Panzer Corps Hoth were doing the same. The 7th division was commanded by General Erwin Rommel, destined for fame in North Africa with the 5th Panzer division was commanded by General Hartlieb. In many ways their actions did not look meaningfully different than those happening further south, they were moving through a different area of the Ardennes but they were facing similar terrain and similar French and Belgian tactics. In one interesting event a French engineering company were sent to demolish a bridge on the Ourthe river, something that it was hoped that the Belgians would do but their demolition charges did not get the job done. This required the French unit to move up, but then they had to wait for the bridge to be clear of Belgian refugees which were streaming across the bridge. They did manage to get it destroyed just as the Germans were arriving, but then they made the mistake of retreating from the bridge without trying to defend it at all. This allowed the German pioneer units to very quickly put build their own bridge back across the river and continue the advance, with the total delay being only a few hours. This is a good example of how it could sometimes be difficult for the French forces to both retreat fast enough to keep ahead of the Germans while also doing the things required to really slow the Germans down, it is was difficult thing to balance. The advance of the 7th Panzer would be the first time that Rommel led such a large unit into combat, and during the days that followed the hallmarks of his later style in North Africa were already present, particularly his emphasis on constantly moving forward, ignoring everything around him. After the very first day of fighting he would write that ‘again and again that in encounter actions, the day goes to the side that is the first to plaster its opponent with fire. The man who lies low and awaits developments usually comes off second best.’ While Rommel would do quite well in his position throughout the campaign, it is interesting to compare his command style to those of other German divisional leaders. He had no experience commanding armored forces, but his natural style was already to just kind of go, as quickly as possible, and to keep moving from objective to objective which was the correct way to command an armored divisions when facing the French army that would have trouble reacting to such moves. The objective of Panzer Group Hoth was the same as Panzer Group Kleist to its south, advance to the river Meuse, although instead of aiming for Sedan they planned to cross at the city of Dinant. Rommel’s 7th division would be the first to reach it, and he was so far ahead of the 5th Panzer that one of the Panzer Regiments of the 5th was subordinated to the 7th Panzer to strengthen it as it moved west. A few German motorcycle troops, often at the head of the advance even managed to cross the Meuse on the night of the 12th, although it would not be until the 13th that the rest of the 7th Panzer was ready to make its crossing. Just like further south the speed with which the Germans advances caught the French at Dinant completely off guard, and the events of the river crossing would display that very clearly.

Over the first 3 days of the German offensive all along the Ardennes front the French forces were falling back to the west, this was expected, and in theory they were making their way back to the Meuse river, where they would occupy prepared defensive positions and attempt to stop the German advance. One important thing to remember is that during these days the belief among French military leaders was that this attack was not the primary point of German effort, which they believed was occurring to the north. But even a secondary German effort still would have been able to push back the French forces to the Meuse, and so the fact that the French were pulling back did not necessarily indicate a change from expectations. There was some worrying information continuing to trickle in, with some of the more worrying information arriving from reconnaissance aircraft that were flying over the Ardennes. During the night of May 11th a report would arrive from the pilot which reported very large columns of German aircraft moving through the Ardennes. This report was absolutely correct, because due to the lack of roads in the area the columns of the German armored divisions were many kilometers long. Another aircraft was sent out the next morning, and it would return with its wings riddled with anti-aircraft fire with the exactly same reports, including sightings not just of vehicles but very specifically German tanks. A confirmed sighting meant that the report reached the 9th Army’s chief of intelligence, but then he did not believe it. Several more reconnaissance flights were sent out but none were able to make it over the front and survive, as one of the primary goals of the Luftwaffe during this period was to prevent reconnaissance flights in this area of the front. To do this there were German fighter patrols during almost all of the daylight hours, just hunting for any French aircraft. There were two French armies at threat from the German attacks, in the north was the French 9th Army which was guarding the Meuse north of Sedan while at Sedan and then to the south was the 5th Army. For both of these armies they kept receiving some intelligence reports that seemed to indicate that things on their front were more serious than expected, but these warnings generally did not impact the actions of the two Armies or those higher in French command. There would be a small reaction though, with the movement of 6 divisions out of the reserve of the Northwest Front, commanded by General Georges, with those six divisions given to the 2nd Army AGroup, which the 5th Army belonged to which was the exact place where they needed to be sent. However, it would take time for these forces to arrive and they were not moved forward with any particular urgency. This meant that they would not arrive at the front in time to be involved in defending the crossings of the river that would occur on the 13th. Instead, those crossings would be the responsibility of the 2nd Army with the forces it had. The army had the task of defending roughly 75 kilometers of front which spanned from the end of the Maginot Line fortifications and then through to the north of Sedan. The commander of the army, General Huntziger positioned his forces to best protect the areas that he thought would be the biggest problems, which were not at Sedan. Instead Huntziger believed that the Germans would actually attack south of Sedan between that city and the end of the Maginot Line, with that area known as the Stenay Gap. Because he believed that the this was the area of greatest risk it was also where he put his best troops of the 18th Corps. The critical areas around Sedan were guarded by the 10th Corps, while the exact areas where the Germans would attack were defended by the 55th Division. The 55th was, well not one of the best divisions in the French army, and it was made up of generally older reservists with very little recent training or experience. Its officer corps was much the same, but it did have at the least the advantage of being in the area since the start of the war.

When the 55th Division had arrived in the Sedan sector in October 1939 they were in for a lot of labor duty, because they very quickly got to work on improving the defenses. Huntziger and the commander of the 55th General Lafontaine but put a lot of focus on building defenses on their areas of the front. Along the entire 2nd Army front the number of bunkers drastically increased, almost doubling, which was impressive. However, due to incorrect assumptions about where the German attacks would fall some of the areas that the Germans would eventually cross saw the least amount of construction. This meant that while some areas of the 2nd Army front had 5 concrete bunkers for every kilometer of front, in some of the areas around Sedan there was not even 1 bunker per kilometer. In what would be one of the most critical areas just north of Sedan near the norther side of the bend in the Meuse river at Sedan there was a 1.5 kilometer gap with no concrete bunkers at all. Now, of course, bunkers are the not the only way to defend an area of the front, another fantastic option would have been mines. Mines, both anti-tank and anti-personnel, do not get a lot of publicity around their use during the war but they would be a critical component of defending any area, they were simply great area denial weapons. Unfortunately for the French there were only a few thousand for the entire 2nd Army, and only a bit over 400 that were allotted to the 55th’s area of the front. And when the German attack came most of them had not even been placed, so they were useless. All of the focus on building fortifications also greatly reduced the amount of time that the units had to do any kind of combat training, training that was most important for units like the 55th division. Overall the 2nd Army spent roughly twice as much time doing construction work as it did on training during the Phoney War period, although this trend did start moving more towards training during the spring of 1940. The 55th Division would begin to send its regiments for a three week period of intensive training behind the front in March. This training was desperately needed, but its timing caused some problems. What the French were doing on this area of the front during the spring of 1940 was moving men into and out of the front lines on a company by company basis. So a company would spend a certain amount of time in the defenses at the front, and then they would rotate out. They were doing this at the company level mostly because it made it easier than having to move larger units. The problem was that this put the companies of any given area of the front into a blender, with little real organization when it came to where regiments and battalions, and their companies, were positioned. This meant that when the Germans arrived there were many situations where companies from multiple different regiments would fall under the command of one Battalion commander simply because the battalion was responsible for an area of the front. This created friction which is the last thing that the French Army on the Meuse needed. All of these issues for the 55th division would suddenly move from mildly concerning to very threatening when the German forces arrived on the other side of the Meuse on the 12th. But panic was not the reaction along the French chain of command. Yes, the Germans had arrived at the river in strength, but it would almost certainly take several days for them to mass the forces required to even attempt to cross the river. This gave the French army plenty of time to respond, and in fact some reinforcements were already on their way to the area. Over the next several days those troops would arrive, and more could be dispatched. Then when the Germans did cross the river, again only after several days, they would be met by the strong French defense that was already inflicting such losses on the Germans further north. The Germans were not going to wait several days, and on the evening of the 12th plans were already being made for an attack across the river early on the 13th.