184: Hannut and Gembloux

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As the Germans moved across central Belgium the exact kind of battle that the French Army had been anticipating for years occurred, and they did very well.

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Transcript

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 184 - The Fall of France - Hannut and Gembloux. This week a big thank you goes out to Andrew for the donation and to RoyalDragoon and Scott for choosing to support the podcast be becoming members. You can find out more over at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. While the Belgian government had made the decision in 1936 to transition back to neutrality, both the governments in Brussels and Paris knew that if the Germans came knocking the Belgians could depend on French assistance. Then the plan would be to push British and French troops to meet up with Belgian forces somewhere in Belgium to form a defensive line that would be used to stop the German attack. This basic outline had not changed since after the First World War, and so Belgium’s period of neutrality during which detailed military coordination could not occur, did not really impact either nation’s ability to put the plan into action. Belgian neutrality was an interesting situation in the late 1930s because while they were neutral after 1936, on both sides of the border there was never any serious doubt that two things would occur: Germany would attack and when Belgium called for aid France would answer. And that is exactly what would occur on May 10th 1940 when the German invasion would begin. News travelled faster than the Belgian diplomats though, and information about German actions would arrive in Paris early in the morning of the 10th. At that time Reynaud, who had just the previous day been threatening his resignation due to his personal conflict with Gamelin, withdrew his protest. In conversations with the French President Lebrun they both agreed that what the nation needed at that hour was unity and continuity. He even agreed to throw his complete support behind Gamelin, sending a note to French headquarters with the very clear and concise “Only one thing matters; to win it. We shall all work for this end together, with a single heart.” As soon as information about the German attack reached Gamelin he would send a message to General Georges, commander of the Northeast Front on the Belgian border, and then that resulted in a message to General Billotte in command of Army Group 1 that they should prepare to move into Belgium as soon as word came from Brussels. The news of the attack caused a bit of a frenzy at Gamelin’s headquarters, no so much out of fear and panic but instead out of excitement that the long awaited German attack had finally begun. This feeling was buoyed by the fact that it appeared that the attack was also developing exactly as expected, with the first and primary German effort falling in the north. Later Gamelin would write that “I confess, that I believed in victory. I felt sure we could stop the Germans…I had confidence in the Army.” This would then arrive at 6:30AM when the Belgian government sent its official request for aid to the French government. Immediately orders filtered down to Billotte to move into Belgium with his movements based on the outline of the Dyle plan. British and French reconnaissance forces moved out almost immediately to scout the path ahead and to race to their positions from which they planned to entrench and defeat the German attack. One of the challenges faced by the Allied forces that morning, and this is a great example of the challenges faced when the enemy as the initiative, was that over 10 percent of the French and British units along the Belgian border were on leave on May 10th. A leave schedule had been put in place in September 1939 after it was clear that there would be no immediate German attack, and so when the attack did arrive there were many Allied soldiers that were not even with their units. This included critical officers, with General Prioux the commander of the French Cavalry Corps that would be the first large unit to race into France having spent the night of May 9th in Saint-Quentin over 50 kilometers from the front. The absence of men and officers did not prevent the pre-arranged plans from being put into place, but it introduced a small amount of uncertainty and inefficiency that the French and British would have preferred to avoid. But that did not prevent the early hours of the May 10th from being, at least from the viewpoints of French and British leaders, a success. They had been given permission to move just hours after the German attack began and their troops were already on the move. The Luftwaffe attacks that had arrived in the early minutes of the attack were not as effective as was feared, with only about 30 French planes severely damaged or destroyed, balanced against 40 German bombers that had been shot down. Then during the morning and afternoon of the 10th the expected German air attacks against the advancing French and British troops did not really materialize. Prewar planning had assumed that any movements would have to be made at night due to possibility of German air attack, but those units that proceeded during the day, while occasionally harassed, were able to reach their objectives with minimal losses. In retrospect the lack of German air attacks on French and British columns should have been the beginning of some alarm bells that maybe the Germans were not putting all of their efforts into their attack in Belgium. But at the time the assumption was just that maybe the Germans did not have the feared level of airpower, or maybe they were just not using it as effectively as possible.

There were three Allied armies moving into Belgium early on May 10th, the French 1st Army under the command of General Blanchard which moved into southern Belgium with the goal of taking up a blocking position along the Gembloux Gap. The Gap was an area where the Germans could move through Belgium without crossing a river, with the positioning of the Dyle and Sambre rivers providing a narrow area where a river crossing would not need to occur. To the left of the 1st Army was the BEF commanded by General Gort which would take up positions along the Dyle to the east of Brussels. Then finally on the very far left of the Allied line was the 7th Army commanded by General Giraud. The 7th Army would push east all the way to The Netherlands where it hoped to link up with Dutch forces in the the areas around Breda. Due to the delays that the Germans would face in The Netherlands and on the Belgian border all of these units were able to move forward as expected and the main bodies of the units began to reach the Dyle late on the 11th of May where they would begin to prepare defenses to assist them in their defense against the expected German attack. Even though their initial move was successful, the overall situation was not developing exactly as the French hoped. Instead of holding the fortifications around Liege and the Albert Canal for several days the Belgians would begin to retreat after just 30 hours. This put additional emphasis on the construction of defenses as quickly as possible, and made it more important that delaying actions were successful. In the far southern areas of Belgium the Belgian and French forces did have the fortifications around Namur to fall back on, and they would do so. These areas had seen a lot of investment by the Belgian leaders in the years before the the war and that investment provided some comfort. It provided a real anchor to the line, and would funnel the German efforts into the Gembloux Gap, precisely where they were expected to go. On the morning of May 12th there would be a major meeting of leaders from all of the involved parties with King Leopold of Belgium, the Belgian general van Overstraeten, the French representatives Daladaier, Georges, Billotte, and the British representative being Gort’s chief of staff General Henry Pownall. At the meeting there were many things to be discussed. The Belgian contingent wanted to make it clear that they felt that their forces had done everything that could be done to delay the German attacks. They then agreed, at the suggestion of Gamelin, that the Belgian forces were placed within the French command structure. This is one of those small decisions that was an important evolution from what had happened during the First World War, during which the Belgian Army had retained its independence which made it difficult to coordinate actions between the militaries of the Allied nations. After the meeting the Belgian King would issue a proclamation, a relatively positive one, to all Belgian forces: “Soldiers, The Belgian Army, brutally assailed by an unparalleled surprise attack, grappling with forces that are better equipped and have the advantage of a formidable air force, has for three days carried out difficult operations, the success of which is of the utmost importance to the general conduct of the battle and to the result of the war. These operations require from all of us – officers and men – exceptional efforts, sustained day and night, despite a moral tension tested to its limits by the sight of the devastation wrought by a pitiless invader. However severe the trial may be, you will come through it gallantly. Our position improves with every hour; our ranks are closing up. In the critical days that are ahead of us, you will summon up all your energies, you will make every sacrifice, to stem the invasion. Just as they did in 1914 on the Yser, so now the French and British troops are counting on you: the safety and honour of the country are in your hands.”

A critical component to the entire French and British plan in Belgium was the Cavalry Corps under the command of the French General Prioux. While it was called a Cavalry Corps the Corps had some of the most powerful French armored forces that had one purpose, to hold the Gembloux Gap against any German attack. They had moved across the border immediately on May 10th to take up their positions, and there was a general belief that the Belgians had put some effort into creating fortifications along the gap that could be used by the French in their efforts. However, this was not the case and when they arrived that their destinations the French troops found that few fixed defenses had been constructed. Most importantly the anti-tank barriers that they believed were in place had actually never been properly positioned, and instead they had simply been dumped in piles near their intended destinations but never actually put in place. The French placed a lot of importance on these positions, and on May 11th Prioux would push two of his mechanized cavalry divisions north east of Gembloux to take up positions around the town of Hannut. Then on May 12th these troops would come under attack by the German 6th Army. At the tip of the spear of the 6th Army was the XVI Panzer Corps commanded by General Hoepner which would be the primary drivers of the attack on the French Cavalry Corps in the days that followed. During the actions that would take place between May 12th and 15th the German units would be better supplied and organized due to the fact that during these days the French units were still at a point where they were not completely settled into their new positions, while at the same time the German units had been preparing for this action for months. This meant that relatively simple operations like the resupply of German armored units by Luftwaffe transport aircraft had already been pre-arranged. On the 12th the German attack would fall hard on the two mechanized cavalry divisions that had been sent forward to Hannut, with Hoepner pushing both the 3rd and 4th Panzer divisions forward against them. This would result in the largest tank battle of the war , with 623 German tanks facing off against about 415 French tanks. The action at Hannut would also be the largest armored battle of the entire campaign, and at the beginning the French tanks would seem to have the advantage. The vast majority of the German armor were older Panzer models, Mark 1s and Mark 2s which even in early 1940 were moving rapidly into obsolescence. They were met with French tanks that were far more heavily armed and armored, and this would be very apparently in the early hours of the battle that followed as the Germans would make little progress. However, the ability of German units to quickly adapt would be on full display as the attack continued, because after it was clear that the German tanks could not attack French tanks head on, the German units shifted to using maneuver to attack the French units at a disadvantage. Time and time again the French tanks would initially do well, and then be slowly isolated as the German units moved around their flanks and overwhelmed them piecemeal. A major contributing factor to these actions was the fact that the German tanks were all equipped with a radio, which was not the case for all of the French vehicles which made coordination far more challenging. This was a major handicap when faced with the high levels of German coordination and their ability to improvise which allowed them to approach the French tanks in unexpected ways. These actions also received a tremendous amount of focus from the entirety of French high command, because under the belief that the primary German attack was moving through Belgium these battles were the ones that would determine the success or failure of the entire campaign. At the end of the first day, the overall battle had been something close to a stalemate, as would be explained in this quote which I quit elike from The Battle of the Belgian Plain, 12-14 May 1940: The First Great Tank Battle by Jeffrey A. Gunsburg “What can one conclude from this first great tank battle? The forces of the two sides were more evenly balanced than either side expected, the relative strength of French armor and armament offsetting German superiority in number of tanks and infantry and in the air.” When evaluating the overall result of the battle it is also important to keep in mind that the French purpose was not to halt the German attack at Hannut, but instead just to slow them down while allied forces solidified their positions on or near the Dyle and along the heart of the Gembloux Gap. This dictated how Prioux constructed and organized his defense, with the decision being made to place the French tanks in fixed positions and along a broad front. This prevented the French from concentrated their armored units in some kind of proactive action, but it also caused difficulties for the Germans as well. At this point in the war German infantry units were simply not equipped to attack enemy armored units without vehicle support. This meant that while the French did not concentrate their armor against the German armor, it also meant that in the areas where German armor was not present, the French tanks did very well. In fact, in almost every case where the French tanks were able to match up against German infantry units they did very well and nearby German tanks were required to move in to assist, slowing their overall advance. On May 13th the Prioux would make the decision that his forward forces like those in Hannut had held on long enough, they were put in position to act as a blocking and delay force, and they had served that purpose. Behind the shield provided by the Cavalry Corps the French and British had established their defensive positions along the Dyle and the Gembloux Gap and therefore Prioux ordered his troops to fall back. The Battle of Hannut had been, at the end, a German victory, but as the reduced Mechanized Cavalry Divisions retreated into friendly lines, it was still not clear that it was really a French defeat.

While there were concerns about a German attack anywhere along the Belgian border, there was a clear area where the Allied front was the most vulnerable, and that was the Gembloux Gap. This was an area between the Escaut and Meuse Rivers which due to geography was not crossed by any waterways. The Gembloux area was on the French First Army front, and the most vulnerable part of the entire Gap was occupied by a division of North African troops. These troops were well armed, well trained, and very well supported by French artillery. Each regiment of the division had dedicated artillery support and then there were French 75s pushed forward in an anti-tank role to further solidify the defense against a German tank attack. This presented a problem for the German officers that would immediately face these positions, not just because the positions themselves were strong, but also because of a mismatch between what was actually being experienced a the front and the belief at higher level of commands that the German attack had already succeeded and all that the German troops needed to do was chase down a defeated enemy. When they then hit the French positions along the Dyle and near Gembloux they very rapidly came to a halt. This would first occur on the 14th when the 4th Panzer division attacked after pushing back the French covering forces of Prioux’s Corps. Then on the 15th things would not go much better, even with some of the strongest German formations like the 3rd and 4th Panzer divisions being quickly brought to a standstill. In the case of the two Panzer divisions their attacks would be called off at 11 AM due to power of French artillery and the overall inability of the Germans to suppress the French firepower. Further attacks throughout the day would again fail, even though more air support was called in to assist. One of the problems that the German armored units were having on this area of the front is that they had been experiencing a high level of attrition for several days already. When the tank breakdowns, accidents, and then losses from enemy action were included they were already in a weakened state. Then the mistake was made to launch these attacks on the 15th without proper infantry support, which was an act derived primarily from hubris. But these mistakes and risks would only result in problems because the French in this area of the front were well prepared to meet the attack, similar problems would be experienced by the German units attacking in other scenarios and they would still succeed due to the weakness of the opposition. In other areas along the Dyle a similar situation was develop, for example further south the troops of the German 6th Army also ran into a solid French defensive line, and they were unable to counter the strength of the French infantry and artillery. Just because the French were holding up the Germans did not mean that they were not also suffering with the units in some areas suffering horrific casualties. For example of the battalions of the North African division would enter their positions with 700 officers and men and leave on the 15th with only 74. But for they were at least able to inflict serious losses on the German forces with the 3rd Panzer losing almost a quarter of its armored vehicles, and the 4th Panzer almost half. Eventually the French would be forced to retreat though, primarily because in a few areas the Germans were able to make some progress, and then to the left and right of the primary French positions along the Dyle and at Gembloux the Germans would have more success.

The actions at Gembloux are interesting because it was one of the few times during the campaign that the French would be able to fight the kind of battle that they wanted to fight. The French forces were occupying well prepared positions, and they were supported by strong artillery support. To quote from The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The “Blitzkrieg” Checked by Jeffrey A. Gunsburg “Here the French artillery-infantry team imposed itself handily on the German tank-plane team, despite the fact that the defense was much more improvised on open terrain than French doctrine intended, and that the German side enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. French generalship picked the terrain for the battle, accurately predicted where the enemy would make his mechanized effort, allotted enough force to stop him, and won the day despite having to divert almost all Allied airpower and most of the reserves to counter [The attack around Sedan].” But even though there were successes, they could not prevent the wider scope of the campaign from having an effect on the French defenses in central and southern Belgium. Because after the relative successes of the 15th, and then the small withdrawals of the days that followed, even more drastic action would have to be taken in the days that followed due to the German attack further south. Gamelin would have to order General Billottee to begin a complete withdrawal from the Dyle positions which would take several days as there were so many troops from 3 different nations that were trying to keep the front together during the withdrawal. And it is worth emphasizing again, that for these armies, divisions, men, they had done nothing wrong, they had done incredibly well against the German forces that had attacked them. But their defense could not make up for the absolute disaster that was overtaking the French forces further south. Because it would not be at Gembloux that the Germans were trying to win the campaign, but instead through the Ardennes forces and then across the Meuse, an attack we will begin to discuss next episode.