178: Preparations for War

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During the period of the Phoney War the French and British would frantically prepare for the war that they were already in.

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Transcript

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 178 - The Fall of France - Preparations for War. This week a big thank you goes out to Blade for the donation and to Greg, Daryl, David, Phil, Curtis, JD, and Mark for choosing to support the podcast by becoming members, you can find out more over at historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members. When Britain and France entered the war on September 3, 1939 the fact that they were in a conflict with Germany was not a surprise, and in some ways they had been preparing for the conflict since the end of the First World War. And immediately when war was declared with pre-planned actions in London and Paris would begin as both nations began to move onto a war footing. This episode will focus on these actions immediately after the start of the war, when both the British and French began to mobilize their forces, work out the ways in which both nations would cooperate to defeat their common enemy, and they began to build support for the war among their populations. Unlike during the First World War these actions would have real time to be put into effect, with major fighting taking place until the fighting in Norway would begin in April and then the Germans would invade France in May. This time, often referred to as the Phoney War, was thought by both sides to be to their advantage, which was discussed last episode. One individual I will introduce here in episode 2, and which will pop up from time to time over the course of this series is a Frenchman, Marc Bloch. Bloch was a First World War veteran, and between the wars would be a relatively well known historian and he would still be in the French reserve in August 1939 when he was once again mobilized due to the threat of German attack. He would participate in the fighting throughout the course of the French campaign before joining the French resistance in the years that followed. In 1944 he would be executed by the Gestapo for those actions, which meant that he would not live to see his work, L’Étrange Défaite or Strange Defeat published in 1946. Strange Defeat would be an early attempt to try and determine why France had done so poorly during the German invasion of May 1940, and it has continued to interest historians for almost 80 years. Bloch’s theories and thoughts would also have an influence on the narrative of the French defeat in the decades that followed, with his first hand account also containing a strong intuition for what had happened and why. But Bloch would write his book after the defeat had already occurred, and perhaps a good place for this episode to start would be with the opinions of normal French citizens when war was first declared.

The experience around France in September 1939 was somewhat odd. During the First World War the French armies had marched off to the front and very soon thereafter news arrived of the Germans attacking into Belgium, and the French Army launching their own attacks in Alscace and Lorraine. But the war in 1939 was very different, with mobilization occurring due to the threats made by Germany in late August, and then Poland being invaded, and then the French army being mobilized and then….nothing. The people of France had little insight into the fact that the French government, along with their British allies, were preparing for a long war against Germany, one that would not be won in months but in years. There would be no talk of troops being home by Christmas, or even launching any real fighting by Christmas. While there was some logic in this approach, it did make it difficult to properly maintain public support for the war because none of the actions that had occurred seemed to manifest an obvious threat to France. Germany was not attacking in the West, and the Allies were not attacking either, so why was all of this even happening? These feelings were exacerbated by the views of the groups on the radical ends of politics in France, with the radical left leaning into their pacifist anti-war views while the radical right was concerned that France was going to let the Communist win by going to war with Germany. During the Phoney war the workers, and therefore those on the Left of French politics, were an important part of government planning because the factories were where a long term war would have to be won. This resulted in working hours being quickly increased up to 60 hours in some cases, and 72 hours in the armaments industries, and strikes were outlawed to try and keep labor in line. Pay rates were also frozen, and overtime pay was just pinned to normal pay levels. These moves were seen as essential for the future of France and to ensure French industrial output could match and surpass that of Germany. Even in these efforts there would be mistakes though, particularly around skilled workers, because in some cases large number of skilled workers were mobilized into the army at the start of the war, robbing the factories of their services just when they were needed most. One example of this happening was an artillery shell factory near Bourges in central France, which had so many of its workers mobilized that it was forced to reduce its delivery of shells by 90%, artillery shells, 90%. It was a well known problem for industry, and had been an important part of the First World War, and so the fact that so many skilled workers were sent to the front in the early weeks of the Second World War is largely inexcusable, especially due to the fact that there were no major French actions planned at the time. But over all of these mistakes, and the greater work being put in by workers all over France was the real problem, a lack of enthusiasm. When the troops marched to the front in 1914 it was a cause for celebration, in 1939 it was a cause for mourning, and even though there was general support for the government and for the troops it was far from the true enthusiasm of the earlier generation. This lack of enthusiasm would become very important when things started to go wrong.

The reactions among French soldiers to the mobilization was also quite different in 1939, with a general feeling of ‘Let’s get it over with’ being the feeling of the moment. One of the challenges that were faced by French officers is that their men had been mobilized multiple times over the preceding year, with each of the major European political crises resulting in at least some level of increased readiness in the French Army. This would lead one French officer of the 2nd North African Division to say “The men of the reserve come in without undue haste, without the enthusiasm of 1914, or even that of last year, being fully persuaded that they will be sent home in two weeks’ time, and annoyed at not being able to complete the harvest.” This feeling was shared by many of the French soldiers, and it did not help that when they arrived at their concentration areas near the border there was no fighting, and instead many of them were sent on harvest collection detail, or were simply used as construction troops. One French soldier would write during this period that the complete lack of fighting sapped the morale out of the men, particularly those that had volunteered to fight, writing “We are forced labourers rather than soldiers. I hardly ever see a rifle and only have the vaguest notion how our key weapons work and should be maintained.” The general lack of urgency meant that French mobilization would extend over the first six weeks of the war, with the movement and then the establishment of long term positions being quite slow outside of the areas where those positions were already in place like in the Maginot Line. The French were of course joined by their British allies in their mobilization efforts, which would begin immediately after the start of the war as well. In Britain there had been many conversations before the war about the size of the army and what the size of the army would be during the war. The two sides of the conversation were generally the political leaders on the side of a larger army and the military leaders on the size of a smaller army. That may seem a bit odd, but both sides were really pursuing different objectives with their desires for army size. From a political point of view it was important that as many divisions as possible be sent to France so that it was clear that the British were doing their part in the alliance. This caused the number 55 to begin to float around the corridors of power in London, with 55 divisions being seen as a good goal for the Army to aim for in its preparations. One of the problems is that to equip such a force over the span of roughly 2 years would require the British economy to outpace the full war economy that had been seen in 1918 when the British economy was reaching its peak of First World War production, figures that were simply impossible to reach in 1939 or 1940. The British Army, and particularly General Ironside the Chief of the Imperial General Staff wanted instead a smaller army of around 32 divisions. From a military perspective the concern was around equipping a larger force and then being able to keep it in the field, with the general feeling being that it was better to have a slightly smaller, better trained and equipped force, than a larger force that lacked equipment and training. But in both cases they were long term goals, because the Expeditionary Force that was sent to France was miniscule in comparison, just a handful of divisions that were sent to help the France. These troops, much like their French compatriots would spend most of the winter of 1939 and into 1940 working on digging new fortifications. There was also a good amount of training during those months, which was important for the army. But even the small force that was sent was generally ill equipped in some ways, for example it did not have enough anti-tank guns to equip all of its units and so it had to borrow some for the French, even though the French were also having troubles equipping all of their own divisions. One British lieutenant would say of the experience in 1940 that “As far as equipment was concerned, the harvest of the fruit of twenty years’ parsimony would find a scarce and rotten crop. Our only real assets were the sterling qualities of the officers and men, who, confronted with a desperate situation, willingly gave of their best.” which was not exactly a ringing endorsement of British planning and preparations. More and more British units would arrive in France over the course of the Phoney War, with the number eventually reaching a total of almost 400,000 by the time of the invasion, but around a third of that number, so around 130,000 were not combat troops and were instead support personnel. The good news for the British is that help would arrive from the Commonwealth if the war lasted into the middle or back half of 1940 because Australia and New Zealand would instantly join the war, with Canada joining not long after. South Africa would also join, although only after there was a change of government. Some other areas of British control, like Egypt, Ireland, and Iraq would stay out of the war initially, but some would soon be drawn in anyway. There would be a visit of representatives of many of the Dominions in late October 1939 to discuss British strategy, with the report being given to them attempting to justify the lack of British and French action during the last months of 1939. The report painted a pretty grim picture for the Dominion leaders, claiming that the Germans had the advantage in the air and on the ground in western Europe, and it was only at sea that the British and French held any real advantage. This had forced upon the Allies a period of inaction, with the hope that this would change in the future as Allied production fully came online, and support arrived from the Dominions that they represented. One final major source of fighting power would be present in France starting in late 1939: the Polish forces that had been able to escape through Romania. The first unit would be formed before the end of 1939, with the 5,000 man Highland Brigade being deployed to Norway in April. These efforts were lead by General Sikorski, who had also been able to escape through the Balkans, and he would being work on the creation of 2 infantry divisions. There are many instances where I do not agree with the criticisms of some leaders during this period in history, but the criticism aimed at the French around these Polish troops is something I fully support. The tens of thousands of Polish troops were ready and willing to fight, most of them had combat experience in Poland, and all of the officers had been involved in that fighting. The French took almost no advantage of any of them, not just in terms of using their fighting capabilities, but also trying to learn from their experience. This meant that they were mostly neglected, and by the time of the German invasion they were struggling to equip the units that had been formed. The support was so poor that many of the Polish pilots just gave up and moved to England, where they would join the RAF, much to the benefit of the RAF in the air battles during the Battle of Britain.

One of the major lessons learned by French and British leaders during the First World War was that in modern warfare it was critical for allies to work together as closely as possible. During the first half of the First World War the two nations had been hesitant to surrender their autonomy to enable truly joint efforts, which manifested in for example the two armies resisting the idea of putting their men under the command of the other army. This was completely changed in 1939 and for all of the criticism that can be levelled against the two governments the one that cannot is that they did not coordinate their efforts as much as possible. We have already discussed one of the ways that this manifested, which was the general support on both sides of the English Channel for a more defensive approach with both nations supporting the idea of a long war strategy. This was also very clear in the high level councils and committees that were setup immediately at the start of the war, like the Supreme War Council which was the highest body of cooperation which involved both Chamberlain and Daladier in their positions as Prime Ministers. There were then also collaborative groups for the military leaders, with representatives from both general staffs. They immediately got to work coordinating not just high level strategy but also detailed economic matters. Joint committees were created for supply, armaments, oil, aviation, and a host of other detailed topics with the goal of ensuring that the maximum possible value was achieved given the available resources. This included interactions with other nations, with some coordination of the purchases that were being made, primarily from America. At this point the Americans were very clearly in their Neutrality position, which would be formalized in November with the passage of the Neutrality acts which allowed all of the belligerents to purchase American goods, but only with cash and they would have to carry the goods on their own ships. While this was strictly neutral, it also meant that it clearly favored the Allies who largely controlled the sea lanes leading to Europe due to the power of the Royal Navy. Even with all of these acts of cooperation, all was not perfect within the Western Alliance during 1939, and a key point of contention especially for the French leaders was the scope of British commitment. Nothing could change the fact that the nation most at threat from the Germans was France, and they hoped that the British would show urgency in their preparations but this was not immediately apparent. There were very quickly financial restrictions put in place for the British economy including tight controls of the user of foreign currency and a limit on lending by banks to prevent speculation. But the first wartime budget was seen to be quite week from the perspective of the French, with tax rates increased from 27.5 to 37.5 percent which would raise somewhere around a billion bounds over the following 6 months. This, along with the rather small commitment of troops to the continent would lead the French Minister of Finance, and later Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud to tell the American ambassador that the goals of British policy was to ‘see French resources exhausted before there was a serious weakening on the part of Great Britain, so that at the end of this war, Great Britain could control the situation absolutely.’ While this was probably too harsh of terms, there was always some level of concern on the British side that they not commit too many resources to the defense of France with first assuring that there was enough at home to defend against a German attack. Nowhere was the lack of commitment evident, at least to the French, than in the commitment of British ground forces. Dating as far back as the 1920s the French knew that the British army was not large, and they understood that at least initially the number of British soldiers in France would be small, but the hope was that with the British efforts to motorize and mechanize their forces they would be able to contribute a small highly mechanized force that could be used as a highly mobile counterattack force. But throughout the 1930s this hope receded along with British military budgets. And instead it was replaced by a reality in which there would be just a few divisions, originally just 2 divisions moved to France in the first month of the war. This would eventually be increased, but the fact remained that the British Army was completely unprepared to fight a continental war, even less than it had been in 1914.

Another interesting area of cooperation between the two nations was around aircraft. In this area of preparations for fighting Germany all of the cooperation, and also feelings of an unequal commitment to the war, would come into play. The good news is that there was good cooperation around how the two nations interacted with America, which was seen as a key source of aircraft manufacturing capabilities. Both British and French orders would rapidly increase for American aircraft with the French ordering 2,000 aircraft and 6,000 engines and the British 1,300 aircraft and 1,200 engines by the start of 1940. There was another massive order placed by the two nations in March 1940 for full delivery in late 1941. In these purchases the two nations had agreed that the British would contribute 60% of the financial resources required to make the purchases, with the purchases being coordinated so that they were not price competing against each other. While this was good coordination, things were far from perfect when it came to air power among the two nations, with the biggest problem being that they were far less prepared than they wanted to be, particularly after the Germans had proven so clearly in Poland the importance of airpower. In both nations there was a strong series of disagreements about what kind of aircraft should be built, with the armies wanting close support craft, some in the air forces wanting as many bombers as possible, while others wanted to pump out fighters at the maximum possible speed. For the British these conversations also got wrapped up in their specific commitment to France, with there again being many schools of thought on what the best British policy should be. The Army wanted as many aircraft as possible on the continent to help defend its forces, which was completely logical, while the Air Ministry was far more concerned with retaining strength in Britain to preserve that strength for a future bombing campaign against Germany. The entire situation around Airpower for the two nations is a great example of their general unpreparedness for the war, on the French side they understood their lack of airpower but did not have the domestic production capacity to resolve the problem, on the British side they could build more aircraft but were not united in how those aircraft should be used.

One of the ways that the French government tried to counteract some of these concerns was through a public joint declaration from the two governments that there would not be a separate peace signed with Germany by the two nations. This was seen by the French government as a way to bolster the morale of the French public as it would more closely tie Britain’s actions to those of France. The agreement would be made in March 1940, after there had already been several opportunities for the two nations to end the war with Germany that they found themselves in. One of these opportunities would occur in October 1939 when Hitler made a speech before the Reichstag in which he suggested that the three nations come together and work out a peace deal. During the speech he would claim that he had no ill will towards the two nations and so they should end the war. This was loudly and publicly rejected by both Daladier and Chamberlain in the days that followed, with both nations make renewed public commitments to the war. These public commitments, combined with the inaction of the troops in France did not mean that the two nations were content to just fully wait for the Germans to attack them, and instead throughout the Phoney War there was one discussion that would be revisited several times, was it possible to get the Germans to fight the war somewhere else?