181: Fall Gelb

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The original German plan for the invasion of France was safe, conservative, and downright boring. But then another plan appeared that was far more interesting.

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Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 181 - The Fall of France - Fall Gelb. This week a big thank you goes out to QuanticPotato and David for choosing to support the podcast by becoming members, you can find out more over at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. German plans for an attack in the West would originate in the last days of the fighting in Poland. With the Polish military clearly defeated, units began to move to the West both to defend the western frontier but also to begin preparations for an attack. On October 9th Hitler would issue Directive No. 6 which stated that the goal of the upcoming German attack was to: “[D]efeat as much as possible of the French Army and of the forces of the allies fighting on their side, and at the same time to win as much territory as possible in Holland, Belgium, and Northern France to serve as a base for the successful prosecution of the air and sea war against England and as a wide protective area for the economically vital Ruhr.” It is worth pointing out that these initial goals did not speak of the defeat of France, only the capture of the Low Countries and then pushing the French back away from the Ruhr. The planning by the German General Staff would then be based around these objectives, but those initial plans would not be the plan used by the German military in May 1940. Instead the plan would evolve from the relatively conservative plans of late 1939 and into the bold thrust through the Ardennes that would eventually be executed. This episode is going to look at that evolution, before discussing the German forces available for the offensive. This period of German planning is a great example of how quickly some of the German planning came together early in the war, as the final german plans for Fall Gelb, or Case Yellow, would be developed started in mid-February 1940, scrapping much of the earlier planning in pursuit of new and bolder objectives. The result of this change and the quick re-orientation of German plans would catch the French completely off guard, a surprise from which they would never recover.

When the first draft of an attack on France was written up in mid October by the German General Staff the results were very conservative, bordering on a bit boring. At a high level the plan was to attack The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg with the primary point of German effort being the forces that would march through the center of Belgium and towards Brussels. The attack would then, using a concentration of most of the available armored forces, push southwest towards the River Somme. This was not designed for any kind of knock out blow against France and had the goal of simply pushing back French forces and taking over some amount of territory, which was in line with Hitler’s instructions and the believed capabilities of German forces. At this early stage the germ of the eventual plan was already present though, because there were two armored divisions positioned further to the south, with one positioned to attack through the Ardennes while another focused on attacking the very northern section of the Maginot Line. When these plans were presented to Hitler he was not really very impressed. The attacks were not exactly the bold kind of plans that Hitler often liked to see, and in the case of these early drafts he was not wrong. It is important to state that these plans were not a mirror of the Schlieffen plan from before the First World War, involving a wide sweeping attack through Belgium and towards Paris, but they did share that earlier plan’s starting point. The risks of this plan would be emphasized after there was a war scare in France in mid-January which would see the French Army put into readiness for a march into Belgium. This seemed to confirm to the Germans that a major part of the French plan was to concentrate forces exactly onto where they were planning to attack. This information would have both short and long term ramifications. On the short term, the next version of the planned attack would increase the number of armored divisions in the Ardennes from 1 to 2 so that they could advance on Sedan and ensure the protection of the German left flank. This would be incorporated into the third major draft which was presented on January 30th. On a longer timeframe the information gained in mid January would play a major role in a complete shift in German planning, a change that had really been building since the very first draft for the attack was presented in October. Hitler had never been pleased with the conservative nature of the plans, a frustration that was just amplified by the fact that he felt that the Army leaders were to blame for the delay of the attack until the spring of 1940, instead of it being launched in October or November of 1939. He wanted a more radical and aggressive plan, and it would be provided by a man who would become one of the most famous German Generals of the war: Erich von Manstein.

Manstein was, in early 1940 the Chief of Staff of Army Group A. Army Group A was not the primary point of German emphasis, and was instead positioned along the area to the south, along the border with Luxembourg and the Ardennes forest. From the period started in October 1939 through the end of January Manstein would write up 7 memorandums outlining the plan that he believed that the German military should use in an attack on France. During this time he would be able to consult with General Heinz Guderian, who was the commander of the armored forces assigned to Army Group A during this period. He would have their headquarters in adjacent hotels and this allowed the two men to have several conversations, with Guderian being one of the leading German armored theorists. This was important because Manstein’s plan was nothing less than a complete rewrite of what Halder was proposing. Instead of making the main effort through central Belgium, Manstein wanted to use that area simply as a diversion, playing on pre-conceived notions of the French leaders. The focal point of the German attack would shift south, with the majority of Germany’s armored divisions being pushed through the Ardennes as quickly as possible. Once they were on the other side of the forest they would advance on the Meuse at Sedan, cross the river, and then continue to push forward. The goal was not just to capture territory, but to try and isolate some of the French and British forces in Belgium to prevent them from reacting to the German attack. Guderian would offer his advance to Manstein in two ways. The first was that Guderian believed that the German armored units absolutely could advance through the Ardennes, an area that Guderian had experience with including during the First World War. The second was that he pushed Manstein to make the crossing of the Meuse river at the earliest possible moment in the attack. Guderian believed that it needed to be completed by the fifth day of the attack because every hour between the start of the attack and the crossing of the river was another hour that the French could move reinforcements into the area around Sedan which was drastically increase the difficulty of the crossing. Such a radical change was not supported, at least initially by Halder, and he would move to minimize Manstein’s influence by promoting him out of the way. This meant that on January 27th, von Manstein would be promoted to command an infantry corps, but it was one that did not exist and was still being organized. But it served Halder’s purpose of getting him out as the Chief of Staff of Army Group A. Just before he left his post at Army Group A Manstein arranged a set of war games that confirmed the basic ideas of his plan, and at this point even Halder was beginning to shift his thinking, although he was resistant to giving Manstein credit.

It was very possible that Manstein’s plans could have ended with his promotion out of the Army Group A, but Manstein would have the support of Hitler’s military adjutant, Rudolf Schmundt. Schmundt had visited Army Group A’s headquarters in January which resulted in him hearing of Manstein’s plans. He would then meet with Manstein in early February after his transfer, and during their conversation Manstein would provide further details of his plans, and criticisms of those that had been proposed by Halder up that that point. Schmundt would tell another member of Hitler’s military staff that one of the reasons he kept meeting with Manstein is that he felt that what Manstein was proposing was exactly what Hitler wanted. Due to this belief Schmundt would take the next step of trying to get Manstein in a position to present his ideas to Hitler directly. First he would outline Manstein’s plan for Hitler and then would invite Manstein as part of a larger meeting between Hitler and some of the newly promoted Corps Commanders including Manstein. Then after the meeting Hitler and Manstein had a direct conversation and by the time that the conversation was over Hitler was more that convinced that moving the focus of the German attack to the south was the correct path forward. Manstein had the benefit that his plan played right into the types of operations that Hitler loved, bold action that would catch the enemy off guard. There were risks, especially around the possibility of French flank attacks, but Manstein even more than Hitler believed that these risks were worth it, and that the speed of their action would prevent a proper French reaction. Fortunately for Halder, he had already been working on his own version of Manstein’s plan, which retained the high level objectives of Manstein’s changes, with the shift of German effort to the south, but there were some key differences between the Manstein version of the plan and Halder’s. Halder’s changes would be represented in the fourth major revision of Fall Gelb. There were very important differences between the two plans though, especially around the speed of the planned advance and the final objectives of the attack. Within the German army leadership there was a fundamental difference of opinion about how quickly certain military objectives could be accomplished in the new world of armored warfare. On one side you had men like Guderian who believed that he could cross the Meuse in five days, while on the other you had men like Halder who took a more conservative approach to the plan, believing that instead it would only be the 9th or 10th day that would see the Germans cross the river at Sedan. One of the reasons that Halder believed that it would take so much longer was due to the difference in speed between the armored and infantry forces. Guderian believed, as Guderian would almost always believe, that all he needed was his panzer divisions, but Halder believed that the Meuse could only be crossed after the infantry arrived at the river to assist with the crossing. If this was the case then the difference in days between when Guderian believed the river could be crossed and when Halder believed it could be done was almost entirely down to how long it would take the foot slogging German infantry to be in position. This then greatly impacted what both groups they could achieve after the river was crossed, with Manstein believing that the objective of the German attack should be to use their armored forces to push as hard and fast as possible all the way to the North Sea Coast, cutting off any French and British troops to their north. Halder initially took a more conservative approach, although he would eventually be convinced to seek out this more distant objective, although these differences in opinion about how fast and far the attack should be executed would continue after it had been launched. While I have been focusing on Halder, who as the Chief of the General Staff was ultimately responsible for the performance of the plan, it is worth taking a moment to say that Halder was not the only voice of concern among the German military, with other leading officers also voicing concerns, primarily around how the plan went against some of the basic tenants of military operations. I will just focus on two of these here, the first is General von Bock, the commander of Army Group B, although his perspective is slightly muddied by the fact that he was the commander that was losing his central place in the German offensive, but regardless, the feedback he would give towards the plan was “You will be creeping ten miles from the Maginot Line with the flank of your breakthrough and hope the French will watch inertly! You are cramming the mass of the tank units together into the sparse roads of the Ardennes mountain country, as if there were no such thing as air power! And, you then hope to be able to lead an operation as far as the coast with an open southern flank 200 miles long, where stands the mass of the French Army.” In a similar vein the commander of Army Group B, General von Rundstedt, who had originally been a supporter of Manstein’s plan, also began to preach caution as the day approached. His views were echoed by his new Chief of Staff von Sodenstern who would write on February 22nd that “I am not convinced that even the reinforced panzer and motorized units will manage to force the crossing over the Meuse in the kind of breadth that is necessary for operational purposes. Yes, I doubt, to begin with, that they will be in a position to cross the Meuse River even only here and there, holding the bridgeheads thus gained until the following infantry division would be able to make room for an operational exploitation featuring the necessary breadth and depth … But even if that should come off successfully, the panzer and motorized units by that time will be so ‘exhausted’ that sending them deep into enemy rear areas will no longer offer any chances of success.” In both cases the skeptical German officers were concerned about the French reaction to the German attack. They would claim that those that favored the aggressive plan were underestimating the French Army, but as it would turn out even the most optimistic of the German plans was actually still overestimating the ability of the French to react to the situation that they were about to be in.

The disagreements that developed after February 1940 were largely based around what would happen at the Meuse and after, not about the path to get there, and so all of the staff officers in Army Group A got to work on planning their path to the Meuse. This planning was critical because Army Group A was made up of 44 division, including 7 Panzer divisions and 3 motorized infantry divisions, and they would be arrayed on just 90 kilometers of front. The 7 Panzer divisions would lead the way, but even these troops could not all move through the area at one time, and the traffic situation would be a disaster even under the best of circumstances. Three Panzer Corps would cross the Meuse at three different crossing points, Sedan, Monthermé, and Dinant. But even as the movement plans were being finalized for the opening moves of Army Group A, and they were very detailed and very precise, discussions would continue about what they did after. Manstein had pushed for a much larger second phase of the campaign, with one group of mobile divisions pushing as fast as possible for the Channel coast while another set of forces quickly began a southern attack against the theoretically largely unguarded areas of Northern France. This second attack would eventually become the second phase of the German offensive, Case Red, but it was decided that it would only occur after the first phase of the operation was complete and the German forces had reached the coast. This would allow the mobile and infantry forces of the German advance to be in place for the expected French counterattack on the German left, with the assumption being that the French could probably get together 41 divisions from their reserve and from other areas of the front to launch a counter attack to try and re-establish a connection with the troops in the north.

With the German plan mostly settled on, the next question was what forces would they have to execute that plan. From the end of the invasion of Poland the German military had spent the Phoney War rebuilding its forces and enhancing them in many ways. But all of these efforts were hampered by the relatively low degree of industrial mobilization that would be the hallmark of the German war effort during the early war years. This resulted in a far smaller output than what would be present in later years, and the output that was present was also structured and planned in a way that was interesting in hindsight. For example, the overall output of German industry was not geared towards a short war in France, but instead around the possibility of a longer war. The clearest indicator of this is the fact that the output of ammunition and other supplies was not scheduled to peak until October 1940. There was also a heavy emphasis being placed on ammunition production, and more importantly the capacity to produce more ammunition in the future. In the German war economy the allocation of steel was a precise indicator of priorities within German industry, and in the second quarter of 1940, during which the invasion of France would occur, there was just as much steel allocated to the increase in possible future production of ammunition as there was towards tanks. Along with an emphasis that was out of step with what the military plans were, there was also some challenges on the leadership level for the German economy. In 1945 Georg Thomas, the Chief of the War Economy Staff would analyze this period of time by saying that “There was complete leaderlessness in the economic field in Hitler’s so-called Führer-state and there was an unspeakably confused parallelism because Hitler did not grasp the need for firm, far-sighted planning, because Göring knew nothing about the economy and economics, and because the responsible experts had no real authority.” These challenges did not prevent the construction of a good amount of new and improved military hardware. This would allow the equipment lost in Poland to be replaced along with the expansion of several areas of the German military. One example this would be the Luftwaffe and its new Ju-88 bomber. It was just one part of the very large number of bombers created during the Phoney War, with around 1,600 of the 2,100 aircraft built during the Phoney War being bombers. The Ju-88 was a major improvement over the previous version of German bombers, and had been available in only very limited numbers during the Polish campaign. Within the German armored units the availability of newer tanks was also important. Almost immediately after the Polish campaign some of the Panzer divisions transferred to Western Germany and began to receive replacement tanks. Efforts were also started to transition the 4 Light Divisions that had been present in Poland into fully fledged Panzer divisions. The Light Divisions had been a concept built around the use of trucks to haul the tanks around the campaign allowing them greater mobility. However, the concept had not really worked out during the Polish campaign, with the massive number of trucks required to move the Light Divisions reducing the number of trucks available for other purposes. Therefore during the Phoney War these divisions were transitioned into standard Panzer divisions and became Panzer divisions 6,7,8 and 9. This expansion of the number of Panzer divisions was only possible due to the increased production of some of the newer tank models, including a large number of tanks built in the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia. These Czech tanks, the 35t and the 38t would be critical components of German armored forces all the way up to Barbarossa in June 1941. But across all Panzer divisions there would be fewer Panzer 1 light tanks, armed only with a machine gun, and higher numbers of Panzer 3s and 4s, both modern designs with larger guns and far more armor. A new type of vehicle would also be ready by the spring of 1940, the StuG-III assault gun. The Stug and its later variants would go on to be the most produced German fully tracked vehicle of the war, and the concept was pretty simple. The chassis of the Panzer 3 tank was used, but instead of mounting a turret on top a 7.5cm howitzer was mounted directly in the hull. This reduced the time and materials needed to manufacture the vehicle, while still providing a mobile piece of artillery that could be used to support the infantry with both fire support and anti-tank capabilties. The lack of a turret made hitting moving targets more difficult, but the volume that could be manufactured was felt to be more than worth the compromise. Eventually over 10,000 Stug IIIs would be built, making it a critical component of the German war effort for the rest of the war even it was not as flashy as the tanks. All was not perfect with the mobile divisions of the German Army though, as there would be a change that would only grow in the years that followed. During the Phoney War period 3 months worth of production capacity for large trucks was given not to the Army, but instead to new Waffen-SS units that wanted to motorize some of their troops. This reduced the motor transport of the Army units and instead handed it over to Waffen-SS divisions that were far less experienced and had not received the education of combat in Poland. It would begin at this point with trucks, but later changes in tank allocations would play a critical role in the overall fighting power of the German armored forces in Russia.

In total there were around 135 German divisions either involved in the attacks in the west or in reserve, with the majority of these being given to Army Group A which had 45 divisions under its command. This allowed the Germans to reach something approaching numerical parity with their enemies, with around 151 Allied divisions although these division were spread out across 4 national armies, including the Belgian and Dutch armies that were technically neutral before the start of hostilities. But the exact positioning the divisions on both sides would be very important, with the focus of the German attack in the Army Group A sector matching 45 divisions against just 18 French and Belgian divisions. At the same time in the north Army Group B, with 29 divisions, would face 45 Allied divisions, although these Allied forces were focused on a defensive strategy and did not plan to launch their own offensive against Germany. Next episode we will begin to discuss what the Germans would do with all of those divisions, starting in the north with the invasion of The Netherlands, a neutral nation that could not hope to completely stop the German invasion, but did hope to be able to hold out long enough for help to arrive.