180: French War Plans

Description

The French had been preparing for this moment since 1919, so what did they come up with?

Listen

Transcript

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 180 - The Fall of France - French War Plans. This week a big thank you goes out to Jcut for purchasing me some coffees on buymeacoffee, a completely commitment free way to support the podcast. You can find that link in the show notes. I would also like to thank Steele and Sarah for choosing to support the podcasting by becoming members, you can find out more at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. While there were many root causes for the defeat of France in 1940, political, economical, and geographical there was also of course at least some blame to be shared by the military. Even with all of the challenges that France faced during the interwar years, and the problems caused by the actions of Germany up to May 1940, in the weeks before the invasion the balance of forces on the ground was roughly similar. When all of the militaries of Western Europe were combined there were about 135 divisions on both sides. On the Allied side they were not all coordinated, with Belgium and The Netherlands insisting on continuing their neutrality until the last moments, but the troops in those nations would distract a number of German divisions during May 1940. The problem for France was not manpower, or even quality of that manpower, but instead the plans for how those men should be used in case of a German invasion. In 1940 France was in its second world war in which it would begin the war with a bad plan, plain and simple. In 1914 Joffre’s Plan XVII would result in catastrophic casualties for the French Army, with more men killed during the opening days of the French offensives than any other days during the First World War. In 1940 the plan would not be as much of a disaster in terms of men killed or wounded, but it would have its own fatal flaws. In 1914 France would be able to recover from the opening disasters of the war, but due to the differences in French leadership and military technology in 1940, the opening failures of the war would be terminal for the French war effort.

Every military plan, and most military decisions, come back to a nation’s military doctrine, or how it plans to behave in a conflict. France’s doctrine during the interwar years was rooted in a single word: firepower. The Army’s regulations of 1921 and 1936, the two key publications during these years would both claim that firepower was the most important predictor of victory in a future war. This was largely a hold over from the end of the First World War due to the incredible firepower that could be brought to bear by the militaries after 4 years of war. This belief in the overwhelming power of, well firepower resulted in an evolution of French battle doctrine around something called the methodical battle. The ideal methodical battle can be thought of as a kind of artillery powered steamroller, with the infantry taking short jumps forward under the cover of artillery fire, then the artillery being brought forward before another jump forward was made. These jumps might be only a few thousand meters at a time. During the Second World War the French would never actually launch a methodical battle operation, they never really had a chance. But it was the aspirational goal of all French planning. This was important because when planning for a methodical battle certain aspects of combat became really important, specifically command and control. When concentrating firepower it was more important for higher level officers to be given closer control of more resources so that those resources could be concentrated at the decisive point. This was true now just of artillery and infantry, but armor, aircraft, everything. The concentration of power at a higher level was an important part of the success of late First World War offensives, and so with the new resources available to the French military during the 1920s and 1930s the hope was that it would be more effective. Another important aspect of French planning was that the infantry was still the key to true victory, and all of the firepower built up around them was not going to win the war itself, but instead just to support the infantry in its goals. The 1921 regulations, which remained largely unchanged up until 1940 would say that: ‘[P]rotected and accompanied by its own guns and by the guns of the artillery, and occasionally preceded by combat tanks and aviation … the infantry conquers the ground, occupies it, organizes it and holds it.’ All of this planning was, in retrospect very susceptible to an attack by an enemy that prioritized mobility and low level decision making. If an enemy was able to construct a doctrine around quick decision making and pair that with the ability to physically move faster, to prevent the higher level of French control from being able to act quickly enough, then they would be able to take advantage of the French system. Then all that would be needed would be to attack the French where they did not expect it, and then commit everything to keeping that attack going at maximum speed. If this was paired with vehicles that could rapidly move through the attack, perhaps protected by armor, perhaps even carrying their own guns, that would be really dangerous. But surely nobody would do that.

For the French military leaders, the most important tool that they had to work with were the French military forces. By the time of the German invasion there were 84 field divisions, with 79 of those being infantry divisions, and then there were also 23 divisions of fortress troops which were primarily manning the Maginot Line fortifications. There was a general feeling among the French political leaders that this was France’s maximum possible sustainable army size while also trying to continue to expand its military production with Daladier writing in February 1940 that ‘France, is in effect reaching the limit of its effort in…personnel. There can be no question in present circumstances of intensifying it.’ This would also mean that there would be relatively modest limits of how many combat casualties could be replaced once the fighting started, which was a worrying situation to be in right at the beginning of the war. The equipment of these troops was, at least on the ground, similar to what the German infantry divisions had available to them. In the area of tanks the French models in some way were better, more armor and bigger guns, but they had some shortcomings that the French tankers would have to deal with over the course of the campaign. The Char B1 and B1bis tanks, which prioritized firepower and armor, was also very slow, and it consumed a tremendous amount of fuel that made it difficult to supply and maintain. One of the challenges of the B1 and another French tank the Somua S35 was that they forced one man to do all of the tasks in the turret. This meant that one man had to be the loader and the gunner, whereas in German tanks this was done by separate individuals. The focus on one task meant that it could be done faster and more consistently, although that did mean there was an extra crew member. But the extra crew member was actually good in some ways, as it was another pair of hands to keep the tank running. A major challenge that the tankers had, and all of the French military units that worked with those tankers, was that they did not have a lot of training as larger units. This would be a problem throughout the French Army, and to be straightforward about it training was not high on Gamelin’s agenda. At no time was this more apparent than during the Phoney War, during which trainings were at times encouraged, but there was nothing done to ensure that they were actually followed through on. Instead the infantry would spend most of the Phoney War just kind of half working on fortifications, which did nothing ti improve their morale and motivation.

The man that would lead the French Army, with its emphasis on close control and orders from above, would be General Gamelin. Gamelin, much like almost every other major military leader in 1940 had fought and led divisions during the First World War. He would then rise to position of Supreme Commander of all French land forces by 1940, which is a title that is actually important to our story. It meant that Gamelin was in command wherever the French Army had forces, which included not just France but also North Africa and Syria. Then in north-east France he had delegated control to General Alphonse Georges, but only in northeast France. Gamelin retained control of forces in southern France. This created a situation in which Georges retained direct control of what would turn into the critical forces for the defense of France, while Gamelin focused on larger strategic issues. It did not help that Gamelin and Georges were barely on speaking terms in 1940 due to the fact that over the preceding years it had become clear that Georges was almost certainly Gamelin’s successor. In my opinion Gamelin is probably blamed for too much of France’s defeat in 1940, and there were many other failings that would occur both before the war and during the brief campaign that he would not be responsible for. However, it is hard to escape the fact that Gamelin had been the Chief of the General Staff in France since 1931, and so if the French Army was unprepared for the situation in 1940 some blame, perhaps most of the blame, must be placed on his shoulders. At the same time, the problems for France in 1940 were deep systemic problems that Gamelin maybe exacerbated, but equally probably could not have solved. One person that was not a fan of Gamelin was Paul Reynaud, who could become the French Prime Minister just a few weeks before the German invasion. Reynaud really wanted to relieve Gamelin, but such an action was difficult due to the close relationship between Daladier and Gamelin. Reynaud depended on Daladier’s support to maintain his government, and he would defend Gamelin absolutely. On May 9th Reynaud finally pushed his chips to the middle and threatened to resign unless Gamelin was removed from command. This threat was not able to be acted on because on the next day the German attack would begin. Not exactly a ringing endorsement of the military by the Prime Minister just a few hours before the greatest threat to both the government and the military would begin. For all of his faults, Reynaud’s chosen successor, General Weygand would have his own problems which trust me we will get to. This points to final problem with the French military leaders in 1940 which we will discuss here: they were all infected with the same disease. All of the most senior French military commanders in 1940 harkened back to the days of victory in 1918, they were all taught how to win a way under the tutelage of Foch and Petain, they were variations on a theme, not a true break from tradition. The next generation of French military leaders, which would have been colonels or even captains during the First World War were not positioned during the interwar years as successors. One of the British representatives at French high command during the bad days of 1940 would write: “In the military corridors one runs into the same old faces one has encountered a generation earlier. Brigadiers are now army commanders, or Commanders-in-Chief; battalion commanders have divisions or corps; the captains of 1918 are now in command of brigades or divisions. But they have aged. Symbolically, here is Marshal Franchet d’Esperey, the virile hero of 1918, in his wheelchair, now aged eighty-three, and declaring to Spears and Harold Nicolson: ‘Well, gentlemen, you see a ghost revisiting the scenes of his past’; Gamelin, the heir to Joffre, is sixty-eight; Weygand, the shadow of Foch, seventy-three.” I think Spears might be placing too much important on age here, and the problem was more a lack of imagination and then a lack of ability to react to the situation, which probably came down more to personalities and abilities less than the exact year of birth.

That is probably enough about the French leaders for right now, it is a topic we will be bumping up against for all of these episodes, and so it is probably best to move on for now. The best topic to cover next would be what they planned to do in a war with Germany, what were the French war plans? French war plans come under a lot of criticism due to how the events of the German invasion would develop, and some of that criticism was certainly deserved. I think the general thrust of all of those criticisms, of which there are many books worth, is summarized the best by Robert A. Doughty in his book Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France when he wrote “The goal of France’s strategy was the avoidance of defeat, rather than the immediate gaining of victory.” This manifested in the Phoney War which we have already discussed in more than enough detail, but it also influenced the plans that the French military leaders had put in place for when the Germans attacked. The key to the entire plan was that as soon was war was declared it was assumed that one of the first acts of Germany would be to violate Belgian neutrality, and as soon as that happened the Belgian government would ask the French and British for assistance. At that moment the French Army Group 1, along with the troops of the British Expeditionary Force would race into Belgium to establish a line of defense along Dyle River and then along the Gembloux Gap. The belief was that by pushing troops in Belgium up to the line of the Dyle they would be able to meet the primary German thrust which would also be trying to push through Belgium, just like the German troops had done in 1914. Due to the belief that it would be these troops, moving through Belgium, that would be in the decisive area of the front they would have to be the best French troops. This included the best equipped and trained troops, and the units that were most heavily mechanized and motorized. If this plan worked it would accomplish two major French war goals, to push the fighting out of French territory as much as possible, and to meet the German attack and blunt it so that the front would settle down and the French could continue planning for their long term goals. There were two major problems with the plan, that would only be exacerbated by some of the changes to the plan in the months that followed: the ceding of the initiative to the Germans and the risks of the Germans attacking somewhere else. When it came to ceding the initiative to the Germans, this was seen as a problem by many military leaders, particularly those outside of British and French high command and closer to the front. The basic problem is that during the Phoney War the Western Allies were essentially letting the Germans plan and prepare for whatever they wanted to do, which fell directly into the German strengths of decisive concentrated action. One example of this would be Lieutenant General Alan Brooke, a Corps commander in the BEF at the time, although he would retire as a Field Marshal. In his diary he would write “The feeling the [War Office] give me is that whilst concentrating on ensuring that they are going to win the war in 3 years from now they neglect to realize the danger of losing it this year! … [W]e are courting disaster against an enemy who adheres to the doctrine of concentrating of effort at the vital point at the right time. To contemplate bombing the Ruhr at a time when the Germans are using their combined army and air force effort in one mighty uniform attempt to crush the French and British forces to clear their way into France, is in my mind sheer folly.” Even if this idea crept into the minds of the decision makes in either Army, the general feeling was that after the surrender of the Poles and the shift of German resources to the Western front, the period where offensive action was possible had passed. The other problem that the French plan caused was the fact that it was possible that, if the Germans attacked somewhere else, they would not be able to react. This was a problem with the Dyle Plan, simply because so much French and British strength was going to be moving into Belgium. This would be pointed out at several points in the years before the war, for example in May and June 1938 a major series of war games was conducted by the French Army and during those wargames the risk of a German attack through the Ardennes, quickly thrusting for the Meuse as Sedan, was suggested as a course of German action. At the time the French general in charge of that sector of the front in the wargame believed that if the Germans made this the central part of their plan they could reach Sedan in just 60 hours, a conclusion that was simply discarded as too pessimistic. But really, the commitment of so many French and British units into the thrust into Belgium introduced risk on any area of the front that the Germans would target outside of Belgium. In some ways the French were simply far too deep into the belief that the Germans would replicate what they had done in the last war, and it would lead to disaster. The risk of that disaster was greatly increased by the decision by General Gamelin to change the Dyle Plan after the war started and to introduce what was terms the “Breda Variant.” This change to the plan was done very late in the Phoney War, March 1940, and was driven generally by a feeling of confidence at French High Command. The Breda Variant meant that that French forces would push beyond the Dyle and instead would base their defensive line not in Belgium but the Netherlands, pushing the line even further from the French frontier. This change to the plan comes under a lot of, in my mind very justified, criticism not because of the more aggressive push forward, but instead what it meant for French force positions. In the original plan, the French Seventh Army, a formation that included some of France’s best troops, was repositioned. Previously it had been kept in reserve to meet any German attack, which was necessary because the French were planning to react to a German attack, and so they needed a strong formation to actual use in that reaction. But then the Breda variant was introduced and the Seventh Army, the strongest French reserve force was moved out of reserve and to the far left of the French line, reinforcing the French Army Group 1. The movement of these troops would have been just fine if the Germans really were planning to attack through Belgium, just more strength to meet the German advance. But if the Germans were planning to focus their strength anywhere else on the front, like for example the Ardennes, then a critical piece of the French reaction, a strong mobile force, would be missing. There was still a reserve for the French Army, but it was now mainly unmotorized infantry divisions, which meant that it would take longer to respond and would be less able to respond to a German armored attack. This was a mistake that lies mostly on Gamelin’s shoulders, as he was the one that developed the the new plan and he was the one who advocated for it and eventually was also the one that forced it to be the French plan. It is worth saying though, that it was not the cause of the French defeat, it is absolutely not a guarantee that the Seventh Army would have been able to react to the crossing at Sedan fast enough and with enough strength to stop it, but by committing his primary reserve force Gamelin was putting the French army in a position in which it could not react in any way to the German attack. If you are a military commander, nothing opens you up to criticism like not maintaining a reserve to react to an enemy’s attack, particularly if you commit your reserve before the enemy even attacks.

By 1940 the French General staff had spent at least 70 years fixating on the possibility of a German attack against France, from the days immediately following the Franco-Prussian war it was the most important topic of conversation among French military leaders. The creation of the Maginot line during the interwar years was specifically done to limit the possible offensive avenues for the German forces, essentially forcing them to go around the line to the north to avoid getting bogged down in the French fortifications. And yet, there was a complete denial of the possibility of an attack through the Ardennes due to the belief among most of the French military leadership that it would take too long to move troops through the area. This is something of a key point, none of the French military leaders believed that the Ardennes was impenetrable or that it could not be attacked through. There were roads through the forest, anything could move through the area. Instead what they believed was that it would take far too long for a strong German mobile force to advance on that road network, then concentrate for action on the other side. The slow movement through the area would be amplified by the plans of French and Belgian cavalry and advance troops to do everything they could to slow German progress, with roadblocks, the destruction of bridges, and whatever else could be done to block the roads that were the only way to move through the Ardennes. The general estimate was that it would take somewhere around 9 to 10 days for the Germans to move enough troops through the Ardennes before they would even seriously consider the possibility of crossing the Meuse either at Sedan or some other area. This would give the French military plenty of time to respond to any German advance in the area, over a week most likely which in the pre-war years felt like an eternity. And even if they could move faster than the 9 or 10 days, there were still French troops defending the river crossings, it would not be a pushover, and it would surely take some time for the Germans to concentrate forces before they tried to make the leap across the river. There was of course that exercise in 1938 that I mentioned earlier where a French general had predicted exactly what would happen in May 1940, but that seemed hard to believe and was written off as a general simply being far more aggressive in a war game where the stakes were so low. It is also important to mention that there were also many German military leaders that completely agreed with the French analysis of the situation. As late as February 1940 the German Chief of the General Staff General Halder was convinced that it would take just as long as the French thought before German troops would be able to cross the Meuse, 9 or 10 days. He would eventually shift in his thinking due to the evolution of the German plans in the last months before the invasion, but in both cases the Generals on both sides were following general military orthodoxy around the difficulty of moving troops through very constrained country against resistance. The goal of the French intelligence services was to try and determine where the Germans would attack, and they did make some progress in this regard before the start of the attack. There would be reports that that Germans had build some additional bridges in the areas that would enable the attack through the Ardennes. Aerial reconnaissance was another important conduit for information, with some aerial reconnaissance flights reporting a build up of German armor units in the areas east of Luxembourg. The problem was that all of these reports were counteracted by others that seemed to indicate a concentration of German forces for an attack in the north, exactly where the French believed the Germans would attack. With two different sets of information, the decision made was that the actions near the Ardennes must be a distraction. What the French did not know at this time was that they had it precisely backwards. Instead of the build up near the Ardennes being the distraction, the preparations in the north in Belgium and the Netherlands were instead being used to divert French attention away from the Ardennes.