183: The Invasion of Belgium

Description

The German invasion of Belgium would begin on the morning of May 10th. The Belgian army had one goal: to buy time until reinforcements could arrive.

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Transcript

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 183 - The Fall of France - The Invasion of Belgium. This week a big thank you goes out to Matthew, Tom, Wyatt, Meredith, Neil for choosing to support the podcast by becoming members. You can find out more over at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. Last episode discussed the German invasion of The Netherlands, one of several neutral nations that German forces would invade during the French campaign. Another would be Belgium. Belgian neutrality was an interesting topic during the interwar years, as for most of the period between the wars Belgium was not in fact neutral. In 1914 it had been neutral, and that had not stopped the Germans from invading southern Belgium on their way to France, and in the years after the war Belgium worked closely with France on military plans and continued pressure on Germany to fulfill its obligations as described in the treaty of Versailles. But then in 1936 the Belgian government did an about face and brought the nation back into its neutral position, in the belief that this would reduce the possibility of a German invasion. As with so many other nations around Europe these decisions were driven out of a mixture of fear and helplessness. Belgium was very vulnerable to a German attack, and it was clear that its military forces were no match for what Germany could bring to bear. This resulted in an influential number of Belgian politicians to believe that the best course of action was to just try and stay out of it. This idea seemed to crash down when the Germans invaded Poland, but throughout the Phoney War Belgian neutrality was officially maintained. During the 1920s and early 1930s the Belgian and French military leaders had many discussions about what would happen in a war with Germany. They both agreed that the best plan was for the Belgian forces on the German border to hold onto their defenses as long as possible while the French army rushed troops through Belgium to assist. This plan served the interests of both nations, as it would allow the Belgians to retain control of as much of their territory as possible, while for the French it pushed the front line out of France. Even while maintaining official neutrality during the Phoney War this plan was reaffirmed, with the Belgian military attache in Paris working with the French to determine how much assistance could be expected within 4 days of the German attack. Another way in which the two nations worked together was through the sharing of intelligence information. In retrospect the most important of these messages was a series of intelligence reports shared in early March by the Belgians which indicated that the Germans were moving some of their troops further south to the area around the Ardennes. This was still part of the Belgian border, or at least part of it was, but the assumption had been up to that point that the primary point of German effort would be further to north along the Belgian Plain. The information from Belgian intelligence confirmed what the French had already detected, but there was very little concern at French headquarters, as they still believed that the strongest German forces would attack in the north and that any attack through the Ardennes could be dealt with when required. This episode will be broken into two parts, the first will discuss the first German attacks into Belgium on May 10th, and then the second half will look at the information that the French leaders had between May 10th and May 13th as they reacted to German actions, or what they thought German actions were.

While the Belgian army was heavily outnumbered by the German forces that could be arrayed against it, the size and power of the Belgians was not something that could be completely ignored. In total the Belgian army mobilized between 600,000 and 650,000 men during the war, and these were arranged in 22 total divisions, including 2 divisions of troops specifically equipped and trained to fight in the Ardennes and then two motorized cavalry divisions. Most of the troops were dedicated to defending the fortifications along the Meuse river and the Albert Canal, which had been fortified with casemates and fortresses over the years. This stood directly in the way of the primary goal of the German attack, which was to get across the Meuse as quickly as possible, but it was hoped that the Belgian forces, protected by the fixed fortifications could hold the Germans for up to 72 hours which would allow time for British and French forces to push up to the Dyle line. Regardless of the presence of those Allied forces, the Belgian plan was always to retreat to the Dyle when the Meuse could no longer be held. The primary challenge that the Belgian forces would face was around equipment. Equipment was always a challenge for these smaller armies and the Belgians were no different, they did have a decent number of 47mm anti-tank guns, which would prove to be effective, but they were deficient in many other areas of equipment particularly in artillery. There was also a general shortage of aircraft, which would be important in the opening moments of the German attack on May 10th. On the afternoon of the 9th it had been announced to the Luftwaffe forces through the use of the codeword Danzig that the attack would begin the next day. And this put into action the Luftwaffe’s Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 which would launch attacks on French, Dutch, and Belgian airfields to open the attack. The goal of these attacks was, of course, to destroy as many enemy aircraft as possible, and for this purpose around 500 bombers would attack 72 airfields. This was then followed by a second wave of 500 bombers that arrived 90 minutes after the first with some target overlap, but also many new airfields targeted by the second wave. These opening strikes were quite effective against the Belgian and Dutch air forces, with both losing around half of their total aircraft just in the first few hours of the attack. They would be less successful against the British and French, who were able not just to prevent the worst of the bombing but also to destroy several German bombers as soon as Allied fighters were able to get in the air.

The early German offensive efforts in the air would also provide cover for what was becoming a trend in German attacks, an airborne drop. In this case the target of the airborne troops was the French fortress of Eben Emael. This fortification was very new, having been completed in 1935 to defend a stretch of the Meuse river about 6 miles from Maastricht. It was situated near the river and incorporated all of the best practices of fortress design in the 1930s with 3 levels, two of which were completely below ground. Each of the levels could be sealed off from one another through the use of heavily armored doors. This protected as much of the 1,200 man garrison as possible from enemy infiltration and would allow them to utilize the 30 artillery pieces that were built into the fort to their maximum effect. This artillery ranged from 120mm guns down to 60mm anti-tank guns, and the largest guns had a range of over 10 miles which allowed them to command a wide swath of the surrounding territory. The presence of the Meuse and a canal that the Germans would have to cross made these artillery pieces even more dangerous because the crossings of the water obstacles would funnel the German forces down into a few very small areas. This was one major problem with the fort, a problem that the Germans would be able to take advantage of because they would be able to obtain a complete plan for the fortress before the war. The problem was that the top of the fortress was a large flat meadow that was built on top of its concrete roof, with the soil and grass designed to provide extra protection. However, if you have airborne forces a perfectly flat piece of ground, that you can count on to be completely free of obstacles because it was manmade is a very nice landing zone. The Belgian designers and defenders completely underestimated this possibility, and the top of the fortress was protected by just a few machine guns. It would be a fatal mistake. A tremendous amount of effort had been put into preparing for the attack on the fortress, including the creation of a special group of airborne infantry and combat engineers. They had even went to the fortresses that Czechoslovakia had built in the Sudentenland to practice their assault and the usage of a specially designed hollow charge. These would be brought in via 11 gliders which would land on top of the fort. Only 9 of the gliders would actually reach the objective, with one of the two that did not make it including the commander of the airborne unit, but the men who did land quickly got to work. The communications between the fort and the outside world were cut off quickly, and the machine guns that were positioned on top of the fortress were neutralized. The group then went to work disabling some of the forts guns from the outside. A nearby Belgian infantry unit did try to mount a counterattack, but it was unsuccessful. For almost 24 hours this small group of airborne infantry continued to fight the forts occupants, while waiting to be relieved by the German ground forces. Two small groups of German paratroopers also dropped near two bridges over the Albert Canal and were in similarly trying to hold onto small pieces of territory. Remarkably, these units could have been completely wiped away if the Belgian units that were stationed nearby would launch launched a counter attack, there were more than enough infantry troops in the area to simply overwhelm the small German detachments. But they did not do so, and eventually it would simply be too late as the guns of Eben-Emael would eventually be disabled and the German advance over the bridges on the Meuse and the Albert Canal could begin in force.

The lack of action near Eben-Emael was just one example of a larger problem for the Belgian forces, a general lack of drive among the commanders of the Belgian defending units. As with any river crossing, amphibious landing, or airborne assault the best time for the defenders to defeat the enemy is when they have as few people across the river as possible. During most of the day on May 10th there were very few German troops west of the Meuse, and they were simply trying to hold on until the real German invasion force arrived which would not occur until the morning of May 11th. Instead of any kind of counter attack, the Belgian forces in the area instead began to disengage and retreat almost as soon as the German attack began. This then had a ripple effect on the defending troops along the entire frontier, and when the 7th Infantry division began to retreat from the area around Eben-Emael, then the rest of the 1st Corps began to do the same. To the south of the 1st Corps the 3rd Corps was positioned in the areas in and around Liege, and when they realized that the 1st Corps was retreating, well they began to evacuate Liege as well even though they had not even been attacked by any German units. They would leave behind the over 6,000 garrison troops of Liege to fight on alone, without the infantry troops that were essential to prevent the fortifications from being surrounded and defeated in detail. This is exactly what would happen when the troops of the German 6th Army arrived in the days that followed, all of the positions were surrounded and neutralized. The retreat of the Belgian 1st and 3rd Corps essentially ended any possibility that the Belgian army had of slowing down the German attack in the area, as it was on the Meuse and the Albert Canal that the Germans would find it difficult to use their advantages in equipment and numbers. And while I am critical of the Belgian officers in charge of these units, they were in some ways just following the plan. The plan was to retreat from the German attack, and the Belgian leaders were under no illusions that they could hold the Germans on the border for a long period of time. But the hope was that the units could slow and maybe even stop the German advance for a period of time, and the Belgian units just sort of skipped that part of the plan. During the south the Belgian defenders in the Ardennes would be able to delay the German advance a little longer, for a few hours but they would also be pushed back even though much like along the Meuse the Ardennes was one of the areas where the Belgians had the best chance of meaningfully slowing the German advance. Instead the retreat would begin, and it would continue in the days that followed. On both sides this resulted in constant marching among the foot infantry which would make it challenging for the defense to re-solidify around any defensive line, although the German infantry would become equally as tired. Here is an account from a German infantryman after a few days of the offensive: “There was little sleep – we slept where we fell, on our packs – little time for anything really. Often we had to be told to eat or else we could drift off standing up. The intensity was unremitting from the first day to the last. A blur of marching, fighting, weapon maintenance – we didn’t know where we were or when it would end.” Luckily for the German infantry, the German Army had another tool that they could use to continue the attack going, the armored units of the Panzer divisions. And while the German infantry was marching over the border, in the Ardennes the German armor was beginning to do the same in the Ardennes, but the situation was still a bit unclear to the French.

With the benefit of hindsight we know that the assumptions made by the French military leaders in the first 3 days of the German attack were critical to the overall course of the campaign. Their reaction, or lack of reaction, to exactly what the Germans were doing would set them up for a military disaster that probably could have been avoided if different decisions had been made. The most important of these decisions was the understanding and belief that the primary German attack was going to come through central Belgium, and then believing that this was still the case as the German attack developed. This meant that even as late as May 12th, as the German armor units began to approach the Meuse around Sedan, French military high command was still convinced that it was in central Belgium that the campaign would be decided. The idea of the Germans following the same basic template as they had in 1914 had been a fixture of French planning for the entire interwar period, and during the first days of the attack the information available seemed to confirm these assumptions. In the early hours of May 10th reports had arrived that the Germans were attacking along the Meuse River and Albert Canal near Maastricht, and that they had in some way attacked the fortress at Eben Emael. This was combined with information about the German attacks into The Netherlands. This was perfectly in line with what the opening moves of a German offensive that was focused on pushing strong German forces through central Belgium. That the French would believe that this was the main point of German effort was exactly what the Germans intended, and they had put a lot of work into making it fit within the pre-conceived notions of Gamelin and other French leaders. Along with this there were German efforts to make it appear that the Germans might also attack through Switzerland, with German intelligence trying to mislead the French into believing that there was a serious threat to the French right on the southern end of the Maginot Line. This attack was never going to happen, but misleading information was planted around there being specialist and elite combat formations moved into the area to try and deceive the French. The result would be the retention of more French forces that otherwise would have been kept in the south out of fear that such an attack could occur, something that was discussed among Allied leaders. While most eyes were fixed on central Belgium, reports began arriving early on May 10th that there was some action occurring int he Ardennes, with the German invasion of Luxembourg happening early in the day and then aerial reconnaissance flights reporting that German motorized and armored units were moving in the area. But these movements were not completely outside of what the French were expecting, with the belief being that the Germans were sure to move at least some forces through the Ardennes. All of this information was then fed up through the chain of command in intelligence reports, and it was the content of those reports which would have such a major impact on the overall course of the campaign. A summary of aerial intelligence was provided early on the 11th of May which drew some conclusions about the German attack, stating that “In summary, the general impression drawn from intelligence received seems to be: a)—principal enemy effort in the region between Maastricht and Nijmegen; b)—secondary effort but extremely strong to the west of Luxembourg [through the Ardennes]; c)—very moderate advance in the region of Liège.” The intelligence from the French Second Army, which was guarding the front along the Ardennes, similarly downplayed the German forces that were advancing in their direction with one summary report ending with “The enemy seems to be presenting himself in force in front of the Second Army. As a consequence, our light divisions have accomplished the prescribed delaying action in a rhythm that appears normal.” While another report would state that “[E]nemy motorized elements have been pushed back by the Chasseurs Ardennais … and have come in contact with our covering [force] elements. Belgian obstacles seem to have been sufficient to halt the progression of the enemy. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS OF ARMOURED VEHICLES ON THE ARMY’S FRONT.” These are just the summary reports that were provided by the Second Army headquarters up to Gamelin’s headquarters at French High Command. The reports coming into the Second Army and other French headquarters were confusing, contradictory, and were not consistently delivered. At every step of the process, when information was incomplete assumptions were made to fill in the gaps, based on what the French assumed the Germans were doing. This created a situation where there was little being told to French High Command that greatly altered their views of the German intentions in the critical early days of the attack, and that would lead to disaster.

The general assumption that the Germans were doing what was expected of them continued throughout the 11th of May, as there was fighting all along the front, but the strongest German efforts seemed to be in the north. There were continued reports of German units in the Ardennes, but there was no firm information that there were large German armored units moving through the area. French focus was instead on preparing to fight the Germans in Belgium near the Gembloux Gap, which will be the topic for next episode, although they at least took the step of ordering some units to reinforce the Second and Ninth Armies which would be the targets of any of those German troops that managed to move through the Ardennes. The Summary report of aerial intelligence that was provided on the 12th of May once again did not require any changes. The reports from the 2nd Army on that day did mention that German armored units had been present, but the report provided would downplay any possible concern stating that “In spite of pressure from the enemy and the presence of tanks, our front has not been ruptured at any point, and the delaying action occurred under satisfactory conditions.” It would not be until the morning of the 13th, just hours before German troops would cross the river at Sedan that French intelligence reports began to correctly identify the areas around the Ardennes as the point of greatest concern for the French. The first crossing would occur at 4PM on that same day, but the 2nd Army would continue to downplay the problems it was experiencing stating that “Overall impression is very good.” While this was very optimistic, the impression should have been bad, very bad. The reason I have brought these conversations forward into this episode, before we even cover the fighting in Belgium and in the Ardennes which will be the subjects of the next several episodes is because of the importance of the mistake that was made by the French leaders in simply guessing incorrectly where the primary point of German effort would be. But those guesses were made, especially at the higher level of French command, using information that in no way supported any other conclusion. The Germans made a concerted effort to deceive the French leaders, and many French intelligence reports from the front just amplified these efforts. German air support was focused on central Belgium, German armor forces would be showcased at Hannut and Gembloux, and French intelligence reports downplayed information that they did have about German forces in the Ardennes. It is very easy to criticize Gamelin and other French military leaders for making the wrong decisions during this period, but to do otherwise during the first three days of the campaign would have went against the information that they had in front of them. Instead, the mistakes came before and after. Before the war they did a poor job of preparing the French Army to react to unexpected situations, and did not foster an force that was ready to react and respond. And then after the German attack developed those in French high command did a poor job of properly reacting and using the resources that they had to respond to the threat. They failed, but not because they guessed wrong but instead because they had not properly prepared for guessing wrong, which should always be considered to be a possibility.